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SEA

THE ROUND TABLE

A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF
THE POLITICS OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE

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WAR AIMS

I. THE ESSENTIAL CONDITIONS OF PEACE.

THOUGH the omens are much brighter, the war is still at a critical stage. Germany and Austria-Hungary are clearly growing daily weaker in men. The Allies are clearly growing daily relatively stronger. Yet Germany still holds in her group Belgium, Northern France, Poland, and Russian territory beyond. There is still no sign of her military collapse, or that we are near the time when she will be unable to stem the tide running through the breaches in her defence by rushing her reserves from one threatened spot to another.

The war is now largely a war of attrition, not only in a military, but in an economic and financial sense, too. Hence the urgent importance of the utmost economy, public and private. If, while Germany husbands her resources and reduces the consumption of her people to the lowest possible point, we squander ours, we are loading the dice against ourselves. Unless we make far stricter economies and submit to far greater privations than we have hitherto, we shall be hard put to it to bear all the burdens we have undertaken for ourselves and for our Allies before our task is done.

For there can be no peace until the power of Germany to dictate to Europe under threat of war is overthrown, and until the national liberties which she has destroyed are restored. So far as we can tell, we are not yet within measurable grasp of attaining these terms. Yet they

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are the *sine qua non* of peace. By her victories in the field Germany has secured a position from which she would be able to dominate Europe if she could retain it, or anything like it, at the peace. As Napoleon pointed out, all war is for position, and Germany to-day has won the position which her rulers need. If the terms offered by the Chancellor in April last—the Mittel-Europa terms—were to be the basis of settlement, Germany would control such resources in men and material that she would still be able to tear up treaties, and challenge all the peoples of Europe in war if they attempted to thwart her will. And that machine, of which autocracy coupled with conscription are the essential parts, and upon which Prussian absolutism rests, would be extended to include many new victims within its grasp.

Therefore, we can but go on enduring the strain and sacrifice of war, until Germany has been driven to accept a territorial settlement which will compel her to abandon all hope of becoming paramount in Europe. Until that is accomplished it is useless to think of peace, or to believe that any effective system for basing the security of nations on a collective guarantee of public right defined by treaty can possibly be contrived. The war came about because Germany believed that, with Austria-Hungary, she could master Europe. Her whole national purpose and policy is still to reach, sooner or later, that goal. She believes, consciously and deliberately, in the struggle for existence and dominion among nations, and until she has been forced to acknowledge that conscience and the love of liberty in other nations are motives strong enough to make it impossible that she should ever attain to supreme power, she will not agree to the preliminaries necessary to any reign of public right, she will not accept an equal status in the family of nations with all other sovereign States, great and small, or recognise that international problems must be settled by free negotiation between civilised States, and not by the over-mastering dictation of a single Power.

The Essential Conditions of Peace

It is not difficult to determine the point when the essential condition of the victory for which the Allies are fighting will have been gained. It will be when not only Belgium and Serbia are freed, but when the number of non-Germans under the control of Berlin has been so reduced that it ceases to be possible for Germany to think of conquering all Europe in arms. Her original chance of victory depended upon her having control, through her Magyar Allies, of the 50,000,000 people of Austria-Hungary. Her present hopes centre upon her keeping control of the even greater numbers of Mittel-Europe. When her political and military control over her neighbours is destroyed Germany will cease to be a menace to the world. However much her rulers may wish it, they will never be able to dream of establishing a despotism over Europe under threat of war. Then we can negotiate about the less essential conditions of peace. The primary object with which we went to war will have been achieved. And the kultur of militarism will be discredited among men.

Then, but then only, shall we be able to go forward and endeavour, in co-operation with other nations, to create an adequate guarantee for public right in the world. This will not be done by high-sounding conferences, nor by well-meaning agreements which have for their purpose the disarming or weakening of the policemen among nations. It will be done by embodying in treaties, such as that which neutralised Belgium, or which might reaffirm the national liberties secured under the Monroe Doctrine, practical safeguards for the liberties and rights of the civilised world. When the Great Powers have erected these practical safeguards for public right, and, in addition, have made them effective by undertaking, severally and jointly, not only to enforce them, but also to be sufficiently prepared to be able to do so with certain success, there will be good hope for lasting peace. Most people now recognise that preparedness to defend the right is the best security for peace. If the Allies win, the

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peace settlement itself will be the most important of all the safeguards of public right. To make "the enthronement of public right," of which Mr. Asquith recently spoke, a permanent reality, it will then only be necessary to obtain the signatures of all the great nations to the most essential of the terms of peace. We shall then have taken the vital step of basing peace upon a combination of nations to maintain respect for treaties, which protect not only their own rights, but the rights of all nations, instead of upon the precarious, and indeed illusory, foundation of the balance of power. No real progress, however, can be made towards this goal until the militarist obstacle in Central Europe has been destroyed. The greatest contribution which we can make at this moment towards lasting peace is to endure till the attempt of Germany to dominate Europe by military means has been definitely overthrown.

II. ECONOMIC POLICY

MUCH controversy over the economic policy to be pursued after the war has been provoked by the report of the Allied Economic Conference at Paris. Up to the present there has been nothing approaching a general agreement on any practical scheme. But certain valuable conclusions have emerged from the discussion. First and foremost, there is general recognition of the paramount importance of seeing that the control of the so-called staple or "key" industries, and of the production of the raw materials necessary for them throughout the Empire, should be kept in the hands of British citizens, and that all the key industries necessary to the life and safety of the Empire should be adequately conducted within its boundaries. Secondly, it is clear that the development of the unparalleled resources of the British Empire should be undertaken on a far more consistent plan than in the past. The

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conservation and development of the economic resources of the Empire under the supervision of something like an economic general staff representative of and in touch with all local governments is of vital importance.

But when we come to examine other proposals, especially those connected with the tariff, it is more difficult to see the way clearly. It is as foolish as it is impossible to base a policy on the idea of treating Germany as if it was the Sahara. It is always far better to concentrate attention on perfecting one's own methods than on hampering one's rival. And this is as true of nations as of individuals. Nor is it practical politics to inaugurate a system of four-decked tariffs, as anybody who has had any experience of tariff-making and its effects will agree. Further, as a general economic proposition, it is certainly true that while every nation ought to develop every aspect of its national resources and productivity to the utmost, and may often usefully adopt protective measures for that end, it is of benefit to all nations that international trade should be as widespread and rapid as possible. Nothing is to be gained by dividing the world into economic watertight compartments, or restricting international trade. And no such policy could possibly last even if it were adopted, and necessarily adopted, for the period of reconstruction after a war.

Indeed, the greatest objection to most of the schemes which have been put forward is that they are based not on sound economic principle, but either on indignation with Germany, or the desire to make profit with the minimum of effort to ourselves. Both motives are fatal. The war itself is our effort to deal with German "frightfulness," and we must go on with the war until justice is done. But if we do that the peace terms will themselves be the German punishment, and will discredit, and so eventually destroy among the Germans themselves the evil system by which they have been ruled. If we do our work thoroughly now it

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will be unnecessary to attempt to go on with the process after peace has been signed. Similarly, with much of the agitation for Protection. If there is one lesson the war has taught us it is that our failures were due to conservatism and lack of enterprise among manufacturers, and "ca' canny" and restriction of output among the workers. The real security for our industrial prosperity can never be Protection, but vigour and enterprise and adaptability in management, the application of science to industry, and hearty and friendly co-operation between management and labour. It is better direction, better relations between capital and labour, a greater sense of industry as a public service on both sides, and not tariffs, which really matter. In so far as Protection is demanded as the shield of slovenliness, slackness, bad work, and an easy-going life, it simply means the encouragement of the vices which nearly betrayed us before the war.

Stringent measures may be necessary in the period of reconstruction. The so-called process of pacific penetration must be definitely stopped. Even after the intermediate period Protection may be useful to prevent dumping, to give a secure home market for the great fundamental industries, to foster agriculture, and to promote inter-Imperial trade. But however valuable discussion may be in the meanwhile, it is not possible to determine finally what is the right fiscal policy to adopt until we can see the actual conditions after the war. Fiscal policy is not a matter of eternal principle but of practical national advantage. There is a danger to-day of Protection being accorded as much fetish worship as was Free Trade in many quarters before the war. The aim of everybody should be to make the Empire as prosperous and well developed and united as possible. But the real foundation of its future can never be artificial measures against Germany or any other Power, but must be the enterprise, the education, and the hard work of its own citizens. In so far as the controversy has awoken us to

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this fact, and to the necessity of grappling with the problem of controlling our industries and developing vigorously our Imperial resources, it is all to the good. But it is the wonderful spirit of unity and work evoked among all classes and in all parts by the war, rather than the shattering of ancient economic shibboleths, which is the real hope, or rather the sure foundation, of rapid recuperation and progress after peace has been signed.

IRELAND AND THE EMPIRE ✓

EARLY in Easter week, 1916, the world was startled to hear that on Easter Monday, April 24, an armed insurrection had broken out in Dublin, and that an Irish Republic had been proclaimed. Thereafter the censorship cut off practically all communication, and save for statements in Parliament which suggested that the trouble was something of the nature of a mob rising, difficult to deal with owing to the advantages which modern weapons gave to street fighting, little more was known until the unconditional surrender of the insurgents on April 29 was announced. Even after that no coherent account of the significance and extent of this republican rising was given and people's attention rapidly returned to the war, when a steady trickle of military executions between May 3 and May 12 recalled it to Ireland. These executions, together with the deportation of many of the rebels to England, caused a violent revulsion of feeling, especially in Ireland and America, as it appeared that the British Government was taking a vindictive revenge for a political rising of no great importance.

The Prime Minister then went to Ireland and as the outcome of a week's visit reported to Parliament that Castle government had broken down and that all parties were agreed upon the importance of taking advantage of the situation to effect a settlement of that perilous if ancient Home Rule controversy which had brought Ireland to the verge of civil war in July, 1914. Mr. Lloyd George was entrusted with the negotiations, and shortly afterwards it was announced that a settlement had been arrived at on

The Anglo-Irish Problem

the basis that the Home Rule Act was to be brought into immediate operation, but that six Ulster counties were to be excluded from its operation. At the same time it was made clear that this arrangement was necessarily in part provisional, and that the assistance of the Imperial Conference was to be invoked after the war to effect a final settlement. After some weeks of heated controversy in Ireland and London, the proposed settlement broke down on the ostensible ground that the British Government had gone back on the pledges given to the Nationalist party by Mr. Lloyd George. Castle government was then restored, presumably for the duration of the war.

In the history of these eventful months there is much that is obscure, much that has revived passions too long fed on memories of a tragic past, and much that may give rise to renewed bitterness in the future, unless misunderstandings are removed. In this article therefore an attempt will be made to tell the whole story accurately and in perspective, and to recall attention to the permanent and unchangeable facts which must govern the settlement. For this purpose it is necessary to begin with a brief outline of the history of Anglo-Irish relations, and of the Home Rule controversy. This will give us the true proportions and significance of the rising itself and of the failure of the settlement recently attempted, and will enable us to estimate the fundamentals of the problem which will confront the united wisdom and talent of the Empire after the war.

I. THE ANGLO-IRISH PROBLEM

THE peculiar difficulty of the apparently eternal Anglo-Irish problem arises from two facts—facts which both sides have attempted to ignore or overcome, but which none the less dominate the situation to-day as they have dominated it for the past seven hundred years.

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The first fact is that, since men learnt how to travel safely upon the seas, the peoples of Ireland and Great Britain have been inseparably interrelated. As all the experience of history shows, the one thing they could never do was to turn their backs for good on one another. Their relations could be based on hostility or friendship. They could maintain a jealous independence and paralyse one another and exhaust themselves by the armaments and foreign alliances necessary to the maintenance of that independence, or they could unite as one people for common defence, and for the promotion and adjustment of their common interests. But the eternal facts of geography were there to prevent them from ever succeeding in disentangling the fortunes of the one from the fortunes of the other.

The second fact is that Ireland has always differed from Great Britain in civilisation. At first her people were far behindhand. They had never experienced the benefits of Roman rule, or of the Norman conquest, as the people of Britain had done. And, largely through the earlier failure of the English to do their duty by their less fortunate brethren, as the difference in the level of civilisation rapidly diminished after the Union, it was replaced by a difference in national character, sentiment, and ideals, in the Irish majority, which is still the most obvious fact of the political situation.

Amid the welter of passions and hatred which the study of Anglo-Irish history almost always arouses, it is easy to lose sight of these fundamental facts. But they have governed the situation in the past, they govern it to-day, and they will continue to govern it in the future. Indeed, the more the history of Ireland is studied the more clearly does it appear that the terrible record of conquest and repression, confiscation, rebellion and massacre, arises not from the special or deliberate malignancy of one people, or the incorrigible defects of the other, but from the failure of fallible and passionate human beings to accommodate

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their theories or desires to these facts. For all their political genius the English have never fully realised that Ireland is not part of Great Britain and have failed to accommodate their system of government to this truth. For all their quickness of understanding and sympathy, the Irish have never finally abandoned the ideal of living unto themselves alone. So vital, indeed, is a recognition of these truths to a settlement in the future that it is worth while to trace their operation through Anglo-Irish history in somewhat more detail.

II. ANGLO-IRISH HISTORY TO THE UNION

IN the early days, before either England or Ireland had attained to any sort of national unity, and while intercommunication was infrequent and slow, the question of political relations did not arise. But no sooner was England united by the military and political genius of the Normans than it immediately became important. And it arose in this form. The turbulent native chiefs of Ireland, for ever fighting among themselves, saw in the armoured Norman warriors, with their disciplined retainers and their powerful long bows, valuable allies, and invited them over to help them in their own quarrels. Henry II. of England, short of land with which to reward his followers, and anxious that they should not turn their restless energies against himself, encouraged them to seek their fortunes across the seas. Strongbow and his friends, however, once invited to Ireland, found that the Irish were almost impotent against their own superior military methods and equipment, and rapidly acquired, by marriage, force or as rewards for services rendered, large fiefs for themselves. Henry then found that so far from diminishing the danger he had but increased it, for the Normans of Ireland threatened to become as much of a menace to the kingdom of England as he and his ancestors had been to the kingdom of

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France. Accordingly in 1171 he crossed over, made himself overlord of Ireland, exacting homage, not only from the Normans but from the majority of the Irish chiefs as well, exactly as William the Conqueror had done from his barons after 1066. A second factor making in the same direction was the Church. The Papacy, then approaching the zenith of its influence and power, looked askance at the unorthodox Celtic Church, and was anxious to bring it more effectually under the control of Rome. As long before as 1155, Adrian IV., in a Bull in which he claimed to dispose of "all islands of the Globe," encouraged Henry to the conquest of Ireland in these terms :

We do hold it good and acceptable that, for extending the borders of the Church, restraining the progress of vice, for the correction of manners, the planting of virtue, and the increase of religion, you do enter this country, and execute therein whatever shall pertain to the honour of God, and welfare of the land : and that the people of this land receive you honourably, and reverence you as their lord.

Thus at a very early stage we find that combination of Irish forces, English forces, and European forces, which has continued to operate ever since, compelling the establishment of some ordered system of political relations between the two peoples.

Henry II., however, found that while the establishment of the principle that England and Ireland were to be one kingdom was comparatively simple, the introduction of a proper government in Ireland was very difficult. In the fifth and sixth centuries there had sprung into being a flourishing Celtic Church, which had sent many missionaries to Europe, but the country had never attained to political unity. There were no roads such as the Romans had made in England, bringing all parts of the country into touch with one another. Impassable forests and bogs cut across communications in all directions. Before good government could be introduced

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not only was it necessary to make roads, but to transform Irish society. In Ireland the tribal system reigned supreme—a system which enables a people to live in happiness so long as it is content to live in primitive conditions, but which is inconsistent alike with national unity and with progress. “The tribe is an embryonic state limited by the fact that its essential bond of blood relation arrests its development at the point beyond which its members cease to be sensible of their kinship.” * Moreover, the communal tenure of land, by giving no security for individual enterprise, was then, as it is to-day in Africa, an insuperable barrier to agricultural development. And Brehon custom by clinging to the idea of compensation for wrong done, in opposition to the higher idea of obedience to law, as embodying the eternal principle of justice, was utterly inconsistent with the growth of an organised society.

These customs had been destroyed in England by the Roman occupation, the Church and the Norman conquest, and the creation of an organic state by William I. was comparatively easy. But in Ireland all this preliminary work had still to be done. And this work the Normans were never able to do. It was not until the reign of Henry VIII. that any serious attempt was made to establish a proper government for the whole of Ireland, and it was not until the time of Charles I. that Strafford, with the high-handed methods common to the day, was able to make it effective. During all this time, while England was making steady progress under the reign of law, with an evergrowing security for individual liberty and enterprise, Ireland was paralysed. English law and government were precariously established within the ever changing limits of the Pale; tribal custom and Brehon law were, until Tudor times, practically undisturbed in the more remote parts; while the confusion was increased by an undeterminate zone in which Anglo-Norman chiefs, largely influenced by native

* *The Commonwealth of Nations*, Part I., p. 7, by L. Curtis.

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Irish customs and ideas, acted now as English nobles, now as semi-independent Irish chiefs. There was no unity, no steady government, no equal security for life and property. The real trouble was not that the kings of England governed Ireland too much, but that they governed her too little. In establishing the unity of the two kingdoms they had done the right thing, but they never went on to do for Ireland what the Normans did for the English, or the English themselves have done for India: they never laid the foundations of national progress and unity by creating an efficient administration and introducing an effective reign of law.

Unfortunately, no sooner was a real government established, than Ireland, having scarcely emerged from tribalism, with no national consciousness, became in the seventeenth century, the helpless victim of the forces which were convulsing England and Europe. It was the age not only of the religious wars, but of the repeated attempts of the great despotisms of Spain and France to stifle the restless independence of the nascent English democracy, and of the long struggle between absolutism and constitutional government in Britain itself. In both cases the Irish, as was inevitable in their backward condition, threw themselves into the fray on the side of reaction. They became the pawns in the diplomacies of Spain and France and a chief support of Stuart intrigue. And at every point the struggle was intensified and embittered by religious passion. It was a ruthless and a bloody time—the era of Alva, the Inquisition, the massacre of St. Bartholomew—and England, fighting for its existence, was in no mood to allow its hopes of constitutionalism and its own liberty to be imperilled by an alliance between the forces of reaction and a backward people. Ireland was “pacified” with all the rigour of the time. Her sufferings in those savage days were as terrible as any in the history of the world.

They served, too, only to make the Anglo-Irish problem more difficult. Broken by war and massacre, driven from

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their lands to the fastnesses of hills and bogs, the Irish became indeed an almost barbarous people. In these circumstances, Cromwell, as others before him, believed that the best way of making Ireland an orderly and prosperous part of the United Kingdom, would be to plant settlements of vigorous Puritan and Ironside stock all over the country as the bones about which the flesh of a new and more healthy national life might grow. But the gulf between the new England which had come into being between Shakespeare's day and the Bill of Rights and the Anglo-Irish was too deep. The plantations only resulted in the creation of a Protestant population, owning land all over Ireland, but concentrated in Ulster and around Dublin, and separated by interest and religion from the rest of the community. And on the ascendancy of this community the government of Ireland for the whole of the eighteenth century came to rest. Ireland at last had a government, but it was a government of a Protestant caste. The mass of the Irish people not only had nothing to do with the government, but were depressed and humiliated by the penal laws. No Catholic could acquire land, nor inherit it by primogeniture. No Catholic could hold any public office or vote for Parliament, or act as solicitor, sheriff, gamekeeper or constable. No Catholic schools were tolerated, and only the ordinary clergy were allowed in the country—bishops and the regular Orders were forbidden to enter under pain of high treason. Thus from a condition in which she suffered from an insufficiency of government, Ireland passed through a vale of tears to a condition in which her people were artificially depressed by a strong government in the interests of Protestantism and of the Protestant minority.

It was manifest that this state of affairs could not last. It was the Protestant minority itself which forced the change. From very early days there had always been a Parliament, mainly consisting of Anglo-Irish, meeting in Dublin to advise the King. For a century this had

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been wholly representative of the Protestant minority. So secure did this minority feel that it was the Protestant Volunteers who, inspired by the growth of constitutionalism in England, wrung from the nerveless hands of the British government in 1782 the abolitions of restrictions on Irish trade, the reversal of Poynings' law, and the recognition of the legislative independence of the Irish Parliament. This concession, however, obtained almost by force from a government which was harassed by the American revolution, a disastrous war with France, and the menace of the armed neutrality of the North, was passed without any regard for the fundamentals of the situation. The arrangement of 1782 was defective in two ways. In the first place it still left the great majority of the Irish people in the position of a subject people. The Irish Parliament mitigated some of the worst Catholic disabilities, but it was persistently and resolutely determined to maintain the Protestant ascendancy. Of its 300 seats, only a hundred were "open"—that is, subject to popular control. The rest were the property of the Crown or of a few individuals. And an Act enfranchising Catholic voters still forbade Catholics to sit in Parliament. In the second place, instead of placing the relations between Great Britain and Ireland on a permanent footing, it made deadlock or separation inevitable. So long as the Crown was the real sovereign power, the Union of the Crowns was sufficient to ensure that both English and Irish policy was subordinated to the needs of the United Kingdom as a whole. But directly Parliament became sovereign, one of two things had to happen: either the Irish Parliament had to accept the authority of the British Parliament in all Anglo-Irish affairs, or it was bound to enter upon a course which could only end in the coercion or independence of Ireland. For as soon as it refused to pass the Acts required to give effect to foreign policy, to measures necessary to the common defence, or to treaty engagements, the government of the United Kingdom would be paralysed.

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These inexorable alternatives did not at once appear, because the Irish Executive was responsible to the British Cabinet and not to the Irish Parliament, and because by corruption and otherwise it could practically always command a majority. But the movement for Catholic emancipation, coupled with the growing demand that the Irish Executive should be responsible to the Irish Parliament, which followed the United Irishmen campaign, exposed the essential defects of the Declaratory Act of 1783. And the renewed attempt of the French Directory and Bonaparte to take advantage of Irish disaffection in order to strike at their most inveterate foe brought matters to a head. The rebellion of 1798, though repressed with not less vigour by the Irish Parliament than the English Executive, forced Pitt to put Anglo-Irish relations on a more stable basis than that afforded by the capacity of the British Executive to persuade, cajole, or bribe a purely Protestant legislature to pass Acts necessary to the peace, order and safety of the United Kingdom. He decided to follow the Scottish precedent, and an Act for the legislative union of the three kingdoms was carried through the Irish Parliament in 1800 in a final orgy of bribery and corruption.

The Act of Union is often abused, especially in Ireland. But on any fair examination of the facts it was the only course to adopt. Its primary merit was that it restored in the only way possible, now that Parliament and not the King were the paramount authority in the realm, that necessary unity in Anglo-Irish affairs which had obtained since 1172. As we have seen, the ideal of separation is not only suicidal but impossible. It is suicidal because it would mean the substitution of armaments and foreign intrigue for the deliberations and decisions of a common Parliament as the method of adjusting Anglo-Irish relations and interests. It is impossible because, if the British people are still to be responsible for the unity, good government and safety of the Empire as a whole, they can

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never allow that Irish harbours and ports should be liable to be used as the bases for foreign fleets. The Act of Union established for ever the sound principle that the common affairs of the British Isles must be regarded and treated as a single whole.

But the Act of Union had other overwhelming advantages. As is obvious from the history we have recorded, it was not the policy of treating Great Britain and Ireland as one country for common purposes which was wrong, but the policy of treating Ireland itself as an appendage of Great Britain, and governing its people not primarily with the view of enabling them to develop a prosperous and progressive society of their own, but of benefiting England, or a racial or religious minority resident in Ireland. To this evil system the Act of Union delivered two death-blows. In the first place, it made possible Catholic emancipation; for whereas no statesman could contemplate the sudden substitution of a Catholic ascendancy for a Protestant ascendancy in an Irish Parliament, in view of the ignorance and backwardness to which the Penal Laws had reduced the Catholic peasantry, it was possible to enfranchise them for a common Parliament in which the Irish representatives were only one-sixth of the whole. It was Pitt's intention to follow up the Act of Union with an immediate measure for Catholic emancipation, but this he was prevented from doing by George III., who regarded it as contrary to his Coronation oath, and Catholic Emancipation, which was really part of the Union settlement, was not passed until 1829. In the second place, the Union for the first time placed Ireland on all fours with England. Though many years passed before the full change was realised, Ireland has since 1800 been in principle treated not as a dependency but as part and parcel of one kingdom, sharing in its resources and its responsibilities, and since 1829 the Irish have occupied the same status as the inhabitants of England or Scotland or Wales. After centuries of disaster, fundamentally due to

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the immense difficulties inherent in the contact between peoples of different levels of civilisation, it has been the long series of Acts of the Union Parliament, abolishing tithe, disendowing the Protestant Church, introducing local government, improving the congested districts, and, after many half-measures, expropriating the descendants of those who had been "planted" on confiscated Irish soil as an English and Protestant garrison, which, despite lamentable failures, especially in the famine, have succeeded in largely overcoming those conditions of political, social and economic backwardness which have always lain at the root of the Irish problem.

III. THE HOME RULE MOVEMENT

IF the Act of Union and Catholic Emancipation placed the relations between the people of Great Britain and the people of Ireland on a permanent and sound basis, that of equality both of status and of representation in the Parliament which dealt with their common affairs, they did little to remove the sense of national difference between the majority of the Irish and their Protestant neighbours. That difference, as we have seen, has always dominated every phase of Irish history from the earliest days. The Act of Union, and all the measures of administrative reform which have been passed since, have failed to undermine the persistent consciousness in the Irish majority that they are a separate nationality.

We need not consider in detail the causes of that persistence. It is partly a difference in race, though the infusion of Anglo-Norman blood has been so great that the difference is far less than is commonly supposed. It is largely Gaelic tradition unconsciously handed down from parent to child. It is in great measure the memory of wrong with the consciousness of present disability in education and attainment due in part to that wrong. It is most of all, perhaps,

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the difference in religion, for the overwhelming mass of Catholic Ireland is Roman Catholic, the overwhelming mass of Unionist Ireland is Protestant. But, however it may be explained, Irish nationalism has been the most obvious and immovable fact in the Irish situation for the last fifty years.

Up to 1870 it had been mainly concerned to secure repeal of the Act of Union. It was not until that year that nationalism solidified into its present shape of the demand for Home Rule. Home Rule is not in essence an attempt to reverse the Union settlement. It accepts the principle that the common affairs of the United Kingdom should be handled by a common Parliament. It rather demands the completion of the process by the separation of Union affairs from national affairs, and the transference of the control of those national affairs to an Irish Parliament. The Home Rule movement is fundamentally one for the modification of the Union constitution by introducing into it the principle of federation, a system of government invented by the Americans in the last years of the eighteenth century, which has now become the basis of the Canadian and Australian constitutions, but which was too novel and untried an expedient to be adopted in 1800, and would in any case have been rendered impossible by the religious situation.

For forty years the controversy has raged. The Home Rulers have based their case on three main grounds. First, on the ground already discussed—viz., that the Irish are, in fact, a separate people, and that they are therefore entitled to the control of their own internal affairs if they wish it. Second, that Ireland is a different country, and that the attempt to govern it as part of the United Kingdom, through a British Government and Parliament wholly settled in London, has been a failure. They point out that the majority of every Cabinet and Parliament know nothing of Ireland, that they care little about it, that they are overloaded with more urgent and more important work con-

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nected not only with Great Britain, but with the Empire and the outside world, and that in consequence every measure of reform has been long overdue, has been extracted only by vicious agitation, and has usually been spoiled by prejudice or ignorance in the passing. They point also to a long series of administrative blunders from the mis-handling of the famine to the abdication of government by Mr. Birrell. They contend that Ireland would progress far faster if its people were left to administer their own affairs for themselves. Thirdly, of recent years another argument has gained many supporters. At first many responsible Irishmen agreed with the Unionists that the Irish electorate was not sufficiently educated to be entrusted with the control of its own affairs, especially while the land question was unsettled. But education—defective as it has been—the experience gained under the Local Government Acts, and, above all, the expropriation of landlord rights under the Land Act of 1903, and the conversion of tenant right into ownership, has, in their opinion, wrought a great change. They contend that if the majority of the Irish are politically backward, are lacking in enterprise, are easily swayed by agitation and phrases, these defects have been intensified by a system which compels them to obtain what they desire by factious pressure on England, and that to throw upon them the responsibility for government is alike the best cure for these defects and the only foundation of individual self-respect and national self-confidence. It is responsible government, following after a period of good government, that has made the Anglo-Saxon world what it is to-day. It is the same prescription which will redeem the Irish world to-morrow.

The Unionists have resisted Home Rule also on three grounds. In the first place, that it would be inconsistent with the safety of the Empire. They have always believed that the Home Rule agitation was popular, not through any belief in federalism, but as a stepping-stone towards independence; and they have also believed that anti-

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English feeling was so strong that a national government in Dublin would be driven to hinder Imperial defence, if not actually to assist a foreign enemy, in the event of war. In the second place, they have objected to Home Rule on the ground that it would mean the creation of a Catholic ascendancy in Ireland, and that in such circumstances misgovernment by a relatively ignorant peasantry, ruled by religious prejudice, would render the condition of the minority intolerable. In the third place they have supported the existing Union settlement on its merits. They have had little sympathy with the sentiment of nationality. In their eyes what matters most has been the reign of law, the security for life and property and therefore for individual enterprise, and they point out that this could not be better than it is under good Castle government. They admit that Castle government has been slow, but they contend that this has been due to the failure of the Irish Nationalist representatives to do anything but agitate for Home Rule: and that had they identified themselves with the general work of legislation and reform in Parliament—even while pressing for Home Rule—these defects would have been remedied long ago. They point to the rapid development of Ulster and ask what there has been in the system of government to prevent the rest of Ireland progressing in the same way. Finally, in view of the violence of religious and party feeling in Ireland, they believe that the government of Ireland by a common Parliament as part of one kingdom, with the security it affords for toleration and good government, and against either party in Ireland acquiring an ascendancy, is still the best system, and that to throw Ireland back to the play of party and religious strife, and to the misgovernment which they believe a Home Rule government under the control of a politically inexperienced majority is bound to entail, would be a service neither to Ireland nor to the Empire. In their eyes the Union was not the government of Ireland by England, but the government of the United Kingdom by

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the representatives of the United Kingdom. Most of them believed that "twenty years of resolute government" would open the eyes of the Irish majority to this fact, and so dispel what seemed to them a natural but fundamentally unsound prejudice.

By 1885 the Liberal majority was converted to Home Rule. But the methods of violence which played some part in effecting that conversion served to alienate the electorate. Murder, intimidation and agrarian outrage seemed to prove all that the Unionists contended, and after two failures the policy of Home Rule fell into abeyance for nearly twenty years. It was revived in 1911 under far more favourable circumstances. The Land Act of 1903, progress in education and local government, the general attitude of Irishmen towards Great Britain had softened prejudice on all sides. It is probably true that these facts, coupled with the undiminished persistence of the Parliamentary demand for Home Rule, had converted a considerable majority of the democracy of Great Britain to the view that if adequate safeguards for Imperial defence, for religious toleration and for the rights of the minority could be provided, Home Rule was the right settlement of the Irish question. Unfortunately for all concerned the Liberal and Nationalist majority made a grave mistake. Fresh from their victory at the polls and flushed by the passage of the Parliament Act, they set out to make a far-reaching constitutional change by party means. The Home Rule Act which they introduced was not an ordinary piece of legislation. It was the gravest measure of constitutional reform since the Union Act itself, for it proposed not only to set up a national government in Ireland, but to withdraw the Protestant minority in Ireland from the control of the British Parliament and put them within the power of a Dublin Parliament overwhelmingly Catholic. This is a measure which in any country possessed of a written constitution would have involved the use of the special procedure invariably required for constitutional

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changes. Yet in this case the Parliamentary majority set out to make the change, not only without consulting that quarter of the Irish population most affected, but without even allowing the electorate to pass judgment upon the proposal. It was inevitable that such a departure from Liberal and constitutional principle should bring the country to the verge of civil war.

It is not possible to realise the situation without understanding how different the Ulstermen feel themselves from the rest of Ireland. There is, first of all, the difference in religion, a difference which has been at the back of all their history, and is recorded with pride in Orange celebrations from year to year. There is also the difference in civilisation. The Ulstermen are partly a progressive farming people, extraordinarily like the Lowlanders of Scotland in speech and habits of life, and partly a vigorous manufacturing community far more like those of the north of England, or even a modern Canadian city, than the rest of Ireland. Finally, there is the difference in economic interest. Their main business interests and prospects are not with the rest of Ireland, but with Great Britain and countries overseas. For all these reasons Ulstermen regard themselves as far nearer northern England or Lowland Scotland than Nationalist Ireland. Hence when the Home Rule majority set out, without any reference to the electorate, to cut them off from Great Britain, and place them under a Dublin Parliament which they were convinced would not only be intolerant of their religion, but incapable of providing for their economic development, if they did not actually ruin it by folly or differential taxation, they prepared to resist the authority of the Dublin Parliament in arms. The Covenant pledging them to do this was quickly signed, and within a short time there were 100,000 Volunteers in training and under arms. The Government, manifestly uneasy at being committed to a policy involving coercion of one quarter of Ireland, but finding it difficult

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to give way at a challenge which they were at first inclined to regard as a bluff, designed to destroy Home Rule altogether, did nothing to stop these manifest preparations for armed resistance to the law. Nationalists then organised an armed force as a counter demonstration to the Ulster Volunteers. Having tolerated the one, the Government could not take strong steps against the other, and Ireland began rapidly to assume the aspect of an armed camp. By this time the Government had recognised that the coercion of Ulster into Home Rule was impossible, and made proposals for enabling the Northern counties to vote themselves for a time out of the operation of the Act. But a concession which might have served as a basis of negotiation in the beginning came now too late. Various ugly incidents occurred. The Buckingham Palace Conference followed. This final attempt at agreement also broke down, not so much, it would seem, on the inability of the leaders to agree, but because feeling had grown so high that the rank and file of both parties in Ireland were beyond reason and control. Ireland was on the verge of civil war when the greater calamity of the war in Europe silenced discord, and a truce was proclaimed.

It will serve no useful purpose to estimate where the blame for this series of events lies, and how it should be apportioned between Liberals and Unionists, Nationalists and Ulstermen. The decision to resist the law is the gravest and most dangerous to the body politic that a citizen can take. But the doctrine that under a democratic system a minority has never the right to resist the law, even when it believes it to be fatal to the commonwealth as a whole, must carry with it the qualification that an important constitutional change should never be made except by something like general consent. The real moral of the history of the years immediately preceding the war is the inevitable disaster which must follow the system of combining an unwritten constitution with the abolition of the veto of an independent second chamber. The consti-

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tution consists of those fundamental laws which enshrine the principles upon which the life of the community is based—they are the vertebræ, so to speak, of the body politic. They ought to be changeable only as the outcome of grave deliberation and something like general consent. If a community is to be protected from being constantly menaced by civil war due to temporary majorities tampering with the constitution, there must either be an independent second chamber, constituted on different principles from the lower house, or the constitution must be written down and made alterable only by special procedure involving a direct reference to the electorate on the constitutional issue. This, the method natural to democracy, is at present impossible. The majority which introduced the proposals for Irish constitutional change was also responsible for foreign policy and the government of Great Britain. A vote against the Home Rule Act would have been a vote against the members' own foreign and domestic policies. And if a general election had ensued the issues would still have been hopelessly confused. The majority therefore held to its course, the minority prepared to resist, and the country drifted momentarily nearer to civil war.

The gravity of this crisis was due, not so much to the action of either party, as to the defects of our constitution itself, which not only made possible a constitutional change by ordinary party means, but provided no method by which an intolerable and dangerous impasse could be resolved by a reference to the people on the constitutional issue by itself. This was clearly shown by the obvious relief with which all parties accepted the truce when war broke out.

IV. THE SINN FEIN REBELLION

AFTER the declaration of the truce, Mr. Redmond and the majority of his followers threw themselves heart and soul into the work of winning the war. They emphatically and with obvious sincerity declared their whole-

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hearted belief in the righteousness and necessity of the war, and their willingness to co-operate in its prosecution in every way. They preached the duty of Irishmen to help in liberating Europe from German domination, and later on they conducted an active recruiting campaign in Ireland. Nationalist members and their sons joined the army and played their part nobly in the trenches. It seemed as if the war was going to exorcise the ancient bitterness of Anglo-Irish relations and make possible not only a final settlement of the Irish question satisfactory to all parties, but friendly and generous co-operation between Great Britain and Ireland in the future.

Unfortunately there were elements in Ireland which were blind to these larger hopes, and worked steadily against them. There were first of all the Sinn Feiners. Sinn Fein was founded some eleven years ago. According to its constitution :

The object of Sinn Fein is the establishment of the Independence of Ireland. The aim of the Sinn Fein policy is to unite Ireland on this broad national platform : 1st, That we are a distinct nation. 2nd, That we will not make any voluntary agreement with Great Britain until Great Britain keeps her own compact which she made by the renunciation Act of 1783, which enacted "that the right claimed by the people of Ireland to be bound only by the laws enacted by His Majesty and the Parliament of the Kingdom is hereby declared to be established, and ascertained for ever, and shall, at no time hereafter, be questioned or questionable." 3rd, That we are determined to make use of any powers we have, or may have, at any time in the future, to work for our own advancement, and for the creation of a prosperous, virile, and independent nation.

Finally, the constitution added :

That national self-development through the recognition of the duties and rights of citizenship on the part of the individual and by the aid and support of all movements originating from within Ireland, instinct with national tradition, and not looking outside Ireland for the accomplishment of their aims, is vital to Ireland.

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In its origins Sinn Fein was part and parcel of that spontaneous movement for national regeneration which sprang up some twenty years ago, and of which the Gaelic League was another product, and of which the most remarkable fruit has been the co-operative movement and the Irish Agricultural Organisation Society. It was a protest against the continuous intriguing about Irish affairs at Westminster, and the continuous financing of Irish politics from America. It was a movement of self-reliance and self-help, which saw that Ireland must be remade by Irishmen in Ireland, and not by anybody else. As such it was entirely healthy, and gained the sympathy of many responsible men. It never became an important force, however, until after the outbreak of the war, and in later years, at any rate, the love of Ireland seems to have been overlaid, in the minds of its leaders, by hatred of England and all things English. The constitution itself just quoted, together with the name, "Ourselves alone," shows their failure to grasp the fundamentals of the Irish problem and a predisposition to methods of violence. As time went on hatred, the narrowest particularism and belief in violence seem to have utterly dominated them. Forgetful of Ulster, regardless of geography, unaffected by the fact that a Home Rule Act was on the Statute Book, which, if a settlement with Ulster could be made, would give Nationalist Irishmen all the powers they required to regenerate their country, they seem to have believed that the Millennium would come merely by declaring their independence and getting rid of all connection with the English. They became, in fact, morbidly obsessed by that demon of racial intolerance, that disastrous fallacy that the ideal of government is to separate mankind into watertight racial compartments instead of to unite humanity under laws giving equal rights and equal opportunities to every individual, which lies at the bottom of the present war.

The Sinn Fein organisation would probably not have come to much if it had not been that the existence of the

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Irish Volunteers put into their hands the weapon of physical force. The Nationalist Volunteers were originally created by a number of Sinn Feiners and Gaelic Leaguers who were determined to show that Nationalist Ireland could do things for itself as well as Ulster, and was as resolute for Home Rule as Ulster was resolute against it. The movement spread so rapidly that the official party decided to capture the organisation, and in the summer of 1914 twenty-five Nationalist nominees were placed upon the committee of the National Volunteers. But the fusion was never effective, and shortly after the war broke out the majority of the original force seceded from the Nationalist Volunteers and constituted themselves as a separate organisation under the name of the Irish Volunteers. They did so ostensibly as a protest against the identification of the Nationalist Party with a British war. As they said—this is not Ireland's war, and in a manifesto published in September, 1914, they declared that "Ireland cannot, with honour or safety, take part in foreign quarrels otherwise than through the free action of a National Government of her own."

As the war went on, the Sinn Fein organisation and the direction of the Irish Volunteers became completely identified, and steadily more anti-English and revolutionary, while the Nationalist Volunteers, a large number of whom had joined the Army, sank into apathy. The story of the growth of open disloyalty, of the successful activity of the Sinn Feiners in stopping recruiting in Ireland, and of their preparation for rebellion, is clearly shown in the report of the Hardinge Commission. Towards the end the Irish Volunteers were supposed to number between 13,000 and 15,000 organised men, possessed of 2,500 rifles.

The second dissatisfied group was the Irish Republican Brotherhood, a very small band of men animated almost entirely by a passionate hatred of England. It was this group, the descendants of the Fenians, which was probably

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the link between Germany and the revolutionaries, and which was the channel whereby the money and the agitators which made possible the organisation and arming of the Irish Volunteers were poured into Ireland from German and Irish-American sources. But for the war and their connection with the enemies of the Empire they were an utterly negligible quantity.

The third element, at the last moment probably the most important of all, was of a totally different kind. The Citizen Army, under James Connolly, was a syndicalist rather than a political association. It was concerned with a social and economic rather than a political revolution. Its genesis was not political idealism, but revolt at a state of affairs in the Dublin slums which is best described in the words of the chief unionist organ, the *Irish Times*. In a leading article of February 18, 1914, it says :

The report of the Departmental Committee of Enquiry into the housing conditions of the Dublin working classes was laid on the table of the House of Commons on Monday night. It is a document of almost historic importance ; every word of it should have been submitted without delay to those whom it chiefly concerns—namely, the ratepayers of Dublin. The Commissioners have done their work fearlessly and well. We cannot suppose that there is in existence a more startling and arresting Blue Book. The report is a terrible indictment of the social conditions and civic administration of Dublin. Most of us have supposed ourselves to be familiar with the melancholy statistics of the Dublin slums. We knew that Dublin has a far larger percentage of single-room tenements than any other city in the kingdom. We did not know that nearly twenty-eight thousand of our fellow-citizens live in dwellings which even the Corporation admits to be unfit for human habitation. We had suspected the difficulty of decent living in the slums, this report proves the impossibility of it. Nearly a third of our population so lives that from dawn to dark, and from dark to dawn, it is without cleanliness, privacy and self-respect. The sanitary conditions are revolting, even the ordinary standards of savage morality can hardly be maintained. To condemn a young child to an upbringing in the Dublin slums is to condemn it to physical degradation and to

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an appalling precocity in vice. These four level-headed Civil servants have drawn a picture hardly less lurid than the scenes of Dante's "Inferno," and they give chapter and verse for every statement.

For this state of affairs the *Irish Times* says :

We are all to blame, but the chief share of the blame rests upon the Dublin Corporation. . . . The Corporation is directly responsible for the worst evils of the tenement system. . . . It has utterly failed to enforce its sanitary authority under the Act of 1890. It has encouraged slum-ownership not merely by connivance but by example. . . . The Corporation's policy has at once increased and demoralised the miserable army of slum workers.

In this view James Connolly concurs. In *The Reconquest of Ireland* he says :

On the Statute Book to-day there are certain laws giving to the Dublin workers through the Corporation powers over the conditions of life in their city. These powers, if properly and relentlessly utilised, would go a long way towards remedying that fearful state of affairs already cited.

But he adds :

If to-day the cities and towns of Ireland are a reproach to the land and a glaring evidence of the incapacity of the municipal rulers of the country, the responsibility for the failure lies largely with those who in the past had control of the political education of the Irish masses and failed to prepare them for the intelligent exercise of those public powers for which they were taught to clamour.

To Connolly, indeed, and the Citizen Army the revolution to which they looked forward was mainly a syndicalist revolution.

The conquest of Ireland had meant the social and political servitude of the Irish masses, and therefore the reconquest of Ireland must mean the social as well as the political independence from servitude of every man, woman and child in Ireland. In other words, the common ownership of all Ireland by all the Irish.

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At first Connolly was as hostile to the middle-class politicians and their nationalist ideas as to the English connection. They were as determined as the English to maintain unimpaired the capitalist system and their own social and economic domination. Their rhetoric about nationalism had only served to divert the attention of the workers. As the result, he writes, of the "apostate patriotism of the Irish capitalist class":

We have had in Ireland for over 250 years the remarkable phenomenon of Irishmen of the upper and middle classes urging upon the Irish toilers as a sacred national and religious duty the necessity of maintaining a social order against which their Gaelic forefathers had struggled, despite prison cells, famine and the sword, for over 400 years.

The words of the proclamation of the Irish Republic, "We declare the right of the people of Ireland to the ownership of Ireland, and to the complete control of her own destinies, to be sovereign and indefeasible," are clearly due to Connolly's influence.

During the war the political and the syndicalist revolutionaries began to draw together. The failure of the Administration to suppress or even restrain an armed movement openly seditious, the belief that the British Government exempted Ireland from national service, and other war measures, because they were afraid, or impotent, to enforce them, the assistance from America, and the endless procession of German victories and Allied defeats, combined with extraordinary ignorance and misjudgment of the true military and naval situation, made the leaders of these groups believe that there was a real chance of success for a revolution, and draw together in the hopes of procuring it. The actual course of events is obscure, but, broadly speaking, the facts seem to be as follows. As the seditious and revolutionary demonstrations of the Irish Volunteers increased, it became more and more difficult for them to draw back. They openly declared that they

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would fight rather than submit to disbandment and disarmament. It became at last obvious that the Administration could not remain indifferent much longer. It was certain that either the Volunteers would be suppressed, or their leaders would be arrested. Accordingly a rising was planned, in concert with the landing of German arms, and possibly of German troops. The idea seems to have been to start the rising in the Kerry hills, where, with arms and German leading, it would have been practically impossible to overcome the rebels and their allies without considerable delay. As soon as the few British troops in Ireland were occupied there, the Volunteers of Dublin and the rest of Ireland were to rise also, thus paralysing communications. It would take a considerable military expedition to handle such a concerted movement, and before this could be mobilised and sent to Ireland the leaders expected that the mass of the Irish, stirred by "the old hatred and distrust of the British connection always noticeable in all classes and in all places, varying in degree, and finding different ways of expression, but always there in the background of Irish politics and character," of which Mr. Birrell spoke, and terrorised by the revolutionaries, would bring about something like a national uprising.

How many knew of the plan it was impossible to say. It is practically certain that the majority even of the leaders of the Irish Volunteers were against any connection with Germany. But seditious conspiracy inevitably entails blind obedience to leadership, and the placing of entire power in the hands of a very few. There is little doubt that the news of the arrest of Casement and the failure of the arms ship induced the countermanding of the general mobilisation of the Volunteers for Easter Monday. There is equally little doubt that it was Connolly and the leaders of the Citizen Army, and probably of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, who, foreseeing their own inevitable arrest and the suppression of their organisation, and blindly optimistic

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about the result, forced the outbreak. Some of the Sinn Fein leaders probably only joined it because they felt that they could not back out, even of a forlorn hope, at the last minute, and the immense mass of the rank and file were totally unaware of what was in store for them and were induced to join the rebels by being told at the last minute, on false evidence, that they were about to be disarmed, a proceeding they had previously determined to resist.

The rebellion itself lasted about a week. The proceedings of the insurgents had been thoroughly organised, possibly with German help, and were a mixture of warfare according to International law, and murderous outrage, such as was to be expected from the elements of which they were composed. The advantage which modern weapons gives in street fighting was demonstrated as clearly in Dublin as it has been in Flanders, as also the conclusion that the only method of dislodging an enemy is the total destruction by fire or high explosives, of the occupied area. The casualties were very heavy—about 300 killed and 2,000 wounded, of which a large number were among the civil population. These figures alone show how much more serious an affair the rebellion was than a mob rising. If it had not been promptly repressed it might have led to a savage civil war, in which, while the end could never have been in doubt, many thousands of lives would have been lost, infinite material damage would have been done throughout the country, and by which any permanent reconciliation in Ireland would have been indefinitely postponed. As it is, the rebellion has caused a violent revival of bitterness. Its first effect on Irish opinion was one of horror and disgust—eloquently and sincerely voiced by Mr. Redmond himself—and the British troops were eagerly awaited and joyfully welcomed by the majority of the Dublin people, who fed and assisted them in every way. But the almost daily trickle of military executions, without public trial, and the enormous number of deportations, rapidly turned Irish opinion towards

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sympathy with the rebels, and bitter denunciation of the "bloody revenge" of the "military tyrants."

The world, too, has been horrified by stories of the ruthlessness and brutality practised under martial law. These stories are pure moonshine. There have been certain lamentable occurrences due to the mistakes or want of balance on the part of individuals—almost inevitable in the circumstances. For the rest the facts are as follows. Fifteen rebel leaders have been executed and many others have been sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment, and a large number of Irish Volunteers have been deported. Of these last many were probably innocent, but since the beginning of May a large number have been released, only those being retained in internment camps against whom there is reasonable evidence of complicity in treasonable practices. For the rest, Ireland, both before and after the rebellion, has never been so prosperous. Except for the destroyed area in Dublin itself, life is absolutely normal. There is less privation and want than usual, and martial law is chiefly remarkable for the absence of any evidence of its existence. Save for prohibition of public meetings and of volunteer parades, Ireland bears its normal aspect. In view of the gravity of the rebellion, and of the fact that it took place at the very crisis of the war, these proceedings can neither be described as unjust nor as unduly harsh. As in all such cases it is easy to find fault after the event, but the imperative necessity was to prevent all chance of a renewal of bloodshed, or of the development of the rebellion into a civil war. The primary duty of the Government was to restore peace and the reign of law, and not, by a repetition of its previous folly, invite a fresh disaster on Ireland.

Yet for every sympathiser with Sinn Fein on April 24, there are unquestionably many to-day. The fact that this should be so shows the depth of the Irish problem. For it discloses the gulf which still separates the English and the Irish Nationalist point of view towards the same events.

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In truth the anti-English reaction was inevitable. Whatever policy has been pursued by the British Government, it was certain that the courage of open rebellion would find a sympathetic echo in the heart of that vast majority of Irishmen whose knowledge of history is the recital of Irish wrongs. However much they deplored the methods adopted, they could not fail to think of the fallen as in some sense martyrs, if misguided martyrs, for the cause of Irish independence. They could never look upon them as renegades to the Commonwealth and allies of Prussian tyranny, as the English were bound to do. And, in consequence, half Ireland judged of the executions as if they were purely political executions, as the vengeance of the English rulers on those who had dared to challenge their domination in arms.

To the English the picture was reversed. In their eyes the rebels were traitors—traitors not to the British Empire alone, but to Belgium and France, and Serbia, traitors, too, to their own brethren in the trenches. They were men so obsessed by hatred, so little believing that Irish co-operation in the war had made some form of Home Rule assured, that they struck their fellow-countrymen in the back at the very crisis of the struggle against the despotism of Germany. In English eyes, indeed, the executions were not political executions at all, but the just penalty, not for a noble rising against oppression or tyranny, but for the most wanton and the most unwarranted rebellion in history, which was bound to lead to the death and maiming of many innocent men, women and children.

There is little use in trying to reconcile these points of view by argument. The whole trouble arises from the fact that owing to the past the Irish majority have never come to regard themselves as part and parcel of one commonwealth with their neighbours. If we may ask Irishmen to look forwards and not backwards, to think rather of how to build a better future than of how to expiate ancient

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wrongs, we would also ask Englishmen, in judging their Irish fellow-citizens for lawlessness and for defect of citizenship, to remember how long both the law and the commonwealth stood in Irish eyes, not for liberty and protection, but for oppression and wrong.

To say this is not to contend for the slightest departure from the true political principle. Not the least of the evils of the past is the effect it has had upon the English themselves. The Birrell administration sought to make recompense by abdicating the responsibility for government altogether. It regarded itself as bound to anticipate Home Rule partly by acting as far as possible in accordance with the wishes of the Nationalist Party—thereby offending the first canon of constitutional practice that power and responsibility should never be divorced, and partly by administering Ireland “on the principle that it was safer and more expedient to leave law in abeyance if collision with any faction of the Irish people could thereby be avoided” thereby neglecting “that cardinal rule of government which demands that the enforcement of law and the preservation of order should always be independent of political expediency.”* Thus have past misdeeds not only animated Irishmen with hatred, but have blinded the British Government to their real duty to Ireland. So long as they were constitutionally responsible for the peace, order and good government of Ireland it was their duty to enforce the law, or to amend it, where they were not prepared to enforce it. Laws are the rules which secure justice and liberty between man and man, and are the protection against the intolerable wrongs alike of tyranny and anarchy. No community can condone lawlessness if it is to survive. The primary principle of human government is that law must prevail. The neglect of that principle has simply been to condemn both Great Britain and Ireland to fresh sufferings and to a fresh outburst of bitterness and discord. In conjunction with the political blunders and the constitu-

* *Hardinge*, Commission Report, p. 12.

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tional defects to which allusion has been made, it has enabled a few hotheads, totally unrepresentative of Ireland, to undo the new union which the common heroism of Irishmen, Scotsmen, Welshmen and Englishmen was cementing on the battlefields of Europe.

V. THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT

THE Prime Minister returned from a visit to Ireland after the rebellion stating that all parties were agreed on two points: first, that Castle rule had broken down; and, second, that the opportunity should be seized to attempt a settlement of the Home Rule question. And he announced that, with the consent of the Cabinet, Mr. Lloyd George had undertaken the rôle of negotiator. It is obvious that it was not Castle government which had broken down so much as the Birrell method of administering it. Hence the reasons for proposing a change of system in response to rebellion, and in the middle of a great war, are not clear. But they appear to have been twofold. On the one hand, without a settlement, the country was bound under the terms of the truce, to go back, at the end of the war, to the impasse of July 31st, 1914. All parties were, therefore, anxious to seize any opportunity which would enable them to get rid of all risk of civil war for good. On the other hand, the Sinn Fein rebellion was almost as much a rising against the official Nationalist Party and its policy as against the British connection, and was greatly assisted by the belief prevalent in Ireland that the truce to which the Nationalists had assented was simply a ruse for getting out of Home Rule altogether. It was of the utmost importance to the Nationalists, who were losing ground to Sinn Fein, that they should be able to justify their policy and their claim to confidence by "delivering the goods" at once.

With such forces making for agreement it was not

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difficult for Mr. Lloyd George to bring the Nationalists and the Ulstermen into line. A settlement was reached on the broad principle that, subject to certain consequential modifications, the Home Rule Act was to be brought into force as soon as possible, but that six Ulster counties were to be excluded from its operation. The Nationalists laid immense emphasis on the fact that this settlement was provisional, and was to be brought under the review of an Imperial Conference after the war. The Ulstermen declared not less emphatically that exclusion was to be permanent, in the sense that the six counties were only to be brought under Home Rule by their own consent. Conventions of Ulster Unionists and Ulster Nationalists accepted the settlement, each subject to its own interpretation of the agreement. No official explanation was made as to what was provisional and what was not, or even as to the exact nature of the settlement itself, probably because the politicians believed that a judicious vagueness was the best chance of getting the settlement through. But it was manifest from the outset that the essence of the settlement was that twenty-six counties were to get Home Rule at once, and that six Ulster counties were to be excluded, until such time as they could be induced by an Imperial Conference or otherwise to come under a Dublin Parliament of their own accord. Whatever else was provisional there was nothing provisional about this central principle of the agreement between the Nationalists and the Ulstermen.

The course of the negotiations after the announcement of the agreement of the leaders is still obscure. But the scheme met with violent opposition among Nationalists in Ireland, who rapidly came to realise that it involved recognition of the principle of partition, and that if the scheme came into actual operation partition was likely to become permanent. This opposition was greatly intensified when it was made known that the Home Rule Parliament which was to be set up for the twenty-six

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counties was to consist of the Nationalist members sent to Westminster six years before, to agitate for Home Rule, and that no general election was to be held till after the war. The Roman Catholic Church threw its weight decisively against the scheme, so did the Protestant bishops and clergy, and it early became doubtful whether, even if it were carried into effect, the Nationalist members would have sufficient authority to conduct a government. At the same time the Southern Unionists urged the grave danger which might ensue to the Empire from the establishment in the middle of the war of a weak Nationalist administration eminently susceptible to Sinn Fein pressure. In conjunction with other Unionists they pointed out the paramount importance of maintaining unimpaired security for military and naval operations in Ireland during the war, and showed how difficult it was to demarcate the line between the Imperial and National spheres so long as the war lasted.

These violent agitations finally ended in the Government undertaking to introduce a Bill giving effect to the settlement as negotiated by Mr. Lloyd George, subject to two conditions. The first was a clause making it absolutely clear that the six Ulster counties were not to be brought under the Home Rule Act by any automatic process, but only by a separate and deliberate act of the Imperial Parliament. The second was that after the next general election, and after Home Rule had been established in Ireland, the Irish representation at Westminster was to be reduced to the figure provided in the original Home Rule Act, except when the Irish settlement was up for discussion, when the whole original representation should attend. This was insisted on by the Unionists, who contended that it was utterly wrong that after the control of Irish provincial affairs had been transferred to an Irish Parliament and after a general election had been held, Irish members, in numbers not proportionate to population, but twice as great as they were entitled to

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by population, should attend and vote on the provincial affairs of Great Britain and so make or unmake governments. The first was not a modification of the agreement so much as the clearing up of an obscurity which ought to have been removed at once. The second was an undoubted modification, but one eminently reasonable in itself and in no sense an impediment to the establishment of Home Rule. But the dislike of the scheme on all sides had grown to the point where it was practically useless to persevere. The Nationalist members declared that they would accept the original agreement or nothing, and the settlement fell through.

There was much recrimination at the time as to who was responsible for the breakdown of the negotiations, and it is easy to ascribe the failure to this person or that. But the plain truth is that the attempted settlement failed from its own inherent weaknesses. What really killed it was the violent hostility in Ireland to the idea of partition, and the almost insuperable difficulties in the way of setting up a Home Rule Government, and that without a general election in Ireland, which nobody cared to face, in the middle of a great war.

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DESPITE the failure of the settlement, the negotiations have left the situation far better than they found it. For they have rendered impossible civil war over Ireland. They have laid bare for all to see the essentials of the situation in Ireland itself. And they have revealed more clearly than ever before the real foundations upon which any permanent settlement of the age-old Anglo-Irish problem must be built. They have rendered civil war impossible because, now that responsible Irish leaders have publicly agreed as to the political boundaries of Ulster, no British majority will ever attempt to coerce

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those six counties into any scheme of Home Rule, to which the majority of their inhabitants violently dissent. They have laid bare the essentials of the Irish situation, because they have made it clear that Ireland to-day contains not one nation, but two, and that any real settlement must depend upon an agreement between the two. They have revealed the permanent foundations of an Anglo-Irish settlement by showing that it must rest upon an understanding not only between Ulster and Nationalist Ireland, but between Great Britain and Ireland, and between the people of the British Isles and the new nations of the British Commonwealth across the seas.

Unfortunately, in more recent times, while the people of Great Britain have grasped firmly the principle of union, the Unionists have made no serious attempt to reconcile the Nationalist aspirations of the Irish majority with that over-riding necessity for a common government for their common affairs. The Ulstermen tried to block Home Rule altogether, while the Unionists preferred to try, in an unfortunate phrase, to kill Home Rule with kindness. The Irish majority, and the Liberals, on the other hand, while clinging steadfastly to the principle of self-government, have never reconciled that principle either with the need for union or the rights of the minority in Ireland. A very large number of Nationalists, while asking for Home Rule, have hoped in the back of their minds that it would lead on, if not to actual separation, at least to their having practically nothing to do with the rest of the United Kingdom. And, with their Liberal allies, they have preached an Irish Unionism as intolerant as the Unionism of the United Kingdom Unionists, with the consequence that, in trying to force Home Rule on all Ireland by using the authority of the State, they have almost succeeded in consolidating Ulster into a separate Irish nationality.

Recent events, however, have brought about a great change. The Unionist majority have recognised the necessity for some form of Home Rule, if a scheme can

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be contrived which reconciles the needs of the three parties most concerned, which protects the rights of minorities, guarantees those personal liberties which are the foundation of our constitution, and will preserve religious toleration. Mr. Redmond and the official Nationalist Party have by their conduct in the war finally demonstrated not only the loyalty of the best elements of Nationalist Ireland to the Empire and its ideals, but their readiness to make immense sacrifices in its defence. The Sinn Fein rebellion has brought into the open the latent sentiment in favour of absolute independence, and forced it to show its strength. That is a great gain, for its strength even now is more apparent than real, and once the case for separation is argued openly and on its true merits, as it must be argued now between Nationalists and Sinn Feiners, it will fail in the minds of all reasonable men through its manifest impossibility and its own inherent weakness. The Sinn Feiners have also, by their intense concentration on "ourselves alone," demonstrated to the world the underlying fallacy of the claim that Ireland was a united nation demanding national rights, by forcing the Nationalist leaders to admit that one quarter of Ireland firmly entrenched in Ulster was not only against the present Home Rule Act, but had to be consulted and won over before any form of Home Rule for all Ireland was attainable at all. Finally the Lloyd George negotiations, by invoking the assistance of the Imperial Conference, have got rid, for the first time, of the old antithesis between England and Ireland, with all its poisonous memories. It is extraordinarily difficult for most Irishmen to feel themselves one with England. It should not be difficult, once they are assured of the control of their own local affairs, to feel themselves an integral part of that great Commonwealth which includes Canada, Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand, and in the creation of which Irishmen have played so great a part.

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It is, indeed, probably not too much to say that the Irish and English leaders have never been so near to agreement as they are to-day. That is not true of their followers, who are still excited and embittered by recent events. But it at least gives good hope for thinking that when passions have died down, and when people have had time to accommodate their ancient prejudices and aspirations to the momentous new facts, which the war, the rebellion, and the original Lloyd George agreement, have thus brought to light, the Anglo-Irish problem will have entered upon its final phase.

We do not propose to suggest any solution. We would only say this. There will be no finality of settlement until one of two results has been attained. Either Ireland must become a self-governing unit within a federated Empire, or it must form one or more units in a federated United Kingdom. Whatever intermediate stages it may be necessary to go through, in the long run we must end in one of those two positions. No form of Home Rule by itself, whether it be applied to all Ireland or to twenty-six counties, can be final, for it involves the retention of Irish members in a Legislature dealing with the domestic affairs of Great Britain, and determining the policy on matters for which they have had no mandate, after the control of similar matters in Ireland have been handed over to an Irish Legislature. Any Home Rule Act must lead on to some form of federation, either for the Empire or for the United Kingdom. The principle of federation, indeed, is the key to the solution of the problem. But the form in which that principle will be realised will depend entirely upon the self-control, the public spirit, and the reasonableness of the peoples mainly concerned. Constitutions do not make agreements, they embody and sanctify them. Almost every federal constitution in the world to-day is the product of an agreement between States or nationalities to get rid of perennial strife by entrusting the control of local affairs to the separate States or nation-

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alities, and the control of common affairs to a common government. This was true of America, of Canada, and of Australia. It was true also of the Union of South Africa. It must sooner or later be true of the Anglo-Irish problem. But the settlement, when it does come, will not be reached because some constitutional draughtsman has been inspired by a new brilliant plan, but because the peoples concerned have faced the fact that they have to live together as members of one commonwealth, and have recognised that they must sacrifice their prejudices and work actively together for the common welfare. That is the necessary preliminary to any settlement. When the people of Ireland, following the best Nationalist lead, and repudiating the separatism of Sinn Fein, have made up their minds that however loyal they may be to Ireland, they must also be loyal and active citizens, not of England but of the Empire, and when the people of the rest of the United Kingdom have recognised that they cannot always decide what is best for Ireland, but must defer to the ideas of Irishmen to the utmost extent consistent with the welfare of the community as a whole, the end will be in sight. It will then be possible for Ulstermen and Nationalists to face together the problem of Irish Government, for both to consult with the people of Great Britain about the government of the United Kingdom, and for these to settle in conference with Canadians, Australians, South Africans, New Zealanders, and Indians, as to the government of the Empire. And when that has come about we shall be on the high road to the framing of a constitution which will lay to rest for ever the spectre which has been a source of discord between all sections of the British Commonwealth almost from the beginning of the history of the British race.

FRANCE

I

FRENCH history, so far back as we can trace it, is the record of the action and interaction of two forces—a force of resistance and a force of expansion. The Celtic race, to which the inhabitants of ancient France belonged, was not confined to Gaul: before the Christian era Celts were scattered throughout Europe, in Spain, in Italy, in the valley of the Danube, in Greece, and even in Nearer Asia. But the peculiarities of their situation and of the influences to which they were subjected marked out the Celts of Gaul from the rest of their race. France was destined, in virtue of her geographical position, to be exposed to foreign invasions of the most diverse kinds. Over a period of eight centuries, from the Roman conquest onwards, race after race of invaders established themselves within her borders, and the life of the native Celts was one long tenacious effort of resistance—resistance against the Romans from the south-east, against the Franks, against the Burgundians, against the Visigoths from the east and north, against the Huns who had driven the Visigoths before them, finally against the Arabs from the south-west and against the Northmen who descended upon the coasts of the west and north.

Of these various invaders the Huns in the fifth century and the Arabs in the eighth were repelled so decisively as

NOTE.—This article, written for THE ROUND TABLE by a distinguished French historian, has been translated for publication.

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to leave few marks behind them. Even the Franks proved, in the words of Augustin Thierry, but a "fleeting accident" in the history of the country. But the same cannot be said of the other invaders. Each of them in turn imprinted characters of their own on the native mould. It is difficult to estimate the strength of the influence in each case. What is certain is that the mingling of stocks that resulted took place, as a whole, fairly quickly, and that an important contributing factor was the Christian Church, which imposed community of faith on natives and newcomers alike. By the eleventh century the fusion of races was an accomplished fact. The immediate result was to reveal a great power of expansion in the new nation. Although its political unity was still far from assured, the French people was already finding ways and means of giving vent to its ambitions and extending the range of its ideas. It was from France that the first two crusades set forth; it was the Norman French that crossed the seas to found kingdoms in England and in Sicily; it was French princes who conquered Portugal and made it an independent kingdom; last, and most important of all, it was the French genius which presided over the first Renaissance of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

The centre and rallying point of this great intellectual movement was Paris. The Paris of King Philip Augustus and of St. Louis was, to a greater degree than it has ever been since, the chief seat of civilised learning. Hosts of students flocked thither from all quarters, from England, Germany, Denmark, Hungary: Pope Alexander III sent students from Rome. In an age when books were rare, speech formed the most important element in teaching, and it was in speech that the French teachers excelled. The "facundia" which Martial had already noted in the Gauls of the Roman age, found a free flow at the University of Paris. The French doctors, with their active and sociable temper, were able to infuse their teaching with a liveliness and a charm, a subtlety and polish, a felicity of generalisa-

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tion and a sense of broad and spacious horizons not to be met with elsewhere. Abelard, a Breton by birth, is a striking example of this new French learning, which combined extreme boldness and originality of thought with that peculiar native moderation, tinged with scepticism and shot through with a vein of satire that is characteristic of modern French writers. Such was the atmosphere which attracted all the best intellects of Western Europe—Albert the Great, Roger Bacon, and, later, Dante, Boccaccio and Petrarch. One important element in this influence of the French genius upon Europe must not be forgotten. Although disdained by the doctors, the vernacular speech of central France, the so-called *langue d'oïl*, which was destined to become the French language, had already taken on that character of combined vivacity and clearness which assured its spread in the surrounding lands. Dante's master, it will be remembered, spoke French because, as he said, "French speech is the most current among all sorts of people." French epic poetry, with the *Chanson de Roland*, French allegorical and satiric poetry, with the *Roman de la Rose*, were already becoming known well beyond the borders of the *langue d'oïl*, and the ideas of which they were the vehicle were characteristically French. Jean de Meung, in the *Roman de la Rose*, exhibits a view of life which, if not correctly described as pagan, is at any rate singularly modern and free in its outlook. The prose romances which date from the same period reveal their French origin in qualities of another kind, in a new conception of love. Love appears there for the first time not as a passion and a torment, a brutal stroke of fate, but as a gentle and disinterested—in a word, a chivalrous emotion, the joyful surrender of a free heart and spirit, "a strange idolatry, a strange rival religion." *

But perhaps the best testimony of all to the great force of expansion in the French people at this time is the wonderful efflorescence of Gothic architecture. The new

* Walter Pater.

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style of church-building, which originated north of the Loire, soon spread over the whole of southern France, crossed the Channel, the Rhine, and the Alps, and was carried by colonies of artists as far as Sweden. Wherever it went it brought with it an originality which was skilful enough to combine boldness of design and vigour of conception with elegance of execution. Moreover, it communicated to the workmen of other countries the characteristic "joyance" of the French artisan, who on a stained glass window expresses his love of light and of harmonious composition, and who in wood and stone alternately displays or conceals his simple faith and his satirical or seditious wit. Thus in a variety of directions, by force of arms, through literature and the arts, as well as through the political influence exercised by the noble and exalted figure of St. Louis, recognised in his time as the arbiter of public right, the influence of the French spirit permeated Europe in the thirteenth century.

But this great effort of expansion was destined to be abruptly arrested. War with England broke out, and for a century and more the fields of France were a battleground. Once more the resisting powers of the nation were called into play. Yet even this proved a landmark in national progress. As a strong constitution may find in a long sickness a remedy for many obscure disorders, and even sources of fresh strength, so France derived some benefit from this century of distress. What the French kingdom chiefly lacked at the outbreak of the Hundred Years' War was not this or that province in the south and east, but a genuine national sentiment. It is true that from the eleventh century onwards the nobility had manifested a feeling of devotion towards the King and of affection for their native land in all its length and breadth: "Douce France" is the appellation which the poets are fond of putting in their mouths. But the patriotism of the common citizen had not yet risen above the level of municipal spirit. Some of the French towns were free; others, the

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majority, were engaged in a continuous struggle with the neighbouring feudal lord or bishop to maintain a precarious independence. It was at this juncture that the King realised his opportunity. He saw that in helping the towns to secure their liberty, in assuring himself thereby of the goodwill of the wealthy merchants and small proprietors alike, and in sustaining them at need against the inroads of turbulent feudal chiefs, he would be building a firm and lasting rampart for his own power. The achievement of this end proved to the King's profit. One by one the towns surrendered their charters to the royal power, receiving in return the right of voting their contributions, and, soon afterwards, under Philip the Fair, that of being represented in the States-General.

These various and frequent negotiations led naturally to an increase in public spirit; but the anxiety of the towns to escape from feudal domination had an even more precious gift to bestow upon the monarchy in the theories of the French lawyers. From the twelfth century onwards a new civil law made its appearance in France. Originating in the charters of the communes, it was inspired by the same principles of reason and justice which had traced the great outlines of Roman Law. The predominant conviction of the old French lawyers was that "in the society of that day nothing was legitimate but two things, the Kingship and the Estate of the Bourgeoisie." In the face of a feudalism still maintaining its ascendancy they proclaimed the theory of one absolute public authority equal for all men, the sole source of justice and law. Thus opened what Thierry called the great conflict "of ideas against facts," which gave the towns an invaluable experience of political life and paved the way for the reforms and revolutions of the future. One memorable, if premature, experiment we owe to the working of these new ideas. The Commune of Paris, led by Etienne Marcel, attempted in the course of the great war to establish a new monarchy on a basis which would have

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made it no more than an instrument in the hands of the bourgeoisie.

But the real strength of France, the element which was to feed the life of a country that was before all things agricultural, must be looked for lower down in the social scale. The French peasant of that day was still known by the name of "manant," the man that "dwells" or "inhabits." The "manant," firmly fixed on the soil, seemed outside the range of civilisation and progress; yet it was he that sustained its weight, and then, as always, had to pay its costs. His superiors took from him the fruits of the earth: nay more, they despoiled and maltreated him, and if he blazed up for a moment in anger they laughed at the weakling's temper. "*Jacques Bonhomme crie, mais Jacques Bonhomme paiera,*" was a refrain they sang in his ear.

Jacques Bonhomme, the typical peasant, is indeed an obscure yet an all-important figure in the development of French history. From the day when the Roman legionary first set foot on Gallic soil the long chaos of alternating conquests and incursions, victories and defeats passed over his head, bringing him no relief, but a change of masters. Patiently he continued his traditional servile working life. Hardly ever is the historian conscious of his voice being raised in complaint. Who was there to listen to his grievances? For centuries he remained the "paganus," the man of the country, still clinging to the old gods of the countryside. Then, by the force of events and in obedience to his masters, he embraced the new religion. But he wove into his Christianity as many survivals of the old faith as he dared: for he was already somewhat conservative, and, since mysticism made little appeal to him, the strange ideals of this new Eastern faith often disconcerted his simple mind. Nevertheless he found much comfort in Christianity, and in this new faith he continued to live—to work and to suffer. And since, in spite of all, his cheerfulness and raillery never deserted him, he laughed

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at his distresses and at those who caused them, the priest and the baron, and, on occasion, even at himself. But a time came when he awoke to a new fact. He realised that above his immediate lord there was another more powerful lord—the King, and that between the King and the peasant there was a direct relationship. Generally, no doubt, when the King stretched out his hand to the peasant it was to take something from him. The peasant was known to be thrifty and a good worker, and it was his wealth the King needed. But at least the King accounted him a human creature, a *Frank* in fact as well as in name. So the peasant went on working as before, for wealth was more needed than ever, and purchased from his immediate lord the right to give his service to a more exalted and distant master. Thus it was that by the fourteenth century Jacques Bonhomme had become the subject of the King of France. It was at this point that the Hundred Years' War broke out. To the peasant it brought more suffering than he had ever yet endured. But he recked little of it. He had a new motive—his allegiance to the King. For the first time in French history the peasant disdained to stay passive and silent, but rose to defy the invader. While the noble turned traitor or weakling and the bourgeois yielded or fled, the peasant flew spontaneously to arms to uphold the standard of the King. Jacques Bonhomme had become a French citizen.

This new and unlooked-for unity of the French people is symbolised in history by the immortal name of Joan of Arc. Through her, the peasant's daughter, the sense of the dedication of the citizen to his State, his willingness to do all, to suffer all, and to surrender all for the love of his country passed up the social ladder, from the humblest to the highest, even to the King himself. The pyre that consumed the body of this daughter of Lorraine lit an undying flame in the heart of a new France.

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II

THE close of the Hundred Years' War synchronises with the fall of Constantinople and the beginning of modern history. France had become politically a new country. She saw around her a new world—a world physically greater, thanks to the explorations of the Navigators, and spiritually larger, thanks to the rediscovery of classical antiquity and the invention of printing. The great Renaissance found its way across the Alps, from Italy into France. But even in France it remained Italian: it never lost the peculiar imprint of Italian humanism. French scholars wrote imitations of Petrarch, of Virgil and Horace, Pindar and Homer; but their compositions smacked of the lamp. The most notable representatives of the movement in France were the group of writers known as the Pleiad. Their work testifies to the debt France owed to Italy in the domain of literary form. But in their study of formal perfection they allowed the essence to escape them: only occasionally did they seek inspiration in the currents of personal emotion and national thought or feeling. The love of the fatherland was sung, it is true, by Du Bellay, the exile, in *Les Regrets*, and by Ronsard, the patriot mourning over his country torn by civil wars, in *Les Discours*, and by d'Aubigné in some fine passionate verse; but in all of them the art of poetry had ceased to be popular, as it had been in the thirteenth century, and was still with Villon and even Ronsard's immediate predecessor, Marot.

But it would be unfair to reproach the poets of the Pleiad purely on the ground that they broke away from the old mediæval poetry. A poet may well forget the literary tradition of his country. Yet if he has the soul to feel, to love, and to assimilate the full and abundant vitality of the people itself he will rediscover the poetic tradition in

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his fellow-countrymen in a more powerful and vivifying form than in mere books. Shakespeare was a national poet, small as was, no doubt, his acquaintance with Beowulf. So was Molière, although, so far as is known, he had read neither the *Chanson de Roland* nor the works of Rutebœuf. The true criticism of the poets of the French Renaissance is that, with their gaze fixed obstinately on Italy, they had neither eyes nor ears for the world around them, and were led astray by a too literal interpretation of Horace's "odi profanum vulgus, et arceo."

Happily, the rupture between literature and the deeper thought of the time was not complete. Two names are sufficient to prove that the French genius was not incapable of adapting itself to the new knowledge. Rabelais and Montaigne seal the alliance between Humanism and the French spirit. To sound the praises of common sense, to cast off the fetters of the Middle Ages, to prick the bubble of megalomania, to shower criticism on the growing superstition for the classics, to search, with or without their help, for the secrets of Nature in all their extension, and to accept them without reserve when once they have been fully understood—all this is a part of the vast programme of wisdom offered us by Rabelais. Acute psychological observation, study of that "specimen of humanity which every man bears within him," the unwearied and sympathetic curiosity of the moralist who fastens on to the customs of countries distant both in time and space, and goes so far as to "willingly give and accost of himself unto the meaner sort," the eagerness to use only words that are current coin in the markets of Paris, a distrust of every novelty in religion, and of "this coile and hurly-burly of philosophical wits"—in other words, of metaphysics—such are the qualities and preferences which Montaigne set forth for his readers in his own inimitable manner in the successive editions of his *Essays*, at once one of the most thoroughly French books ever written and one which has had the most fortunate career among readers of other countries.

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To read and reread Montaigne is to understand, better than through any study of the politics of the time, why the Reformation failed to win a secure footing in France. The wars of Religion which convulsed France at the time of the great Reformation struggle in Europe were due in large part to the jealousies of the last great feudal barons under the reign of incapable kings. To the ordinary thinking Frenchman, who read Montaigne and Rabelais, neither Luther nor Calvin appealed as a gospel. They seemed to deliver the soul from the yoke of a traditional authority only to plunge it into a new slavery still more narrow and repugnant—grace, justification by faith, predestination. They left the body more fettered than ever. Luther applauded the extermination of the German peasants. Calvin proclaimed the benefits of the strictest system of authority, and was even ready to welcome pure theocratic rule. The French Protestant publicists (such as Hotman and Hubert Languet) spoke of the people with contempt and distrust. Calvinism was, in fact, in the words of the historian Louis Blanc, "a new kind of oppression, suitable only for a feudal military State." Its failure to convert France meant the triumph of Montaigne's ideas. It was "*les politiques*" who restored peace to the kingdom, and leadership passed with them into the hands of men who were both humane and tolerant—a tolerance due partly to selfishness, but more still to scepticism, to an indifference to religion and a fear of over-confident convictions.

Yet, in spite of this failure, French Protestantism has won a definite and honourable place in the history of French thought: though it only achieved it by departing from its early Calvinistic teaching. Calvin regarded liberty as a weapon only to be entrusted to the hands of the chosen few. His later disciples transformed it into a powerful instrument which even their religious opponents were not ashamed to use in attacking tyrannies of every kind. Moreover, France owes another debt to her Protestants.

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Their moral life has always been true to the austere commands of their master, thus supplying a precious and powerful counterpoise to the Frenchman's natural apathy in such matters amounting almost to repugnance to anything that limits or hampers his freedom of conduct.

In the domain of thought and of art sixteenth-century France might seem to be receiving more than she gave. The same could not be said of the field of politics. In the reign of Francis I France became involved in a great struggle which concerned the interests of Europe as a whole. "Is it the fault of France or her inherent genius which has set her at the prow of Europe?"—such is the question broached by a recent writer, M. Suarés. However this may be, France has never shrunk from accepting the responsibilities of her position. It is to the honour of the French monarchy that from the first moment it never bowed before the formidable danger to Europe involved in the Austrian hegemony. It was from Charles of Austria, already King of Spain and elected Emperor of Germany in 1519, that the menace came. The French monarchy had faced a similar danger forty years before. Charles the Bold of Burgundy, with his ambition of reviving the ancient kingdom of Lorraine, had been the bugbear of Louis XI. But the dream had been dissipated by the heroic resistance of the Swiss and the skilful policy of the French King. It was now to be revived in a new and far more dangerous form. It will soon be four hundred years since the first clash of arms between France and the House of Austria: and although, in the course of centuries, the centre of the Eastern Power has shifted to Berlin, it is the same contest that is still being fought out to-day.

The French King's course was clear. He saw at once that his safety consisted in a combination of alliances sufficient to counterbalance the power of Charles V. In order to establish what has since been called the European Balance of Power he sought the help of the two most powerful States which were then sufficiently independent

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of Austria—England and Turkey. England, he calculated, would always be willing to attack the Empire through the Low Countries ; while Turkey would menace it in Hungary, where Ferdinand, the brother of Charles V, was King. Henry VIII hesitated for a moment ; but after Francis had been defeated and taken prisoner at Pavia he took alarm at the growing power of Austria, and took up the cause of France. While Francis was in captivity at Madrid, Henry made the Regent promise to refuse any cession of territory. It was the first time that a King of England had recognised that the integrity of France was a safeguard for English security. But the new relationship between the two Powers was of short duration. Henry VIII had other preoccupations which diverted him from Continental affairs. Francis, having regained his liberty, concluded other alliances which were momentarily more effective. He urged on the Turks, who had reached the walls of Vienna, took up the cause of the Protestant princes of Germany, and, later, made further treaties with Denmark and Sweden.

The great lines of French foreign policy were thus laid down. In the century that followed, Henry IV and Richelieu did no more than adhere to them. The general aims of the policy remained unchanged : in the south-west, to detach Spain from the Empire ; in the south-east, to free Italy from the influence of Austria ; in the north and east, to push back as far as possible from Paris the ever-vulnerable line of the frontier.

From 1520 onwards it was Austria that France encountered on every side. The wars undertaken by Francis I and Henry II, whilst warding off the immediate peril, had not solved the problem. At the close of the religious wars Henry IV dreamed of a more durable settlement. His design was to consolidate the defence of France against Austria by the establishment of a new European organisation, a sort of Court of Arbitration, which would have placed the political and religious independence of the

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peoples under the guaranteed protection of the great States. In other words, it would have been a bold reconstruction of the map of Europe in which account would have been taken of the desires of the peoples. "The reign of law would have replaced the reign of force," writes Duruy. "The project was the application of a great principle hardly yet dreamed of at that time, the respect for Nationality." Henry relied for success in this task on the goodwill of England and on his own large material resources. Unhappily his premature death put an end to the project.

Doubtless the dream was on too vast a scale to have become a reality at that stage; but Henry's successors, first Richelieu and later Mazarin, at least followed its main outlines and succeeded in giving France the security which she had been seeking for over a century. The Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, followed by the Peace of the Pyrenees, put an end to the power of Austria in Germany and caused Spain to pass within the orbit of French influence.

But an epoch of history cannot be closed like the chapter of a novel. Louis XIV, finding the path level before him, became in his turn a danger to the liberty of Europe. In the pride of power he abandoned all the political traditions of his house. Turning against the Turks, he helped the Emperor to win the battle of St. Gotthard and thereby relieve Austria, and then helped the Venetians to retake Crete. He abandoned the alliance with the German Protestants, and even expelled the Protestants from France. Finally he adopted the policy which drove England for generations into an attitude of frank hostility. Lord Stanhope remarked to Dubois in 1717, when the relations between the two Powers had for a moment become friendly: "France and England acting in unison would have nothing to fear from all the other Powers. They could maintain the peace of Europe and even govern the Continent." Such an alliance, had it lasted, would certainly have been profitable to France. It would have preserved her colonial

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Empire ; and, in the eighteenth century, it would have enabled a skilful diplomatist, had there been one available, to prevent the successive losses of Austria in her struggle against Turkey, in Italy, and in Silesia from turning so greatly to the advantage of her Prussian neighbour. When Choiseul arrived on the scene it was too late.

It is true that the marriage of the Dauphin with the daughter of Maria Theresa was calculated to draw together the two great rival Powers, France and Austria. Marie Antoinette became Queen of France. But the alliance was not to last. The Revolution broke out, and the chief political effect of the ill-fated marriage was to precipitate the fall of the French royal house by driving the weak King into anti-national courses and furnishing the people with one reason the more for detesting the Queen, whose nickname "l'Autrichienne" sounded in French ears as a term of gross opprobrium.

The French Revolution proved so terrible a shock to the world that all ancient landmarks of policy seemed to be effaced. Yet when monarchical Europe issued threats to the French people from Pillnitz, when Austria and Prussia forced the Legislative Assembly into war, their aim was surely not simply the salvation of the French monarchy. France herself at least refused to believe so. She recognised in the invaders pouring through her eastern frontier the successors of the hosts of Attila, long since sent flying from Chalons ; of the armies of Otto, defeated at Bouvines ; of Charles V, of Piccolomini, and of Prince Eugene. She saw them besiege Lille with futile displays of barbarism, with their bombs and their red-hot cannon balls. She saw them checked at Valmy and sent flying from Jemmapes. Where had this improvised army of townsmen and peasants found the strength to rout the trained troops of Prussia and of the Holy Roman Empire ? What spring of enthusiasm sustained them ? It was nothing but the will of a people that had resolved not to perish.

All the world knows to what lengths that will proceeded

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when, freed from all restraining influences at home, it found itself face to face with a coalition of all reactionary Europe. The Napoleonic adventure that ensued—what was it but the outcome of the powerful impulse which follows the intoxication of a new idea? A united nation surrendered itself to the man who seemed able to provide it with an unending harvest of triumph and glory. But Napoleon fell: and his fall revealed the jealousy and the hatred of the old enemies of France so clearly as to open the eyes of the other allies. The Germans, especially the Prussians, desired the dismemberment of France, and already the more extreme among them were stretching out their hands for Lorraine, Alsace, Burgundy and the Franche-Comté. Wellington and the Tsar intervened to nip these projects in the bud, rightly judging that France must remain strong enough to be a counterpoise to the power of Germany. Sixty years later, in 1875, when France had once more been crushed, the same warning, from the same two Powers, again arrested Germany in her ambitions. So that, centuries hence, the philosophic historian, dismissing other complications, may regard the nineteenth century as a kind of lull, by no means unbroken, it is true, during which Germany became a steadily increasing menace to her neighbours.

III

LET us now turn to observe the development of the French genius in the centuries preceding and following the Revolution.

We left French thought at the close of the sixteenth century with Montaigne, at a moment when, after a period of upheaval and controversy and new ideas, it was inclined for philosophic repose. But the ensuing generations soon awoke anew the desire for a firmer basis of thought. Enthusiasm for a deeper and more austere religion, on the

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one hand, or, on the other, a marked inclination towards a heroic stoicism, characterised the French spirit until Descartes revealed to it the single solid foundation for which it was searching.

If the story of the developing thought of a people could be told in the form of a romance we should picture French thought as an ever-youthful princess who desired to free herself from the detested authority of her old tutor Scholasticus; the good giant Rabelais threw open for her the door of her prison house: but she needed a less uncouth protector to take her out into the world. Rejecting the support held out to her by the imperious Calvin, she dallied for a little while with Montaigne. But Montaigne was too volatile, too uncertain, to win her for good. She sets out escorted by them all and ends by meeting the knight, René Descartes. The new champion frees her for ever from old Scholasticus. If she does not definitely espouse all his opinions, she is nevertheless free for good and reasonably "happy ever afterwards."

Descartes proclaimed the intimate union of the will and the intellect. He set forth new and powerful reasons for the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. But his greatest achievement was in resting all certainty upon the knowledge that the mind has of itself. Setting out from this point to reach up to God and to discover other truths, he formed those habits of exactitude and of certainty whence all modern philosophy is derived. The Cartesian philosophy, revised and augmented by Malebranche, crossed the frontiers of France. Spinoza expanded and developed it; Leibnitz built up his theodicy on its basis. In France itself, after the obscure controversy between Malebranche and Arnauld, the eighteenth century, which professed to be philosophical, declared itself anti-Cartesian. In reality it was anti-metaphysical. Men refused to inquire into "the invisible and useless truth," as Fontenelle amiably called it. The French writers of the classical period which opens in 1660 are Cartesians in

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so far as they accept the methods and intellectual discipline of Descartes. Fontenelle himself, some five and twenty years later, sees it clearly enough: "The chief characteristic of philosophy, that by which its influence extends to other departments of thought—I mean its method of reasoning—has been greatly perfected in this century." And he adds with a fine touch: "Before M. Descartes men reasoned in greater comfort: past ages are lucky indeed not to have had that man amongst them."

The supremacy of reason, it is to that, or almost to that, that France reduced the doctrine of Descartes. There befell Descartes what not infrequently happens to thinkers who become fashionable. They seek to include all in their purview: their general outlook is spacious; they produce a great work which has demanded of them a whole life of meditation and composition. They leap into fame. Men turn the pages of the book, light upon one or two pages which they find brilliant, tear them from their context and regard them once and for all as the complete doctrine. In the case of Descartes the passages are the opening page of his *Discours de la Méthode*, where he says that reason being equal in all men it is not likely that it deceives them, and the other passage where he declares that the "Ego—that is to say, the Soul—by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body," and even "that it is more easily known than the body."

It is rather piquant to observe that these passages in no way constitute the real originality of Descartes's philosophy. What they contained, however, was all that the French classical writers asked for. Reason, they proclaimed, the universal basis of all truth, will guide us to beauty, which is the form that truth takes when applied to sensible objects. This æsthetic philosophy, first set forth by Boileau, found general acceptance. The soul, that human soul "more easy to know than the body," became the one subject of study, to the exclusion of the body and of all external nature. The result was the contempt or dis-

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regard of the human body and of nature which was the dominant note of the great writers of the time, of Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, Racine and Bossuet. Molière and La Fontaine, however, in whom survive unimpaired the characteristics of Jacques Bonhomme, moderation and practical sense, do what they can to uphold the body and nature, and it is worth noting that these two have remained the most popular writers of the period. "Yes, my body is myself, and I mean to take care of it," says Chrysale in *Les Femmes Savantes*, in natural reaction against a spiritualism which would mutilate us if carried to excess. "They would make us cease to live before we are dead," says La Fontaine, referring to the indiscreet Cartesians, to the spiritualists and Jansenists who found in Descartes a new force. The ordinary Frenchman sees nothing but food for laughter in the pedant who dreams of a union of hearts in which the body has no part, and agrees whole-heartedly with Molière's Clitandre, whose love extends to the whole person. Thus we find ourselves back in the old track of "common sense." If this means parting company with Descartes, so much the worse for Descartes.

French literature of the classical age exercised a considerable influence in Europe—an influence all the more remarkable because it came at a time when national literatures were already thoroughly formed in the neighbouring countries, England, Spain and Italy, whither its vogue extended. If Cartesianism reinforced those characteristics of reasonableness and universality which attracted foreigners in French writing, there was another and more novel element which contributed greatly to their success—the importance which social life had assumed for French writers subsequent to 1660. Men began to look to France for that engaging "civilité" which was a feature common to all the works of the age, and is still to-day often particularly associated with French letters. This characteristic is often explained as being due to lucidity of

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language; but, as Brunetière* has admirably pointed out, it is out of "civilité" and in order to make themselves accessible to all, not simply to their compatriots, but to foreigners also, that the writers of the seventeenth century rid French speech of the Greek and Latin pedantry which still impeded it at that time. And he adds that, if in the following century the language of Voltaire becomes more rapid and more alert, less grand and imposing in structure, "la civilité" is still the object aimed at, for it is in order to reach and to instruct a new and less enlightened circle of readers. If finally in the nineteenth century the vocabulary is less dignified and choice and more popular than in the classical writers, it is always with the same motive of securing the ear of a public less aristocratic and refined than that of Voltaire and Pascal.

But, to return for a moment to the classical period, the critic who expresses astonishment at the lack of depth and true feeling in the literature of the time is simply ignoring the conditions under which it was composed. It is the literature of a court—that is to say, of a salon—and of the most refined and distinguished salon that the world had ever seen. It is a place for conversation, but that conversation will not trespass on those high regions where the clearest minds lose their bearings and go astray; nor will it allow men to discourse of themselves, of their joys, their passions and their woes. That may be allowable later on for a plebeian like Rousseau, whom men will excuse for his bad manners in consideration of his genius. But genius and good manners can, after all, get on together, and it is the great writers of the age of Louis XIV who taught Europe to appreciate this fact. And it taught Europe further, that, without surrendering a high ideal of art or the inspiration of classical models, genius could submit itself, without any loss of essential qualities, to the discipline imposed by its contemporaries in a highly refined society, in short, to the discipline of *taste*. It is this which Europe

* *Études critiques*, fifth series.

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chiefly admired, and strove to imitate, in the French classical writers.

In the eighteenth century this world-wide distribution of French language, the heritage bequeathed by the classical period, served to spread ideas for the most part imported from England, but in which the old French spirit of St. Evremond and other silenced *libertins* of the preceding age is often to be discerned. Their two chief exponents were Voltaire and Montesquieu. With Voltaire this universality became the most far-reaching instrument ever wielded by a journalist of genius. With Montesquieu the originality of French thought is extended to a new sphere in the re-discovery, or rather the new foundation, of the science of politics and its definite association with literature.

Montesquieu is in the true succession of the French jurists to whom the absolute monarchy was indebted for its title-deeds of Natural and Divine Right. But whereas the older jurists, according to their temperament, or perhaps according to the part of France where they lived and which they knew best, relied either upon the authority of Roman Law or on some ideal of law more or less consciously derived from custom, Montesquieu introduced a new method of study. With him Natural Law is discarded, and so is all discussion of those laws compiled fifteen centuries earlier in an Eastern court. Laws are relations which depend on the nature of things. It is things, then, which must be the subject of study: soil, climate, manners, the religion of the country. It is a realistic method, eminently scientific and cautious in conception, but one that needs careful handling. A logical thinker might, for example, press this definition of law to the point of denying the utility of any legislation: for if laws depend on the nature of things, what is the use of changing laws? It is external things which must be changed. Let men by all means be moralists, scholars, agriculturists, propagandists, but not legislators: for the laws will come right of themselves in proportion as things right themselves in the

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external world. Not so, replies Montesquieu: for if manners, religion and all the arts determined the laws, the laws in their turn can correct the arts, religion and manners, and even climate itself, or rather the effects of climate. "The good legislators are those who have opposed the defects of climate, while the bad are those who have bowed to them." *

Thus, in Montesquieu's *Esprit des Lois*, political science, divested of mathematical rigour, became a supple, penetrating, infinitely diverse study, a science of real life, in short a moral science. Montaigne would have loved Montesquieu's book. It is the fountain-head of the liberal historical school of the nineteenth century. "After having sought light at the opposite pole, France is returning to him," said M. Faguet, and if his words are not strictly true, at least they are the expression of a wish that testifies to the perennial influence of Montesquieu.

By "the opposite pole" M. Faguet meant, of course, Rousseau. Against the realist or positive method of Montesquieu Rousseau sets a method that is purely ideal and logical. He starts from the principle of Right and Justice established by natural law, and at once sets out his thesis of the state of nature, as Descartes started from universal reason and self-knowledge to build up his metaphysics. The equality between men, which the Roman lawyers recognised in the juridical sphere as equality before the law, is developed by Rousseau into a civil equality, an equality of citizenship. Since he regards society as a contract, the contract only becomes legitimate in his eyes when the contracting parties are equals. In the treatises of Hobbes and Locke, where the contract idea already predominates, the people after agreeing on a first contract between themselves make their pact with a chief, either surrendering all their rights in his hands or reserving a portion for themselves. According to Rousseau the people contracts with none other than itself. Any other contract

* *Esprit des Lois*, Book XIV.

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is valueless and indeed impossible, and the aim of the legislator is to prevent any other contract from being even a temptation to a single individual in the State: for every individual contract would necessarily be contrary to the general will. It *must* be so contrary, because otherwise there would be no reason for making it: for, since the general will is the sole, unique and infinite source of power in the State, it would be futile to endeavour to help it through any lesser agency.

This splendid but impracticable conception (impracticable because Rousseau himself never succeeded in showing how, even in the smallest State, the general will could find expression) proved a fruitful seed. With the necessary adaptations to circumstances, we can watch its influence continually spreading through the field of modern social and economic life. It contained the germ of nineteenth-century State socialism. Moreover, by boldly basing every society upon a contract—in other words, on an obligation, a tie which the individual is not free to relax, which he must feel and revere, without discussion or analysis, by proclaiming the infallibility of the general will—Rousseau endowed society with a mystical and mysterious quality which exercised a great power over certain minds. If Montesquieu created a science, Rousseau created what was almost a religion.

No one can deny the great influence of Rousseau on the men who made the Revolution of 1789 and, two generations later, that of 1848. It is worth while calling attention, in this connection, to a curious change that took place in the ordinary French character. So far we have seen the Frenchman as the devotee of order and proportion, inclined to scepticism, timid in the application of his systems and general ideas. In the second half of the eighteenth century the abstract treatises on government, of which the *Social Contract* was the most widely read, effected a transformation in this attitude. The French people was eager for reforms, but the liberty for experiments was denied

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to it. It took to making reforms in its head, tried one system after another, and finally decided in favour of the simplest and most radical. As de Tocqueville justly observes, "the habit has stuck and is to-day so completely incorporated with the old French character that men often attribute to us as a natural endowment what is really the result of this singular process of education." * This "singular process of education" was, however, not confined to France. In Russia and in Prussia the French language and French ideas went far to supplant their native rivals, and the sovereigns led the foreign fashion. In Italy great reformers like Beccaria and Filanghieri took their inspiration from Voltaire, Rousseau and Montesquieu. Spain and Portugal, Denmark and Sweden were subject to the same influences. Everywhere men became conscious of a movement tending to ameliorate the lot of the citizen and to improve the old methods of administration. It could be said of Europe on the eve of the Revolution that, thanks to the influence of French writings, the continent presented a spectacle of moral unity. Yet, if the Governments here and there were endeavouring to effect certain purely economic reforms, not one of them was disposed to abandon a jot of its despotic authority. It was perhaps in France, where these ideas, as is natural, had taken the deepest root among the people, that the Government showed least activity. French political and social institutions seemed to be immobilised by the fear that one touch might be sufficient to bring down the whole edifice.

Let us cast our eye once more over the strata of French society.

Since the time of Louis XIV the wealthy bourgeoisie had taken an increasing share in the work of administration and its riches had enabled it to force its way into the body of the privileged nobility. The lower middle class, on the other hand, the numerous town population, of artisans and small traders, had made no progress since the day of Louis XI.

* Tocqueville, *Ancien Régime*, Bk. III, ch. i.

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These men spent their lives entangled in a medley of corporations, each with fixed privileges, which stifled all initiative. They could neither sell, buy, nor manufacture as they pleased. Every day added to their discontent: for by now they were "enlightened," and were eager readers of the pamphlets of Voltaire, the treatises of Rousseau and of all the revolutionary economists. In the great change which was impending they were to be the most conscientious and not the least fanatical workers.

Very different was the condition of the great mass of the peasants, numbering 20 millions, five or six times as numerous as the town-dwellers. Their wretchedness was such that the word "beasts," often applied to them by strangers, is the only one that can describe them. They had the beasts' submissiveness and the beasts' endurance. On the eve of the Revolution their condition was more miserable than in the thirteenth century. Crushed down by a number of different kinds of taxes, depriving them of three-quarters, and sometimes more, of the fruits of their labour, they alone bore the burden of military service (which was obligatory but not universal, selection taking place by lot, under a system established in 1726) and of the *Corvée*, a system of unpaid labour on public works which was increasingly employed. Yet, in spite of all, they retained a natural good humour, an unquenchable source of hope in a better to-morrow, the "incurable optimism" of the race. They did nothing to prepare the Revolution: but when it broke out it is not surprising that the first excesses were committed by peasants pillaging and burning the *châteaux* and only ceasing when the privileged nobility, in a movement prompted by fear as much as by generosity, themselves surrendered their privileges.

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IV

TO pass judgment on a movement so momentous as the French Revolution, the effects of which for good and ill are still so much felt in our day, is often little more than to make an indirect avowal of one's own personal and partisan views. The Revolution still musters to-day its fanatical adherents and its contemptuous assailants. But for one and all it remains one of the greatest events in history since the fall of the Roman Empire, comparable only in importance to the Reformation. But what a contrast in spirit and in principle the two movements present. The French Revolution boasted of being a new beginning: it repudiated all links with the past and with all authority: it proclaimed an optimistic ideal based on the progress of humanity through liberty; moreover, while the Reformation saw its action confined to the lands of the North and North-West of Europe, the spirit of the Revolution penetrates throughout the world, its expansion, prepared as it was by the eighteenth-century writers, being marvellously facilitated by the wars of the Revolution and the Empire. Not only were privileges abolished and the civil code introduced and maintained in the lands momentarily annexed by Napoleon, but amongst all the other nations there was a movement towards the limitation of arbitrary power and the association of the people in the government.

After Waterloo this spirit was vainly opposed, first by the Congress of Vienna and then by the Holy Alliance. It continued to make its influence felt, giving birth to two movements of thought which are still alive among us: the Liberal movement in countries under an absolute monarchy and the Nationalist movement among peoples wishing to be united under a single Government and disappointed by the Allies in 1815. In France the Revolution had penetrated too deep into the life of the nation for any return to past conditions to be possible. Hence the numerous *régimes* that followed one another in the nineteenth century;

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in spite of the aspirations of some of their supporters, all recognised or accepted the great political and social principles embodied in the Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1789. These principles, which lie at the base of modern society, are those of the existing political order in France, finding expression in the sovereignty of the people, the right to vote, and the separation of the executive from the legislative power. The first of these was explicitly set forth by Rousseau : the second is generally recognised as the practical means of ascertaining the general will : the third is derived from Montesquieu, who laid it down after a study of the British Constitution : it has, however, not been fully put into execution.

The chief characteristic of the present French Constitution, which dates from 1875, is the establishment of Ministerial responsibility to Parliament. Parliament, and more particularly the Chamber of Deputies, which represents the country more directly, thus wields the legislative power and indirectly the executive power also, Ministers being unable to govern without it. There being numerous parties, however, Ministerial crises are of frequent occurrence. The legislators too often tend to become the patrons of their electors, the indirect dispensers of "bureaux-de-tabac," and other less modest perquisites, and in order to keep some of their pledges they try to influence the Minister. The Ministers tend too often to think first of keeping their portfolios, and this is not necessarily identical with the good of the country. The parliamentary *régime* has been described as a system of petty barter. As a matter of fact, the evil is not so serious as might be believed. Nevertheless the need for a remedy was felt, and it was believed to have been found in the project of Proportional Representation, passed by the Chamber, which the Senate had not yet ratified at the outbreak of war. This would have had the further advantage of leading to a more equitable representation of the general will and making room for minorities.

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Meanwhile in France, as in many other countries, economic and social reforms are occupying the front of the stage; they are of more immediate concern to the mass of the electors, and also, no doubt, to the welfare of the nation. In this sphere there is much in common between England and France. A strong democratic impulse is making itself felt in both countries before which other and older forces are giving ground.

If the nineteenth century, as a result of the Revolution, led to an increase in the importance of the part played by the people, literature, too, had to accommodate itself to these new conditions. The writers had, as it were, to go to school afresh. The thinking public grew in numbers and tended to lose its homogeneity as education penetrated to new social strata. The result might easily have been two or more literatures living side by side.

V

UP to 1830 it so happened that all the writers of genius belonged to a reactionary aristocracy. They rejected the eighteenth century, the age of philosophers, turned their backs on the seventeenth, admired the sixteenth, rediscovered the Gothic cathedrals of the thirteenth, drew their inspiration from foreign literature, read Shakespeare and, with even greater enthusiasm, Scott and Byron, and becoming thus in spite of themselves the nephews of Rousseau, they gave voice to their emotions of love and religion and endowed France with a great heritage of lyric poetry which she had hitherto lacked. The other school of writers found little hearing in face of this gorgeous rhetoric. What is the prose of Courier, the vine-grower, beside that of Chateaubriand, Peer of France, or a song of Beranger beside an ode of Victor Hugo, or the frail and uncertain flageolet of Delavigne beside the harp of Lamartine?

Meanwhile the Revolution of 1830 broke out, and the disparity between the political and literary leanings tended

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to disappear. The intoxication of those first years passed away; and the aristocratic Romanticists turned to the people to find out where it was going, to lend it the support of their sublime eloquence, and to follow its footsteps whilst appearing to lead it. It was a wonderful initiation into democracy, and lovingly did the devotees submit to it. Hugo emerged with a larger vision, Lamartine with a less self-centred inspiration. In 1848 it looked as if France would put two great poets at her head—it was a worse course that she actually chose. It was the moment when Vigny, working far from the crowd, was preparing for the future a religion of devotion to suffering humanity, when George Sand was writing social novels, when Balzac was finishing his colossal effort at realism "by the light," as he said, "of two eternal truths, religion and monarchy," in order to bring out their profound social significance. Everywhere these dreams were supported and confirmed by a movement from below. Humanitarians and Utopians were dedicating all the strength of their thought to this present world. A great Christian movement was extending its influence—a movement incomparably deeper, sincerer and more liberal in spirit than the purely political movement of 1802, in which Chateaubriand and Napoleon worked so strangely together. Michelet, a true plebeian sings the apotheosis of the people in the past. Comte establishes the hierarchy of the sciences whose study is to suffice the human spirit for all time and leads men to the altar of a Divine Humanity where their soul is to find rest.

In the eyes of the people and the politicians one barrier only prevented the achievement of that definitive well-being so often announced: the right to vote. The Revolution of 1848 provided an opportunity for the realisation of all these dreams. By so doing it prematurely led to their pitiful disappointment. Then opened one of the darkest periods of history and of French thought. Looking back upon it, it would almost seem as if the French nation, capable at once of the worst excesses and

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the greatest flights of generous emotion, were consumed by an inward remorse. Whether it was the crime of the 2nd of December which lay heavy on its soul, or its whole-hearted surrender to the despotism of money, or its sense of the tyranny of science, from which it expected more than it could give—whatever the cause, the result was a phenomenon unique in France, the triumph of pessimism. The brilliance of the Tuileries, the comedies of Meilhac and Labiche, the music of Offenbach deceived no one: the generation of the Second Empire could scarcely smile, a fact strikingly illustrated by the *Journal des Goncourt*. It yawned its way through life. It could not even pretend to the careless elegance of the last years of the *Ancien Régime*. Talleyrand remarked one day to Guizot: "No one who has not lived in the years round about 1780 can know what the joy of living is." No intelligent person could have said the same of the years round about 1860.

Literature of every kind bears witness to a profound disillusionment. Apart from the voice raised from the island where the veteran Victor Hugo lived in exile—a voice which amid all the thunders of indignant invective preserved its faith in an era of liberty and justice—what do the poets give us? A call to death from Leconte de l'Isle, a passive acceptance of distress and a fear of living from Sully Prudhomme, a disgust at insatiable pleasures from Baudelaire. The realistic novelists analyse in man the passions which despoil him of all nobility, depicting without sympathy the invincible folly and monotony of the narrow, selfish life of the middle classes.

The thinkers of the age, men like Taine and Renan, present the same spectacle of discouragement. With Renan it takes the form of a diletantism eager to understand everything and incapable of arriving at any conclusion; with Taine of a rigid determinism in which the lights of the good and the beautiful are extinguished beneath the same grey pall.

Finally, at the moment when France would perhaps

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have shaken off this sombre cloak, she was overwhelmed by defeat. The result could have been anticipated. Conscious of her weakness, ashamed of an odious insurrection which broke out actually under the eyes of the victorious invader, the country fell a prey more than ever to the disintegrating forces that had been undermining its strength for the last twenty years.

The war of 1870, amongst its other results, created a sort of superstition in Germany's favour which was not confined to France. Men began to admire and to desire to imitate German science, German philosophy, German music, German achievements and methods generally. The French mind, which had entered the path of scientific criticism, proceeded to collect facts and to accumulate data, often without any idea as to their eventual use. The hope of overtaking and surpassing their German teachers on their own ground buoyed up French students in a work utterly foreign to their nature; they accepted it as in some sort a punishment due to defeat. It was no time for the pleasant promenades of a Montaigne, the huge laugh of a Rabelais, the austere hardihood of a Calvin, or even for the spacious generalisations and theories of Descartes, Rousseau and Comte. These useless intellectual diversions were received with contempt in the schools. Nevertheless from time to time some scholar, a Pasteur, a Gaston Paris, or a Boissier, raised his voice and illumined his unimpeachable scholarship with imagination and charm of style and with generous and heartfelt emotion.* Their readers were glad to be reminded of the great French tradition; yet there were critics ready to warn them, like the marchioness in *Le Monde ou l'on s'ennuie*: "Take care; that's almost amusing; beware of that sort of thing."

* To these names it is only fair to add that of Brunetière; for instance, his last lesson of *L'Evolution lyrique au XIX siècle* is a fervent plea for the general ideas and systems so much dreaded at that time (1893). In literary criticism Brunetière's voice has not a little contributed to open large vistas to the younger generation and encourage them to do so for themselves.

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It was about 1885 that a reaction against this mood became apparent. It began in the domain of poetry. Justly so, because it was poetry, in all its branches, which had suffered most from the depression. The poets of this period, in laying stress on symbolism—in other words, on the suggestion of ideas by words or images—went back to the ultimate sources of all poetry. They boldly proclaimed that their aim was the representation of mystery, the desire to evoke sensations without the medium of description, and to move the reader by touching chords within him of which he himself was unconscious. The symbolists were laughed at and parodied, little read and less understood, and it was largely their own fault. Their verse-form was new and unfamiliar: their writing was difficult and invariably obscure; it had not even the excuse of being German in origin. Certain well-intentioned critics did indeed do them the honour—for it was an honour then—of crediting them with German tendencies; but in reality if they acknowledged any master in metre it was Walt Whitman, and if their individualism had some relation to certain German romantics of the eighteenth century, such as Novalis and Schlegel, it was little more than an accident. Their spiritual ancestors, if any, were their own countrymen Baudelaire and Vigny. In any case, one used occasionally to see Germans come to Paris to hear the new poets; they opened their eyes wide at them, took copious notes, bought the *Revue Indépendante* or the *Mercur* series, and returned to their homes to found a “sub-symbolist school,” of which no more was heard. The French school, however, survived, and some of its representatives, having successfully escaped the danger of sinking into a narrow preciosity, are among the most generous and influential spirits of the day. It is enough to recall the names of Stuart Merrill, Verhaeren, and Paul Fort. The work of the symbolists did not prove fruitless. In setting themselves against the poetical tradition of their predecessors, who did not venture to trespass on the emotions

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except with the guiding light of reason, they gave the first shock to the determinist philosophy at that time predominant. The blow was so shrewdly struck that some years later, when, after the fruitful teaching of M. Boutroux, M. Bergson brought forward his philosophy of intuition, it found men's minds prepared : only recently an opponent of Bergsonism, M. Benda, remarked of that philosophy that " it had come to tell the age exactly what it wanted to hear."

The first achievement of the philosophers was to isolate the fact of consciousness by showing that the external world, explained by consciousness, cannot in its turn explain that consciousness. M. Boutroux took away from scientific law the quality of necessity with which it had always hitherto been invested. Finally M. Poincaré went so far as to show that the very axioms of geometry were no more than conventions which, if not arbitrary, yet at any rate do not impose themselves on the mind of necessity since the mind has still the power to change them.

What was lost to science in all this was so much gained for liberty. No doubt reproaches can be cast at M. Bergson for his anti-intellectualism, his aggravating tendency to exalt in human nature the qualities of intuition and feeling, of the heart as against the head, of all that is vague, individual and uncertain. But to the generation that was so eager to hear his message, his philosophy rendered the immense service of restoring the moral basis of action. The deliverance of the spirit from the tyranny of scientific determination—this was the philosophic aspect of this French renaissance. Not that it was a question of expelling Science ; it was a question simply of putting her in her right place. It was the scientists themselves who were the leaders of the movement. No one greeted it more warmly than the great mathematician Poincaré. How, he asks, could there be a conflict between Science and Morality—that conflict to which Taine was so cruelly conscious towards the close of his life and which he was unable to resolve (see, for example, in Vol. IV of his correspondence

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his letter to M. Paul Bourget about the latter's *Disciple*, in 1889). "There can be no such thing as a scientific morality," replies M. Poincaré; "but neither can there be such a thing as an immoral science. . . . The motive force of morality can only be a feeling."* These words indicate a definite break with the parallelism, uncontested since Descartes, between the life of the brain and the life of the mind. And why should we not accept the fact of this double nature with its implications of liberty for the human conscience and at least an apparent determinism in the realm of scientific law?

In their reinstatement of free will, the philosophers found themselves, moreover, in complete accord with the great current of fresh energy which was stirring the whole nation. Their teaching came just at the epic moment when, in Dahomey, in the Congo and in Madagascar, France definitely established her Colonial Empire, and established it with the explicit consent of the whole country, whereas fifteen years before, it will be remembered, the Ministry which presented France with Tunis and Tonkin won nothing but unpopularity. It was the men of this younger generation who accompanied explorers like Marchand, Baratier and Moll across Africa. This was the moment, too, when, by means of the Franco-Russian alliance, France began to feel that she was once more an important factor in European politics. The same new spirit revealed itself also in the rapid progress of French enterprise in automobilism and aviation and in the revival of open-air sports.

Thus in many different fields groups of thinkers and workers surrendered themselves to the spell of action, to confidence in life—in other words, to optimism—and so came into touch once more with the depths of the national soul. For there is no other road to the heart of the people. The scholar, the philosopher, the writer, can live without a ray of sunlight to illumine his study desk: Art, Truth, Science, are his supports. But the people needs

* H. Poincaré, *Dernières Pensées*.

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the sunshine of to-day, and needs to have faith in the sunshine of to-morrow. Only so can it remain the potent soil with its eternal daily gift of fresh and life-giving dew. When the best minds of a nation sink into a disillusioned pessimism the people naturally draws away from them, and the leaders, for all their feverish desire to be in touch with it, lose all power of understanding it. That generous spirit, Flaubert, describes this divorce with brutal clearness: "the people is an eternal minor." Leconte de l'Isle, sincere republican though he was, writes to his friend Louis Ménard: "How stupid the people are, it is an eternal race of slaves." The greatest victim of this loss of touch was the French people itself. Deprived of its natural leaders it fell a prey to the worst aberrations, of which the Boulangist movement of 1888 is a curious instance. Twelve years later such a movement was no longer possible. The Dreyfus affair supervened, very different in its whole atmosphere and setting.

"Our Dreyfusism was a religion," wrote Charles Peguy. "I use the word in its most exact and literal meaning. The Justice and Truth with which we were so much in love, to which we had given our all, were not a Justice and a Truth of abstract ideas, of books and libraries." * Both camps revealed the same ardour of conviction, the same love of country, well or evil interpreted. Looking back on the great contest from a distance, a Frenchman to-day can see in it the indubitable mark of happy times and heroic hours. Men were fighting for an idea. This resounding struggle, in which the interference of foreigners frequently only led to embitterment, should have made the world and Frenchmen themselves understand what they had become. So these world-wearied sceptics believed in something after all! O Renan, our old master, how you were forgotten in the turmoil! And there was no one to regret it, for it was your pupils, men like Anatole France and Jules Lemaitre, who were among the most ardent fighters. "One of the

* C. Peguy, *Notre Jeunesse*.

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consequences of the *Affaire* was that, for both sides, France became less and less of an abstraction and more and more of a reality. She became for each man a reality outside of him and within him, a reality which it was for him to enrich, but also to safeguard, and the dangers from abroad showed that there was indeed a need to safeguard her." These words of a young writer, M. le Cardonnel, written three years ago, are strangely significant to-day.* During the last fifteen years indeed France has created a new army. The full system of conscription, with equal liability for all, dates from this period. The presence in the ranks of soldiers of all classes, of every kind of education and means, effected a profound modification in the spirit of the officer class. The French officer, the product of exclusive schools, often a real student, turned himself into a teacher. It became his duty to impose his will without arrogance or familiarity, to make his authority felt without exposing it to injury, in face of the peasant and the bourgeois, the workman, the lawyer and the professor—a difficult rôle which he worthily upheld. The barracks, where for some time there was a fear of the growth of a school of anti-militarism, became the home of a living patriotism, the school of an army of free wills which cannot be conquered.

No one therefore was astonished, except the enemies who failed to understand her, that when the call to arms resounded in July, 1914, France rose up with a unanimity long since assured, stronger and more complete than that of 1793. For thirty years past the country had been moving, more or less consciously, towards the self-confidence which is the indispensable condition of great achievement. The war surprised it at a moment when there was no force that could divert it from the one task where its duty lay.

"The essence of civilisation," says Guizot, "lies in two things: the development of the social state and of the

* *Mercur de France*, March 1913.

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intellectual state"—that is, the development of the common and exterior condition of mankind and that of the inner and personal nature of the individual man. No completer illustration of this definition could be given than the France of 1914.

The power of resistance she had shown in intellectual life by suppressing the foreign element in the first romanticism, has during the last generation asserted itself again by eliminating the German and other Northern influences from her literary and scientific domains. Her influence in the world, the result of the power of expansion and the spirit of sociability which she has always manifested, has never been extinguished: dimmed though it may have been some half a century ago, it is ready to burst forth once more with greater assurance than ever. The intimate alliance, so often projected, postponed, resumed and again abandoned during the last 400 years, which France and Great Britain have lately sealed by mingling the blood of their sons in the same great cause of liberty and honour, will be of advantage to both countries and to the world as a whole. Closer intercourse with England and a better understanding of the English character will help France to arrive at a deeper sense of individual initiative and a greater respect for the liberty of others, while England will have the precious support of the French qualities of sociability and expansiveness in her task of spreading the principles of a free civilisation. The hateful idea which flaunts itself to-day, an insult to humanity as a whole, that a culture and a civilisation can be imposed by violence, is too sharp a violation of the modern principles of liberty both amongst ourselves and others. The whole world will come to feel—feels, indeed already—that an era of unbroken peace will result from the victory of these two countries, the most ancient among modern nations, who slowly and at the price of such efforts have achieved their own liberty, and it will not doubt the good faith of witnesses who have given their blood in its cause.

THE IMPERIAL DILEMMA

I. "THE COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS"

SEVEN years ago there was begun a private "enquiry into the nature of citizenship in the British Empire, and into the mutual relations of the several communities thereof." The first volume of the results of this enquiry has recently been published under the title of *The Commonwealth of Nations*. It would seem to be desirable, therefore, to give some account of the method by which this book has been prepared, for it is largely because of that method that we wish to commend it to those who are interested in the political problems of the British Empire.

The enquiry has been an attempt to apply the methods of scientific study to politics. It arose in South Africa, as the outcome of the accomplishment of South African Union. The South African had found himself driven to grapple with the problem of Union, because so long as he was a citizen of the Transvaal or Cape Colony only, he found himself impotent to deal with the common affairs of South Africa, by the wise or unwise handling of which he was himself vitally affected. No sooner, however, had he created a South African Parliament and become a true South African citizen, than he found himself in a precisely similar difficulty so far as Imperial affairs were concerned. Events, then recent, had proved to him clearly enough that Imperial policy, as being concerned with peace and war, was a matter vitally affecting himself. Yet he had no sort of effective voice in determining that policy, nor did the Imperial constitution

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as then existing appear to offer any hope of his ever acquiring a voice in determining it. Moreover, a further question was manifest to those who had had experience of the inexorable logic of war. They were citizens of South Africa. They were also citizens of the Empire. If the claims of the two came into conflict how were they to be reconciled, and, if they could not be reconciled, which had first call on their allegiance? In view of the recent "Uitlander" experience, these questions seemed to them not academic in their nature, but of urgent practical importance. To "wait and see" was to give a blank cheque upon their lives and resources to the British Ministry—an indefinite liability, the reality and magnitude of which was certain to be disclosed by the next war. And it might also mean the sudden forcing upon them of a choice between allegiance to South Africa and to the Empire—through the pursuit, for instance, of a policy by the British Government which either ignored South African interests, or was misunderstood in South Africa because there was no effective constitutional link between the two. It was clear that these problems, in a form equally or even more acute, faced the people of all the other Dominions. It was in order to throw light on these problems, and to ascertain whether they were insoluble, and if not, what were the conditions of their solution, that an organised enquiry was set on foot.

The basis of the enquiry was that its members were agreed upon one thing only—namely, that there was an Imperial problem, and that it was a primary duty of such responsible citizens as could find the time for serious study to endeavour to state the problem and the conditions of its solution, and to make them available for their fellow-countrymen. For that reason the groups of students which came to be known by the name of this Review, and which by degrees spread over the British Isles, Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, India, and Egypt, have never been propagandist

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associations. They have never had an Imperial policy. Their sole purpose has been to conduct an investigation of the Imperial problem on a scale commensurate with its complexity, based upon knowledge of the peculiar conditions and needs of every part of the Empire and representative of all sections of opinion within it. Accordingly they have, wherever possible, included within each group members belonging to all local parties, and holding all shades of Imperialist and anti-Imperialist opinion. There has been no secrecy about their proceedings, but neither has publicity been sought. The primary object of enquiry has been to bring to bear upon the greatest of all our political problems the methods of scientific investigation characteristic of a Royal Commission, for the benefit, first, of the members of the groups themselves, and, after them, of the public at large.

The Commonwealth of Nations, of which the first volume is now published, is the result of these researches.* This volume is almost entirely the work of the editor, Mr. Lionel Curtis. It represents, in the main, his opinions and experience, and is in no sense an agreed document. It is, too, issued on his authority and commits no one else to the views expressed in it. But, as Mr. Curtis says in the preface, "No single brain could master the facts required for an adequate survey of the complicated polity which embraces a quarter of the human race." Thus the report is not the outcome of the investigations of a single man, but of the constructive criticism of one man's work by many hundreds of minds in all parts of the Empire.

No attempt will be made in this article to summarise or review all the contents of *The Commonwealth of Nations*. The book covers far too much ground for that. It will merely examine briefly the two fundamental problems of which it attempts a statement—namely, what are the

* *The Commonwealth of Nations* must be distinguished from *The Problem of the Commonwealth*, another book by Mr. Curtis, which was noticed in the last issue of *THE ROUND TABLE*.

The Nature of Citizenship

duties and obligations of a British citizen, and what is the value and significance of the British Empire in the world.

II. THE NATURE OF CITIZENSHIP

AT an early stage of the enquiry it became evident that the first necessity was to decide what citizenship, or, in other words, what membership of a State, implied. It was impossible to decide whether citizenship of the Empire was different from citizenship of the United Kingdom, or of Canada, or of Australia, and if so in what respects, and how the two were to be reconciled, until the nature of a State and of the obligations which citizenship imposes upon the individual had been determined.

The State is the primary and fundamental form of association among men, that association which includes and makes possible every other form of association, whether it be a limited liability company, a trades union, or a municipal or county government. The essential nature of citizenship is described in *The Commonwealth of Nations* as follows: "The quickening principle of a State is a sense of devotion, an adequate recognition somewhere in the minds of its subjects that their own interests are subordinate to those of the State. The bond which unites them and constitutes them collectively as a State is, to use the words of Lincoln, in the nature of dedication. Its validity, like that of the marriage tie, is at root not contractual but sacramental. Its foundation is not self-interest, but rather some sense of obligation, however conceived, which is strong enough to overmaster self-interest." * This doctrine is the central theme of *The Commonwealth of Nations*. And, subject to certain interpretations, it is unquestionably true. It is obligation, not privilege, duties, and not rights, which lie at the root of citizenship, and which, in consequence, are the

* *The Commonwealth of Nations*, Part I., by L. Curtis, p. 8.

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foundations upon which every healthy and progressive State must build its communal life. This obligation, however, is not owed to a monarch or to an abstraction labelled "the State," as is the Prussian view. It is owed to the whole body of one's fellow-citizens, organised as a community in obedience to law.

The essential notion of political obligation is admirably expressed in the original constitution of the Pilgrim Fathers in New England in which they

by these presents and solemnly and mutually in the presence of God, and one of another, covenant and combine our selves together into a civill body politick, for our better ordering and preservation and furtherance of the ends aforesaid: and by virtue hearof to enacte, constitute, and frame shuch just and equall lawes, ordinances, acts, constitutions, and offices, from time to time, as shall be thought most meete and convenient for the generall good of the Colonie, unto which we promise due submission and obedience.*

The State is the word we use to denote this fundamental form of human association, that which is based upon the irrevocable dedication of the members to one another for the practical conduct of social life. The common view that the State has the right to dispose of the life and property of its citizens obscures somewhat the essential truth that it is not the rights of the community over the individual, but the unlimited duty owed by the citizen to his fellows, which is the foundation of citizenship. Citizenship is at bottom recognition of the fact that men have to live in society, and that the primary duty of the individual to his neighbours is to obey those laws which they together drew up for the guidance of the communal life, and which secure to the individual his rights, prescribe his duties, and protect all the members of the State from injustice and wrong, until he can persuade his fellow-citizens to amend them. There may be times when the citizen feels bound to resist an unjust law, or the wrongful exercise of the authority of the State, by the

* *The Commonwealth of Nations*, p. 203.

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government of the day. But circumstances can never arise which release him from his obligations to his fellow-citizens themselves, or entitle him to put personal or sectional interests before the welfare of the whole, or which justify him in repudiating his obligation to comply with the general body of laws which represent the agreement of the community as to the conditions under which they can best and most fairly conduct their common life. This ultimate truth is not so apparent to-day as it ought to be, because, the world being still divided into separate sovereign States, citizens can migrate from one State to another. But, even so, the individual can get rid of his obligation to obey the laws of one State only by undertaking a similar obligation in another. The "cityless" man, or the "Stateless" man is an outlaw. The inescapable obligation of citizenship will only become plain when all mankind is united in one world State.

But while obligation is the primary essence of citizenship, liberty is its essential correlative. If a citizen is bound to obey the law, he must have an equal voice with his fellow citizens in determining what the law should be, once he is qualified to use it. But the essence of liberty is responsibility. A citizen is entitled to liberty, not in order that he may do as he pleases, but in order that he may use that liberty in the service of the community as a whole; not because he is a privileged being, but because he cannot help to improve the conditions of communal life if he is the servant of the will of others, and does not bring his own unfettered judgment and activity into the common pool. It is this idea of liberty which distinguishes a commonwealth from other States. In an autocratic State the emphasis is laid on the duty of implicit obedience to authority, generally reinforced by divine right, with results we can see in Germany to-day. In many modern democracies the emphasis is laid upon the rights of the citizen rather than upon his obligations, a course which must ultimately end in the paralysis or

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dissolution of the State. In a true commonwealth the emphasis is laid on liberty in the sense that the citizen must have it in order that he may thereby make himself a more useful citizen.

In practice this idea leads, by an inevitable process, to the steady transfer of political power and political responsibility from a monarch or an aristocracy, to an ever widening circle of citizens. For those who become members of a commonwealth find that they cannot fulfil their duty to their fellow-citizens properly unless they are able to take an active part in helping to improve the laws under which the community lives, when once they are able to grasp what the duties of citizenship are, and are sufficiently educated to be able to discharge them properly. A true commonwealth can fall neither into the error of entrusting all power and responsibility to one or to a few, as did the later Roman Republic, nor into the error of entrusting responsibility for its destinies to backward peoples until they have received the education and training in local self-government to enable them to recognise their responsibility to all their fellow-citizens. The principle, indeed, which guides the citizens of a commonwealth in all their political actions is loyalty to the constitution and the laws which unite them in the bonds of mutual service to one another, and an active determination continuously to amend those laws from time to time, not in deference to ever-varying political theories, or the interests of race or class, or nationality, but so as to promote in ever-increasing degree the progress and welfare of all its members.

It is this combination of absolute dedication to all one's fellow-citizens with the right of active participation in the work of law-making and government which is the essence of the citizenship of a true commonwealth. And, as *The Commonwealth of Nations* shows, it has been this principle, born in Greece, and perfected and developed by the Anglo-Saxons, which has been the key to the political progress of the human race.

Nationalism v. Empire

III. NATIONALISM v. EMPIRE

FROM this examination of the nature of citizenship and of the State it follows that no one can be a citizen of two States at the same time. For if the laws of two sovereign communities require an individual to act in conflicting ways, he has to choose between the two. He has to repudiate allegiance to one State or the other, because he cannot obey the laws of both. This fact, owing to the huge migration from Europe in recent years, has not always been clearly understood. But, if there were any doubt on the subject, it has been dispelled by the recent internment as enemy aliens in all belligerent countries of thousands of people who, though long residents in these countries, had never formally repudiated their old allegiance and taken on in its place the obligations of citizenship in their new homes by a formal act of naturalisation. The war, indeed, has abundantly demonstrated the searching and inexorable nature of the obligations of citizenship.

It has also brought out the fundamental importance of the question which lay at the root of THE ROUND TABLE enquiry. If the primary duty of the individual is to obey the laws of the sovereign community to which he belongs, it is of paramount importance that he should know which State it is to which he actually belongs. In the case of the British citizen, is it to the British Empire, or to his national community within it, that his primary allegiance is owed? In other words, is the Empire one State or is it an association of States? If the laws and commands of the Imperial Legislature and of the Canadian, Australian, and other national Legislatures conflict, which is he to obey?

It is quite clear that in constitutional theory and in fact the Empire to-day is one State. It is one State because, when it is declared to be at war by the Imperial Government, all its citizens are at war; because the national

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constitutions of the several parts are derived from the sovereign Imperial Parliament, which, in theory, has the power to revoke or amend them at will ; and because, if any self-governing community determined to pursue in regard to foreign nations in some matter of vital importance a course which was inconsistent with the deliberate policy of the Imperial Cabinet or the laws of the Imperial Parliament, it would find that it could do so only by severing its connection with the British Empire—a severance which would be announced either by its own Government or by the Imperial Government as the only method by which the latter could repudiate responsibility for the consequences of its conduct. If, therefore, a conflict arose between the Imperial Government and the Government of any self-governing part, the duty of the citizen to-day would clearly be to obey the Imperial rather than the national command. From the constitutional point of view there is not the slightest doubt that that is the position to-day. To put it in its most familiar form, every British subject's allegiance is to the King.

Yet it is obvious that constitutional theory, if it were brought to the test, would not wholly coincide with practical fact. The Imperial Parliament has almost abdicated its position as a sovereign legislature by abandoning in practice its claim to legislate for or to tax the Dominions. It has not absolutely abdicated it, because, as we have seen in this war, it can and has, put them into a state of war, with revolutionary results on their national lives, and that without even a pretence at consulting them. But for everyday purposes it admits that it has no right to tax or legislate for the peoples of the Dominions. Similarly in the vast majority of cases the overseas citizen thinks of himself to-day as a citizen of his Dominion first and of the Empire second, and if a conflict of opinion arose between the Dominion Parliament and the Imperial Parliament he would instinctively feel that he ought to support his own Parliament as against the Imperial Parliament.

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There is clearly an anomaly here. The Empire is one State in law. Yet it has no legislature which is universally recognised as being entitled to make laws for all its members, and great communities within it not only repudiate its authority to legislate for them but regard themselves as almost independent allies of the parent community, perfectly free to act as they choose, rather than as part and parcel of the same State. How serious and disastrous an anomaly this is, and how disastrous its consequences might be, can be seen by considering what must happen directly there is a conflict of opinion between the Imperial Parliament and a Dominion Parliament on a matter of vital importance, in respect of which a decision (as in the case of a war) cannot be postponed, and in which agreement is found to be impossible. The original dispute would then immediately become swallowed up in a far graver question. For the Dominion people would then find themselves faced with two alternatives, and two alternatives only: they would either have to submit to the law of the Imperial Parliament or to separate from the Empire. No third course would be open to them, if agreement were found impossible. Needless to say, this is the one issue which every responsible citizen hopes will never be presented, for however vigorous their nationalism may be, the overwhelming majority of the citizens of the Empire are not less proud and tenacious of their citizenship of the Empire than they are of their national rights. Yet the overwhelming testimony of history, as we shall see in the next section, confirms the lesson of recent events, in proving that it is no more possible to shirk this question by ignoring it than it was possible to get rid of the German menace by ignoring it.

So long as the world slept in a peace which most people assumed to be eternal, it was not difficult for the Empire to jog along on co-operative lines. Each Dominion, almost wholly preoccupied in its own internal development, was content to leave the control of foreign policy to the

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British Government. The Imperial Parliament, having admitted that it could not tax or legislate for the Dominions, was so habituated to carrying the whole responsibility for foreign policy that it was able to persuade the people of the British Isles to continue to bear practically the whole burden of Imperial defence on their own shoulders. The war has made it impossible that this situation should last much longer. The Dominions are not only going to be actively interested in the peace terms, especially those relating to the disposition of territory in Africa and the Pacific, but, having realised what war means to themselves, they are going to be not less actively interested after the war is over in the policy which secures their own safety and the peace of the world, and which adjusts the growth and influence of European and Asiatic Powers. We realise now that wars are not made in a fortnight, but are the outcome of the diplomacy of many years. Great Britain, on the other hand, burdened with an immense debt will not be able to bear for ever the whole cost of Imperial defence by herself, nor is she likely to be willing to make good, by supplementary estimates of her own, promised contributions to Imperial defence from the Dominions which have not been forthcoming. The adjustment of a common policy in Imperial affairs and, still more, the enactment of the laws necessary for the carrying out of such a common policy, if it can be arrived at, will often be extremely difficult. Everything will have to be done by negotiation between five governments, and much of it must perforce be conducted by letter or cable. Disagreements between peoples situated at opposite corners of the earth, each looking at every question from its own angle, and having no effective machinery for ensuring that the common policy shall take into account its own views and needs, are, sooner or later, certain. And when such disagreements do arise there will always lurk in the immediate background the uneasy feeling that at any moment the question may resolve itself into a choice between acquiescing in the decision of un-

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representative imperial authority and breaking up the Empire. Under present conditions every inter-imperial question tends to put a strain on the loyalty of the communities of the Empire to their common State.

It is not difficult to see what the root of the trouble is. It consists in the fact that the British Commonwealth to-day is not a true commonwealth, it is an English Empire, or rather an Empire governed by the United Kingdom. Its common affairs are controlled solely by the people of the British Isles, and the Cabinet and Parliament through which they control them is the same Cabinet and Parliament which is responsible for the Dominion affairs of the United Kingdom. The peoples of the Dominions, on the other hand, have liabilities from Imperial policy, but they have a share neither in the control over nor in the responsibility for that policy. The Imperial constitution, therefore, offends against those canons of the Commonwealth already set forth. The sense of common obligation has grown weak, because the first principle of liberty, the sharing of power and responsibility in common, has been infringed. The remedy cannot be permanently found in any mechanism for enabling five separate communities to adjust their common policy and determine their several liabilities by co-operative means, for, apart from the practical impossibility of conducting a true government by the co-operation of five governments, no such arrangement solves the fundamental difficulty that the Imperial Foreign Secretary and his associates must be responsible to one Parliament and the electorate which chooses it. They cannot be responsible to five. Hence, when the five fail to agree, the Imperial Ministers will inevitably adopt the policy acceptable to Britain, and the rest will once more be faced with the intolerable alternatives of compliance or secession.

It is indeed obvious that events are bound, sooner or later, to drive the peoples of the Empire into one of two solutions: either a formal separation involving the dissolution of the Empire and the destruction of British

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citizenship, or a federal reconstruction which will clearly delimit the federal and the national spheres, and reaffirm the unity of the British Commonwealth as a single State by creating for federal purposes a Legislature and Cabinet representative of all its self-governing citizens. Such a constitution would separate entirely the domestic affairs of the United Kingdom from the affairs of the Empire, by entrusting the former to a Dominion Legislature of the British Isles. It would resolve the original difficulty in which the Transvaaler, newly become a South African citizen, found himself, by defining clearly when the Englishman, the Canadian, and the Australian was to obey the national laws and when the Imperial laws. And if it followed the principle of the American and Australian constitutions, not only would Imperial affairs be conducted by a truly Imperial Parliament, but the sovereign power of the Empire would be transferred from the Imperial Parliament to the people, by providing that no alteration could be made in the spheres of the national and the Imperial Parliaments without a reference in some way or other to the people of the Empire themselves.

IV. THE LESSONS OF HISTORY

IT is hardly sufficient, however, to rely entirely upon analysis and argument to prove the inexorable nature of the alternatives which will thus sooner or later confront the citizens of the Empire. *The Commonwealth of Nations* therefore examines in great detail the chief historical precedents, and it shows that on four separate occasions the English-speaking world has been confronted with the same issue in almost identical form.

The first occasion arose at the Union of England and Scotland. The two countries had been united by a common Crown since 1603, when James I and VI came to the throne. The Parliaments were left separate, but so long as the King wielded the supreme power no serious diffi-

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culties arose. But no sooner did the Parliaments take into their own hands the sovereign power than an acute controversy arose. To which Parliament was the Cabinet which conducted foreign affairs to be responsible? It could not be responsible to both, if they disagreed. And even if the Cabinet were adroit enough to conduct for a time a policy which was satisfactory to both, how was it to ensure that the laws necessary to give effect to foreign treaties, or to secure the defence of the two kingdoms, were to be passed simultaneously and in identical form? And how was it to ensure that each Parliament would vote promptly its own share of the cost of the common defence? After repeated efforts to conduct the common affairs of the two countries by co-operative means, in which it became clear that the system meant that not only was the Scottish Parliament always getting the English Government into difficulties with foreign Powers, yet that at the final crisis Scotland always had to submit to the decisions of the English Ministry, matters were brought to a head by three Acts of the Scottish Parliament. The first declared that "no person being King of England shall have power of making war . . . without consent of Parliament, and that no declaration of war without consent aforesaid shall be binding on the subjects of his kingdom." The second provided that ambassadors representative of Scotland and accountable to the Parliament of Scotland should be present whenever the King had occasion to treat with foreign princes or States. And the third enacted that, failing acceptance by England of certain Scottish demands, the Crowns of England and Scotland were to be separated at the death of Queen Anne. It was clear that if these Acts were carried into effect they would divide the people of England and Scotland, who had already been united for one hundred years, into two separate States. When it came to the point, however, of facing the inevitable consequence—namely, diplomacy, and possibly war, as the only means of adjusting their interests,

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and dangerous weakness for each in the face of continental perils—both countries hesitated. Commissioners were appointed by each, and the problem was solved by uniting the two peoples in one Parliament representative of the people of the whole island.

The causes which led to the Union between Ireland and Great Britain are very much the same. The Union was precipitated by the granting of complete legislative independence to the Irish Parliament in 1782. They are outlined in another part of this issue.*

But for present-day problems the remaining two cases are even more illuminating. Owing to the novel circumstances of their origin, the status of the American colonies within the British realm was never clearly defined. And unfortunately during the long peaceful days which followed the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 they came to be looked on as trading settlements rather than as nascent societies or nations, or even as integral parts of the original State from which they derived. The bond between them and the Motherland was regarded not as a mutual obligation based on common citizenship, but as a contract whereby Britain controlled their trade with foreign countries in her own interest, and in return guaranteed their safety from foreign attack—an arrangement which for decades commanded the assent of both parties.

The inherent defect in this arrangement was revealed after the long and exhausting war with France, a war which resulted in the conquest of Canada, and the securing of the great American West as a hinterland for the colonists. Almost the whole expense of this war, by which the Americans profited, had been borne by the already overburdened British taxpayer, and the British Government felt it imperative that the colonies should contribute regularly to the defence, not of the Empire, but of America itself. They regarded themselves the more justified in making this demand because the

* *Ireland and the Empire*, p. 614.

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restrictions on trade with foreign countries which represented the colonial side of the bargain under the commercial system were being consistently evaded, and the colonists not only traded with foreign countries, but even with the enemy in time of war, to the grave detriment both of Great Britain and of themselves. The sequel is familiar to everybody. The question was brought to a head by the rebellion of the Indians under Pontiac, the cost of which was mainly borne by British taxpayers. The British Government determined to tax the colonists. The colonists refused to pay taxes levied by a Parliament in which they were not represented. The quarrel ended in civil war, and with the assistance of autocratic France the colonies finally broke away.

The Commonwealth of Nations points out that the split of 1776-83 was due not so much to the special folly and selfishness of the leaders on either side, as to the failure of the Anglo-Saxon world to adapt its institutions to the changing conditions of the time, mainly owing to the demoralising effect of the doctrines of the commercial system. Neither people could lift itself above its own narrow point of view. There was a general inability to realise that both Americans and British were members of one commonwealth, and that, if a constitutional impasse arose, it did not prove that the commonwealth should split in two, and its peoples repudiate their obligations to one another, but that the constitution itself should be amended. There was no sufficient body of opinion in England which recognised that it was impossible to expect the Americans to be loyal to Great Britain, and that if any legislature were to tax them, it must be one representative of the Americans as well as of the British. Similarly, there was no sufficient body of opinion in America which realised that the essence of citizenship was responsibility and that they could not claim indefinitely the privileges of self-government without assuming their proportionate share of its burdens, and that if they objected to taxation

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for their own defence being imposed from England their proper course was to adopt the course recommended by the Albany Conference of 1753, and create a common assembly to deal with their common affairs and tax all Americans for American defence. Had this happened, had the American colonies undertaken the responsibility for purely American defence, can there be any doubt that the split would have been avoided, that they would have assisted Great Britain in the struggle of freedom against the Napoleonic autocracy, instead of fighting on Napoleon's side, and that at some later date when travel was quicker and easier some machinery would have been devised whereby they could have shared in common the tremendous responsibilities which, as we shall see, now rest upon the British Commonwealth. And had they done so, it is hardly open to doubt that the present attempt of Prussia on the liberties of the world would never have been made. As it was, each side dully persisted in its own attitude until the crash came. Even then, a large body of colonists, recognising the true nature of citizenship, migrated to Canada rather than forfeit their membership of the older Commonwealth.

No sooner, however, were the colonies separated from the British Empire than they discovered the fallacy which underlay the idea for which they had been fighting. Directly the unity which had been given to them by their common membership of the original commonwealth was destroyed, they found that they had to create for themselves that very union, with its necessary concomitant, a legislating and taxing assembly for the people of all the colonies, which they had refused to make while under the British Crown. It was impossible for them to go on their way on the theory that each colony was sovereign and could alone tax and legislate for itself. There were common American affairs, notably defence, foreign affairs, and finance which could not be handled by voluntary co-operation between thirteen different States. The Confederation

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of 1781 was an attempt to deal with American affairs by the free and voluntary co-operation of thirteen States. It broke down hopelessly. It was impossible to secure unanimity in the necessary legislation, promptitude in financial or military contributions, or obedience to the authority of the Confederation. Every State necessarily looked at American problems from its own point of view. Every State waited to see that its neighbours lived up to the decisions of Congress before living up to them themselves, until the system ended in bankruptcy and the paralysis of all government. Seven years of bitter experience sufficed to show that unless America was to be condemned to a repetition of the disunion and armaments of Europe, unless the colonies were to be for ever squabbling and fighting over every dispute and especially over the share which each colony was to have in the new territories to the West, they must create for themselves a legislature which could tax and legislate for all Americans, and to which was entrusted the sole control of their common affairs. Under the wise guidance of George Washington and Alexander Hamilton they invented a federal system, which while it left the fullest possible measure of self-government to the States created also an effective common government for American affairs.

The full significance, however, of what the makers of the American constitution had done in 1787 was not finally demonstrated until eighty years later, when the question of whether slavery was to be extended to the new States of the West, brought to a head the question of whether the allegiance of the citizen was primarily owed to his own State or to the United States. The action of South Carolina in repudiating the authority of the Federal Government made it impossible for the issue to be burked any longer. It was necessary for every citizen to make up his mind one way or the other. And in the outcome, under the steady guidance of Abraham Lincoln, it was decided, at the cost of a million lives, that in 1787 the

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American people had created not an association of sovereign States, but one new State. The American Civil War proved that the foundation of a Federal Commonwealth, like that of every other commonwealth, is the dedication of every individual to the whole body of citizens which come within the boundaries of the commonwealth. In the ultimate analysis his allegiance is due neither to the State Legislature nor to the Federal Legislature, but to those constitutional laws which represent the covenant of the whole people as to the form of government under which they should live, and which can only be altered by a procedure which is tantamount to a special decision of the people themselves.

V. THE FUNCTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH

THESE historical precedents abundantly confirm the conclusions already advanced as to the way out of the dilemma which confronts the South African and every other citizen of the Dominions to-day. Sooner or later the self-governing peoples of the Empire will have to choose between separation into independent sovereign States or federation. However well we may manage to get along in the meantime on co-operative lines and through a development of the Imperial conference, in the long run we shall be forced along one course or the other, not by the activities of enthusiasts or agitators, but by the inevitable pressure of facts. It is worth while therefore, in conclusion, to form some estimate of what is the real value to ourselves and to the world of the British Empire, which we shall thus make or mar.

The first and most obvious function of the British Empire is to preserve the liberty of its citizens and the safety of their ideals. In a world in which ancient States are daily becoming greater and more organised, in which new States, the character of whose civilisation is still in doubt, are growing steadily in importance and power, it

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is manifest that only in unity can the communities of the Empire make certain of their freedom and make certain also that the institutions and civilisation which they have inherited and which they have helped to make will endure. Isolated they would be impotent and without influence in the world. United they have resources within their territories which, once properly organised, will both give them an unassailable defence, and will ensure that they will continue among the leading nations among men.

But there are two other functions of the Empire which are not so usually recognised. On the first *The Commonwealth of Nations* throws a flood of light. It shows how the Empire came into being as the direct and almost inevitable outcome of the discovery by Henry the Navigator of a sailing vessel capable of crossing the ocean, and that perhaps its most important function has been and still is to adjust the relations between East and West. The effect of the advent of drink and firearms, the financial adventurer and concessionaire, even of the honest trader and missionary, in dissolving the societies of Asia and Africa has often been set forth in the pages of *THE ROUND TABLE*. Communities which were able to manage their own affairs sufficiently well under a tribal system, or the great semi-religious despotisms of the East, began to crumble into ruins under the ideas and forces brought to bear upon them after the seas were opened by Henry the Navigator. Of all the non-European peoples the Japanese alone have been able of their own accord to readjust their national life to the knowledge and methods of the West. In all other cases the outcome is still uncertain, as in Mexico, Persia and China; or there has been total collapse, as in India, Egypt and Africa. Owing to her detachment from Europe and her sea power, it fell mainly to the lot of Great Britain to deal with these problems as they developed in the years which followed, with the result that under pressure of necessity rather than of set purpose she gradually came to assume responsibility for the government of the vast

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tropical territories now included in the British Commonwealth.

The earliest responsibility was India. After a preliminary period of mistakes and of failure, the British people realised that it was impossible to confine their relations with India to commerce, and that if the disorder and chaos which followed the collapse of the Mogul Empire was not to grow continually worse, from the unrestrained activities of their own traders, it was necessary for some civilised nation to take charge, restore law and order, and protect the people not only against their own marauders and destroyers, but against the far more powerful influences for evil which emanated from Europe. This function the British Commonwealth has continued to discharge ever since. For more than a century it has maintained those elements of law and order which have enabled the individual to enjoy liberty and justice and reap the fruit of his own labours, and the foreigner to trade in security and peace, and has watched over and assisted the process by which the ancient civilisation of the East has, gradually but without serious bloodshed, begun to readjust itself to the new knowledge introduced from the West. It is ridiculous to suppose that the British Indian administration has been perfect, and that no mistakes or crimes have been committed. But no dispassionate enquirer can dispute that since the Warren Hastings trial conditions have been incomparably better for all concerned than would have been the case had the Westerner been left a free hand to do in India what he has done in the Congo, the Putumayo and elsewhere.

This same process has been going on in other parts of the tropical world until the Empire is now responsible for maintaining law and order among a quarter of the population of the earth. Of late years, however, the earlier problem of conducting a government which would protect the inhabitants against internal chaos following on irresponsible exploitation from the West has been supple-

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mented by another problem, that of gradually enabling the people to assume control of their own government under the new conditions resulting from contact between the older and the newer civilisations. No society can be permanently healthy which does not govern itself. Government from above is often the preliminary necessity in order to sweep away abuses, to protect a politically backward people from outside forces they have not learnt to control, to enable them in peace to learn the meaning of civilised law and order. But it is essentially transitional, paving the way, by education and the tradition of good administration, for the time when its people, having grasped the principle of citizenship, can begin to take an active share in building a better world for themselves.

The business of transfer, however, is a matter of infinite difficulty. Self-government is not a mere question of democratic machinery. It implies the growth of a sober sense of responsibility, interest in and knowledge of public questions, the breakdown of those barriers of creed and caste which make any true democracy impossible, and grasp of the meaning of the reign of law. Every advanced community has now come to realise that the democratic form of government is liable to as great abuses as the autocratic, that government by the passions of the mob, or by unknown political bosses who buy or otherwise control ignorant votes, produces the gravest evils, and that the only security for democracy is the knowledge and public spirit of the voter himself. While actual responsibility is necessary for the development of that knowledge and public spirit, no greater injury could be inflicted on a young people than to hand over the whole responsibility for government prematurely to local politicians. The inevitable result is that the poorest and most ignorant are exploited for the benefit of the privileged classes before they have reached the stage when they have any reasonable chance of protecting themselves.

It is difficult, therefore, to imagine a greater or a more

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important task which lies upon any people than that of helping the 370,000,000 human beings of every grade of civilisation, who are now members of the British Commonwealth to acquire that education and training which will enable them eventually to govern themselves. Yet that task rests upon the responsible peoples of the British Commonwealth to-day. It cannot be handed over to any other Power. The war has revealed how fatal it would be for India and humanity that a reactionary Power like Germany should take over the charge. It would not only mean the choking down of all liberal ideas and the teaching of some inhuman kultur, but that the resources and peoples of these vast territories would be organised and conscribed to create military power with which to master the world. Nor can the task be abandoned, half completed. India, for instance, a continent in itself, divided as Europe is by race and language, and containing 315,000,000 people, of whom the vast majority are illiterate and totally unable to cast a vote intelligently for anything but the narrowest of local affairs, could not be suddenly left to govern itself. For many years yet the responsible peoples of the Commonwealth must continue to be responsible for law and progress in India. And if this task is to be successfully accomplished it is practically essential that the conservative tradition of Britain should be combined with the initiative and the robust confidence in self-government of the younger democracies across the seas.

The third function has been revealed by the war itself. The most obvious lesson of the war is the evils which inevitably arise from the separation of humanity into separate sovereign States. In the present stage of civilisation it cannot be otherwise, but it means that where the interests or aspirations of these communities conflict, as they are bound continually to conflict, there is no final method of adjusting them save a trial of strength in diplomacy or war. Within a State the final settlement between

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the conflicting views and interests of sections or parts, is the decision of a Monarchy or a Parliament which is able to survey the question with regard to the interests of the whole, and then to enact a law settling it, which all citizens are bound to obey until they can persuade the sovereign authority to amend it. In the international sphere that method of settlement, the sole one which can prevent war, is impossible. Whatever progress may be made towards unity and peace by means of arbitration, the development of international law, the insistence on respect for public right, the fundamental difficulty remains that the several States retain their sovereign independence, that there is no final method of settling differences between them, differences it may be on matters of vital principle, if they cannot agree, save recourse to war. Whatever may be done to diminish the probability of war, war itself will only be abolished and the practical brotherhood of man will only be realised when the separate States, having reached the same standards of civilisation and justice in their laws, agree to unite their members irrevocably to one another by common membership of one world commonwealth.

The British Empire obviates the danger of war between a quarter of the human race. Within it are to be found communities of almost every race and colour, and of every grade and civilisation. Within it are to be found not nationalities alone, but nations, acutely conscious of their national identity. Yet defective as its machinery still is, it binds them all together under the rule of one constitutional law, and it possesses a Legislature and a Cabinet which can, in the last resort, with the assistance of the Imperial Conference, review disputes from the point of view of the welfare of all, and settle them by means of a law which all are in duty bound to obey. That is a tremendous contribution to the peace of the world. It would be a terrible set-back if that unity were dissolved; if its communities were to narrow their allegiance to

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themselves alone, to have no other method of finally adjusting their disputes save diplomacy and war, to possess no constitutional machinery whereby they could mobilise their common resources in self-defence, and especially for that best of all forms of self-defence, the vindication of liberty and public right. It would not only be a setback for the people of the Commonwealth themselves. It would be the overthrow of the surest signpost that the world has seen, that it will eventually be possible to unite all races and all nations, under the rule of law. If existing machinery is defective, the right course is clearly not to dissolve the Commonwealth but to amend its constitution so that a truly representative legislature will possess authority in common affairs in all parts.

The British Empire, therefore, is far more than a convenience to its members, gradually outgrowing its usefulness. It is in fact the corner stone of human society. No greater disaster to this world could be conceived than that it should dissolve in ruins. Yet, if the conclusions to which *THE ROUND TABLE* enquiry and *The Commonwealth of Nations* have led are true, it is certain that sooner or later the citizens of the Empire will be forced to adopt a federal constitution divorcing the control of Imperial affairs from the politics and the social system of the British Isles, if the Empire itself is not to collapse. With that we may leave the question. The issue may not come up for final decision for many years. But it may be forced upon us by events sooner than any of us expect. It is not possible, therefore, to begin to make up our minds too soon on what is at bottom the essential question—are we determined that come what may the Empire shall endure? Until we have answered that question to ourselves our road cannot be clear. But when we have done so, we shall know whether at every crisis we shall vote for weakening the Imperial bond, or for steps, which, however long they may take to reach the final goal, will end in the creation of the first true federation of nations.

THE PROBLEM OF THE DISABLED

A WAR medal and the workhouse have too often been the reward of the men disabled in former wars, and, unless the problem is tackled boldly and at once, there is every prospect that this war will repeat the scandal of the past on a colossal scale. Already the question is urgent. By the end of July more than forty thousand men had been discharged from the British Army alone as physically unfit for further service. Of this number it is estimated that about half have returned to their old employment. Of the remainder a considerable section would still be undergoing medical treatment. But making every allowance for those who have resumed employment or are still unfit for work, there must remain many who are unemployed and are fast becoming unemployable. In these cases the process of deterioration is terribly rapid. All who have experience in dealing with discharged soldiers agree that in the majority of cases a man who remains unemployed for three months after his discharge is past praying for, and what is true of the discharged soldier in general applies with special force to the disabled man. It is not primarily a question of pension. The most liberal scale of pensions ever suggested will not check this waste of manhood, which, in its ultimate effect on the community, entails a loss difficult to over-estimate.

The disabled man deteriorates because he has no interest in life. He feels himself to be a marked man, a member of an unfortunate class, cut off from the normal life of his fellows. He broods over his disability, and too often he

Contributed.

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is persuaded that his services to the community entitle him to be kept in idleness for the rest of his life. There will, of course, be a considerable number of men so completely crippled as to be incapable of any work at all. For these men the utmost that can be done is to alleviate their lot by providing medical attendance and skilled nursing. Where a totally disabled man has a home he will probably be happier in it than in the most palatial institution. But helpless cases need constant and experienced nursing, and where they are left in their own homes it will usually be necessary to arrange for some system of visiting by qualified nurses. For helpless cripples who have no relatives able or willing to look after them, there is no alternative but institutional treatment. But in selecting sites for institutions of this kind it is important to guard against what may be called the landscape fallacy. Various owners of remote mansions in beautiful surroundings have offered them as permanent homes for the disabled, regardless of the fact that an appreciation of natural beauty is usually undeveloped, and that, in the case at any rate of the town-bred man, scenery is a poor substitute for society.

But the real difficulty and the most urgent arises in the case of the partially disabled. Here the whole problem is to restore the man's confidence in himself, to make him realise that he is not a wreck but a citizen still capable of serving the community to which he belongs. The false psychology of the sentimentalist tends to encourage instead of eradicating that despondency and dependence which are usually far more difficult to cure than physical disability, and inevitably end in boredom and misery. The only hope for the disabled is to arouse in them the will to serve. A useless future is the worst reward for a glorious past. It is fatal to encourage the natural propensity of the human mind to think that happiness is to be found in plenty and idleness and not in work. The right that every disabled man can claim is that the community should spare no pains to help him to learn how to support himself and to be of

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service to his fellows. The truest charity is to enable a man to do without charity, and to pension a man instead of training him is a counsel of despair.

This co-operation between the community and the disabled citizen should begin from the first moment the man is able to leave his bed. The seeds of many habits which he will find it difficult to overcome, and of much avoidable despondency, are sown in the very early days. The wounded are too often left to loaf about the streets or the hospital grounds when they might already be learning the beginnings of a new life; or else they are given menial drudgery which simply creates in them the sense that they are already cast away upon the scrap heap. Not only in institutions specially designed for the purpose, but in many a hospital, half the battle would be won by making the men who can never return to active service feel that the same practical interest is taken in training them for a new start in civilian life as in training the less seriously wounded for a fresh turn in the trenches. A man who finds no one interested in him will soon despair of himself.

In this, as in so many other matters, France has led the way. In the late autumn of 1914 the energetic Mayor of Lyon had founded l'Ecole Joffre, which has since formed the model for other and larger schools in Paris, Bordeaux, Havre, and other French cities. L'Ecole Joffre was itself modelled on the training school at Charleroi, which was founded to deal with men disabled by industrial accidents, and the guiding principle of its founders is summed up in the word "re-education." It aims at developing any latent capacities of its pupils, and it starts on the assumption that a man whose incapacity prevents him from returning to his old occupation can and ought to be taught a new one. The sacrifice these men have made has earned them the right to a fresh start in life. In France the establishment of these institutions has been left to municipal enterprise, but there are obvious advantages in a co-ordinated system. It is to be hoped that in our case,

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instead of leaving the great industrial cities to establish independent institutions each on its own lines, some correlation in system and inspection will be secured. For instance, there should be one principal centre, which would serve not only for experimental purposes but also as a school for instructors, who could be trained under the supervision of medical and surgical experts familiar with the methods so successfully adopted at Lyon and St. Maurice. Qualified instructors could then be drafted to other training centres, and in this way the experience of the central institution would become generally available. The principal institution would serve both as a model and as a centre for research.

It is essential that these instructors should be of the right type. The perfunctory instructor who teaches by rote is worse than useless. The work needs enthusiasts who will be sympathetic without being sentimental, who realise the importance of thoroughness, order and discipline, and who will be able to inspire their pupils with a zeal for work and a belief in their own ability to do good work. These instructors must in the first instance be able-bodied men, but wherever disabled men show conspicuous aptitude they should be trained to act as instructors in their turn. The experience of Sir Arthur Pearson at St. Dunstan's has shown that the blind themselves make the best teachers for the blind. This is, of course, an extreme case, but generally speaking it will be found that at any rate the minor instructional posts should, wherever possible, be filled by men who are themselves disabled. The first difficulty with any disabled man is to persuade him that he can learn, and the example of an instructor who is himself a disabled man cannot fail to have a stimulating effect. Every man under training ought at the earliest possible stage to be given some special duty, however unimportant. He should be made to feel that he is individually responsible for something, and that he owes a duty to his fellows to carry out his task.

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It seems best that institutional training should be limited to special cases and to men whose health is so far impaired that they cannot hope to obtain employment under ordinary commercial conditions. Institutions, however, should also be available for the treatment of neurasthenics. Neurasthenia cases are already very numerous, and if neurasthenics are allowed to return to their own homes without any provision for their after-treatment they will become the victims of sentimental charity, and in a few months' time will be in fact as incapable of work as at the time of their discharge they believe themselves to be. The difficulty in cases of this kind is to persuade the men that they really can work, and the most hopeful method of doing this would be to treat them institutionally. It is not desirable to establish special institutions for this purpose, and the men could be treated more effectually if they were employed in company with other disabled men.

But as a general rule it is not desirable to take men away from their homes, and in the majority of cases it ought to be possible to provide adequate facilities in the larger towns. The arguments in favour of the Murray Committee's policy of utilising as far as possible the facilities for technical instruction which already exist are unanswerable, if only because any alternative policy would probably be ruled out on financial grounds. But the successful adaptation of existing technical training institutes to "re-education" depends upon three conditions: the proper training of instructors, the formation of separate classes for the disabled, and a judicious selection of trades. The first point has already been discussed. The necessity for separate classes for disabled men is obvious, though it is to be feared that in the interests of economy there will be a tendency, where the number of disabled men is small, to compel them to attend the ordinary classes. This would be a most unfortunate arrangement. The French experiments have shown clearly that once a certain point

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is reached the disabled man often learns a new trade with astonishing rapidity. But in the early stages he is naturally slow, and liable to fits of depression which make the initial steps in training very difficult. Success depends on restoring a man's confidence in himself by a gentle but continued encouragement, exactly as in the new orthopædic hospitals muscular control is revived by the stimulus of a relatively mild electric current. If a disabled man is forced into an ordinary class and required to compete with the ambitious young apprentice he will soon become discouraged, and the result will be inevitable failure. As, however, technical classes are usually held in the evening and the buildings are rarely required for other purposes during the day, there should be no difficulty in the way of arranging special classes for disabled men in the day. The cost would be limited to the instructors' fees and the cost of heating and cleaning.

The choice of trades must obviously be determined not only by the aptitude of the individual but also by local conditions, and the demand for labour in any particular trade. It is manifestly useless to train men for already overcrowded employments. But subject to these qualifications, it is desirable in the case of men who have been trained to a skilled trade to select new trades more or less analogous to those in which they were formerly engaged. This has the advantage that the men will start with a certain familiarity with the new work and will therefore learn quicker. The success of the recent Toynbee Hall experiment in converting upholsterers into saddlers goes to show that a man who has learned one skilled trade can be taught another analogous to it in a surprisingly short time. A further advantage of selecting a new occupation akin to the old one is that it will help the men to find employment in the same area and the same environment as that in which they formerly worked. This point is important as there is a consensus of opinion in favour of getting the men back, wherever possible, to something like their old conditions. It is

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essential that the disabled man should be made to regard himself as a normal member of society. Nothing could be worse for him than to be constantly reminded of his disability, and this is one of the gravest objections to schemes which aim at herding the disabled together in residential colonies. The object of all training should be to make the man forget his disabilities or, though this is rather a counsel of perfection, to regard them as a handicap which only adds to the credit of success.

It ought not to be assumed in regard to any disabled man that he is incapable, with proper training, of acquiring a trade which demands more skill or intelligence than his former occupation. The results already obtained in France show that a man with natural intelligence but a defective education is far more adaptable than might have been supposed. But in spite of striking instances to the contrary it may be assumed as a rough working rule that a man's aptitude for learning a new trade varies inversely with his age, and that the great majority of those over 30 who were unskilled labourers or had no trade before enlistment will have to be absorbed in unskilled or relatively unskilled occupations.

Certain occupations requiring a good character and habits of punctuality and orderliness might to a large extent be reserved for disabled soldiers. The success of the Corps of Commissionaires shows what can be done in this direction, but it has to be remembered that the assets of the commissionaire are his good character and his habit of discipline. Much can be done, no doubt, by reserving for disabled soldiers posts as messengers, door-keepers, and lift-attendants in Government offices, and if the Government sets an example in the matter there should be no difficulty in securing similar posts in banks, insurance and other large offices. But in all these cases a good character and orderly habits are essential, and, while local War Pensions Committees can hardly go as far as the Corps of Commissionaires, which practically guarantees its men, it

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must be recognised that the policy of limiting minor posts of trust to disabled men will break down unless care is taken to select trustworthy men. It is a matter for consideration whether men selected for posts of this kind should not be required to deposit some caution money to be forfeited in the event of misconduct.

A movement has already been started in Lancashire to induce manufacturers to reserve a proportion of the lighter posts for disabled men, and this is all to the good as long as employers do not tempt the pensioner to undersell his able-bodied competitor. But the question of wages bristles with difficulties. It is clear that in any work involving much physical exertion the disabled man cannot usually over a prolonged period maintain the same output, and consequently be worth the same wage, as his able-bodied competitor. The possession of a pension will tempt him to accept a lower wage. Where piecework payment is applicable, this offers the simplest solution, but where payment has to be made on a time basis the equitable adjustment of rates will be no easy matter.

Various schemes are in contemplation for placing disabled men on the land, and it is no doubt important that the rural workers should, wherever possible, be brought back to the land. It is, however, much more doubtful whether men brought up in towns can ever usefully be settled on the land, and any schemes for co-operative small holdings for disabled men will probably have to be limited to country-bred men. There is undoubtedly room for experimental work here, but before large sums are spent in setting up permanent colonies, practical tests should be made. No disabled man should be settled on the land until he has been through some qualifying course at an experimental farm, and this qualifying course should be sufficiently long to make certain that the man has a real chance of earning some sort of livelihood. Market-gardening and poultry-farming should afford employment quite suitable to many cases.

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Special arrangements will have to be made to deal with incurable cases in which the nature of the disease allows of light work being done. In tuberculous cases in particular there will undoubtedly be an appreciable number of men who will never recover sufficiently to be discharged to their homes. If they are treated merely as hospital cases they will lose hope and consequently any power of resistance to the disease, and for this reason they should, wherever there is no prospect of ultimate recovery, be removed to special institutions which should be regarded as homes rather than as hospitals. Here it will be necessary to provide them with some occupation, not because any work that they are able to do is likely to be of any commercial value, but in order to afford them some distraction and to save them from brooding over their misfortune.

In considering the cost of establishing and running institutions, whether residential or otherwise, it is unwise to over-estimate the value of the work which they are likely to produce. They will no doubt turn out a certain quantity of articles which can be sold and the proceeds applied in reduction of current expenditure. But in estimating the extent to which these institutions can be made to pay their way, too much allowance should not be placed upon the past experience of organisations like the Soldiers' and Sailors' Help Society. There has always been a certain sale for articles produced by disabled soldiers, and no doubt for a short time after the war the market for products of this kind will be considerably increased. But this sale is to a large extent a sentimental sale, and as the recollection of the war begins to grow dim the sale will correspondingly decrease. After a few years, articles produced in these institutions will only sell on their own merits and at commercial prices. As these institutions cannot be run on a commercial basis, there will be a temptation, as the purely charitable sales fall off, to dispose of the output by undercutting the ordinary market. So far as the institutions are merely competing against foreign products, this is

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immaterial. But in all cases where they are likely to compete against the home producer any attempt to cut prices is to be deprecated. It would be manifestly unfair to allow workshops endowed out of State funds or private charity to compete against the home manufacturer, and any policy of this kind must, in the end, re-act against the institutions themselves, and would lead inevitably to friction, both with capital and labour. It might, however, be possible, following the policy adopted by the Prison Commissioners, to arrange for certain articles required for Government purposes to be supplied exclusively or mainly from these institutions for the disabled.

A question of great importance which is bound to arise in connection with the training of disabled men is the question of apprenticeship. Many skilled trades require a certain prescribed period of apprenticeship before the man is recognised by the trade organisations as a skilled workman. The normal apprentice enters as a boy and the period of apprenticeship is therefore fixed on the assumption that during the earlier years the apprentice will be too young to learn at all rapidly. Apprenticeship has also become a means of limiting the number of persons allowed to enter a particular trade. This restriction of entries can of course be paralleled in nearly all the learned professions. But it is admitted that, given some natural aptitude, an adult can learn most skilled trades in a much shorter period than is prescribed for a normal apprenticeship, and if disabled men are to begin to work at new trades within any reasonable time the consent of the trade unions must be obtained to their being classed as skilled men as soon as they are in fact capable of passing the necessary trade tests.

It is essential that the arrangements for training should be closely linked up with the hospital treatment. Before a man is discharged the local War Pensions Committee should receive a notification indicating the nature of the disability. Provisional arrangements for training should

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be made at once, and the man should be visited as soon as he reaches his home. In many cases, of course, patients are discharged before they are fit for employment, but as soon as the man is able to work he should be encouraged to make a start. No doubt many men will not at first be disposed to work, but every effort must be made to induce them to do so. Every week that is lost after recovery is complete will add to the difficulty of training. The co-operation of the hospital staffs in this work is of the utmost importance, and it would be an immense help if the doctors would encourage all men who obviously cannot return to active service to make up their minds what work they would like to undertake. A sensible doctor could do much to interest the man in his future career. If the desire to take up some definite type of employment is once aroused a real advance has been made.

These notes on the problem of the disabled have been pieced together not because they are particularly new, but partly because they are an attempt to summarise the available experience on the subject, and partly because the problem is daily becoming more urgent. The first necessity is the active and understanding interest of people who realise that the principle of treatment is to enable these shattered men to help themselves. The second is the introduction of some immediate co-ordination and system into the still too undirected effort which is now being put forth, or is ready to be put forth. Perhaps the gravest danger of the time is the tendency to rush into well-intentioned schemes to which philanthropic notabilities give their patronage without examining the merits of the proposals they so impulsively adopt. The problem is still in the experimental stage, and it offers a fruitful field for private enterprise, which, if properly directed, is capable of more elasticity than is possible under State control. But private enterprise which is ignorant, unregulated and unco-ordinated, may work irreparable harm; and the danger lies not in the waste of money but in the waste of

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men. The question of the relative spheres to be filled by State action and private enterprise is not easy to determine. But the clear principle is to adopt that system which will best enable the disabled individual to feel and prove that he is still a useful and a valued citizen.

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RECONSTRUCTION

DURING the last two months a change has come over the people of this country so noteworthy, and yet so silent and indefinable, as to deserve attention in these pages ; for no outside observer could discover it for himself from our newspapers, nor could he easily interpret it from the external demeanour of the population in street or train or office. It is a change of which most men and women are aware within themselves and of which, if they are observant and sensitive, they are conscious also in those around them, but which few care to acknowledge, still less to analyse, for to do so would stir the depths, and that the Englishman dislikes. This silent revolution is the reaction upon Britain of the great advance.

The greatest revolutions in this country have always been silent revolutions. We have always realised that outward changes are of no avail unless men's minds have been prepared beforehand to profit by them. We know that new social classes cannot be created in a moment to undertake the new tasks which may be ready for them. We have always believed in progress as a broadening down from precedent to precedent, and attempted to make ready the workmen before summoning them out to the harvest-field. English history is a record of startling achievements ushered in by silent revolutions. Without Wiclif and the Lollards there would have been no Reformation ; without the Puritans no Revolution ; without Wesley and

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the Evangelicals no abolition of the slave trade and no Factory Acts ; without the philosophic Radicals no colonial self-government ; without Thomas Arnold and the public school system no Indian Civil Service ; without the forty years' devoted labour of the elementary teacher no Kitchener's Army. It is the quiet work of the mind that makes revolutions possible. Without a change of outlook all external change is meaningless. But if the inner change has taken place, everything is possible, even the moving of mountains. And it is this silent inner change which is preparing the way for the new world after the war.

It is a change which is strangely compounded of the spirit of hope and the spirit of sacrifice—of the sense of coming victory and the ache of personal loss. We know now that the Empire and what it stands for are saved, that the old country will "carry on" for generations to come. But we know too that for tens of thousands life has henceforth lost much of its personal meaning, that there are gaps in the home circle which will never be filled, and that life will be a lonely pilgrimage to the end. Personal affections and ambitions have made way for a bigger cause. Life seems wider and more impersonal. Our fellow-countrymen seem nearer to us. Rank and class seem to count for less. All have suffered alike and all have served alike, and all have the same world to live in and to repair—a world that seems lonely at times beyond all bearing, yet is lit up with the flame of sacrifice and the undying memory of those who are gone.

How can we best bear our testimony to the spirit in which they died ? That is the question which underlies the activity which has sprung up during the last few months round the idea of reconstruction after the war. When reconstruction was first publicly mentioned in a House of Lords debate last December the idea that was in most men's minds was the difficulty of the sudden transition from a war to a peace footing. The Government was urged to prepare a "Peace-book" on the analogy

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of the "War-book" prepared by the Committee of Imperial Defence. But in the months that have since intervened reconstruction has taken on a wider scope. People have come to realise that what is needed is not a mere transitory programme to enable life to resume its normal pre-war channel, but some larger and more permanent policy, conceived in the spirit which the war has revealed. Less and less do we feel inclined to go back to "Business as usual," with all the narrow habits of thought and action that it implies. It cannot, we feel, ever really be "business as usual" with so many gone. There is a sense that an effort must be made to lift our whole public life, both on its political and economic sides, above the petty and disastrous contentiousness which disfigured it before the war. Men who have breathed the larger air of common sacrifice are reluctant to return to the stuffy air of self-seeking.

There is another respect in which a change is to be felt. We have become more acutely conscious than ever before that there have been two Englands—one the England of tradition, of the public, of the Army, of Parliament, in later years of industry and finance, the other the England of individuals who have maintained their personal independence, but have had but a dependent share in the great historic past. Many have discovered for the first time, what every foreigner sees, and what every Briton from across the oceans knows, that the British are not a nation as the French are a nation, because the revolution of social equality has never yet been made. The great mass of the nation are fighting even now not for an England which is themselves, but for an England which inherits noble traditions and fine qualities, but which is separated from them by the impalpable barrier of caste. This separation which has added bitterness to every political and economic dispute, has been wonderfully bridged in the trenches. There is a growing sense that it must be bridged at home. Social superiority and privilege must give way to common humanity and common sacrifice. In

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future we must be a more united and a more equal people than we have been in the past.

The effects of these tendencies are still obscure, but they are already to be seen in the programme of the work allotted by the Government to the Reconstruction Committee presided over by the Prime Minister. The subjects that are being enquired into by that body, working through a number of carefully manned sub-committees, cover a wide range of social and economic interest. Its investigations are not confined merely to problems of demobilisation, but cover "the entire range of subjects which will call for immediate treatment at the close of the war." The two most important of these are certainly education and the organisation of industry. It has already been announced that a Committee, presided over by Lord Crewe, the new President of the Board of Education, has been appointed to review the whole question of national education in the light of the war. The industrial enquiry, it may be imagined, will be on a similarly comprehensive scale, designed to probe into the causes of the contrast between the spirit of public service which the war has so strikingly revealed in all classes of the community and the habits and traditions of self-interest and class-antagonism which have become endemic in our commercial and industrial life.

Such enquiries go down to the very roots of our national life. If the recommendations put forward are wise and far-reaching, and the country is in a mood to adopt them, we may see the beginning of a new epoch of regenerative activity. For the most critical points in our national defences are, and have been for some time, the school, the workshop, and the slum. The war, as a whole, has been a triumphant vindication of the spirit of the country. But it has brought to light grave shortcomings, which it will need a generation of active work to repair. And it is work that needs most of all to be set on foot in the homes in which our children are reared, both in town and country,

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in the class-room and the teachers' training college whence their education proceeds, and in the office and workshop where they spend the greater part of their lives.

With the question of housing we do not propose to deal. It is a large and complex problem for itself. What was wrong with our pre-war organisation of industry can be stated in one word. It was inhuman. The coming of the joint stock company and the growth of large-scale undertakings had destroyed the old personal tie between masters and men and the sense of common service to the community that was associated with it. It has been replaced by mechanical profit-making organisations, which have not yet either been humanised or related to public service. Trade Unions and Employers' Associations are necessary parts of the organisation of a modern State, and collective bargaining is clearly an advance on the old unequal system of individual wage-contracts. But collective bargaining between large-scale organisations of employers and workmen involves a piling up of armaments on both sides not unlike that of the rival European groups before the war. At its best it preserves the peace by establishing a precarious balance of power: at its worst it precipitates a disastrous conflict: and, in either case, whether it works well or ill for the moment, it is non-moral and inhuman, for it has no basis in a sense of common service or public duty. Hence it creates a feeling of divided interest and permanent estrangement which has been all too visible to the rest of the community during the recurring industrial crises of the last ten years.

In this vicious situation a great national responsibility rests upon the leaders of both groups of combatants. "The future of the community depends on them working with and into one another." "The issues are too tremendous to be left to tests of strength." These words are quoted from the last book written by one who was both an employer and a teacher of economics, the late Professor

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Smart of Glasgow *: and he goes on to give his own remedy for improving the relations between Capital and Labour. "If they are not to be regulated," he says, "by a kind of martial law from above" (and Professor Smart, who was no Socialist, had no love for State intervention), "*they must be regulated by conscience.*" It is a very simple remedy—but how much more effective, if men would adopt it, than Compulsory Arbitration or the Munitions Act! And Professor Smart goes on, out of his own experience, to make a special appeal to employers. "Personally," he says, "I count it (the employers' function) the noblest profession of all, though, as a rule, it is taken up from anything but the noblest motives: and what I ask is—just this and no more—that the tradition of the professions be transferred to it—the *noblesse oblige* of living for their work and, if necessary, dying for it. If an employer has any faith in the well-worn analogy of an 'army of industry' he must believe in the necessity of Captains of Industry, who think first of their country and their men, and only second of their pay. . . . He must take the sins of his order upon himself and win back the confidence that meanwhile has disappeared. His task to-day, in fact, is very much that of a philosopher-king who comes to his throne after many days of misrule by his predecessors. He has no right to his honourable position but that he governs divinely. And, if I am not mistaken, the first thing that will test his worthiness for high office is the attitude he takes up to Trade Unionism."

Partnership and a sense of common duty, in other words, can only spring up out of mutual knowledge and understanding; and these cannot arise except as a result of ordinary unrestrained human intercourse—of frank and open conference by the leaders of both sides in the questions of common interest to them both. The first step to put into action the aspirations towards good will which the sacred memories of the war are stirring on both sides is

* *Second Thoughts of an Economist*, 1916, pp. 152-3.

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the establishment of joint representative Committees in the various industries to meet and discuss the problems of their common work. While we are thinking of reconstruction and of re-establishing the Public Law of Europe let us not forget the work of constructive organisation on similar lines that awaits us at home.

The work that lies before us in the field of national education is of a somewhat different kind. Here it is not so much a change of spirit and system that are required, but encouragement, consolidation, invigoration. The war has indeed revealed grave shortcomings of detail in English education, especially in its higher branches ; but on the whole it has been a vindication of its essential soundness. It has proved us a nation not only sound and strong in character but far more adaptable, both in soldiering and in industry, than either we or our enemies suspected. The number of our volunteers and the success of the New Army in France are a historic tribute not only to our homes but to our schools. Whatever may be said in criticism of British education, let this outstanding fact always be remembered.

But the grave defect of our national education is that there is not enough of it. There are not enough children in our elementary schools. There are not enough teachers to teach them. There is not enough provision for educating the teachers, either before or after they have begun teaching. There are not enough classrooms to make good teaching in small classes possible. There are not enough playing fields to enable the elementary schools to develop the corporate spirit by which battles are won. There are not enough secondary schools available for the children of the great mass of the population or sufficient facilities for the children of poor parents to reach those that exist. There is not enough access to the Universities, either from the schools or for adult students. There is not enough support for voluntary agencies, such as the Workers' Educational Association and the Adult Schools, which are

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trying to make democracy a reality by creating an educated public opinion on current problems. There is not enough contact between the great organised professions, including commerce and industry, and the national centres of knowledge. In a word, we have a system of education which, excellent in many of its parts, and filled with devoted workers, is lacking in unity and coherence, and testifies to a want of thought or of faith on the part of the nation as a whole.

Such a condition of affairs cannot continue into a time when men's minds will be concentrated on making up in the next generation what they have lost in their own. Great and far-reaching developments and extensions will be demanded. Three only can be mentioned here. The status of the teaching profession will need to be raised so as to attract more teachers. Already before the war and its wastage began the prospects for the profession were not bright. Of the 14,000 elementary teachers annually required to fill up vacancies, only about 5,000 were forthcoming, leaving an annual deficiency of 9,000. Moreover, of the total of 160,000 only some 60,000 were fully trained. These deficiencies can only be redressed by very largely increasing the present rates of pay and pension—especially for assistant teachers. Teachers should be paid enough to have money for books and a good holiday and ordinary social intercourse. It is the monotony and loneliness of so many teachers' lives, especially in the country, which deters so many from the profession. Secondly, no class should contain more than 30 pupils except in subjects where practically no individual teaching is required. This would transform the whole conditions of elementary school life and would attract to the profession thousands of "born teachers" who dare not face it at present. Thirdly, all exemptions under 14 should be abolished and provision should be made for part-time continuation education up to the age of 17 or 18. The years between 14 and 18 are perhaps the most important in life, and our social and industrial problems will never

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be solved so long as we continue to waste the fruits of the elementary school and to throw our young people out into the competitive struggle just at the age when they most want shielding. We have only to think of the children of the poor as though they were our own to realise what this means. The New Army has shown us how what is called "the public school spirit" can develop in new soil when it gets the chance. The Boy Scout Movement points the same moral. A Continuation School system not devoted to purely technical ends but laying stress on corporate life and on character will mean giving everybody the opportunity of passing through the stage of "public school life."

These changes will cost much money and we shall all be poorer after the war. They may more than double our education estimates. But even if the richer classes have to live much more wholesomely than they have hitherto, we must secure the health of the coming generation so that they can hand on the torch which the dead have so nobly borne.

CANADA

I. FRENCH IN THE SCHOOLS

DURING the last few months issues have appeared which may have permanent effects in Canadian politics. Perhaps incidents rather than issues is the truer word of interpretation. For the issues are as old as the Confederation. Four years ago regulations governing the teaching of French in the public and separate schools of Ontario were adopted by the Legislature. These regulations, with the historical background, are described with insight and true historical temper in *THE ROUND TABLE* for December, 1913. Briefly, it is provided that in communities where French is the prevailing language it shall be for two years the language of instruction in elementary classes, and for a further period if the inspectors so order. After two years of school life the language of instruction becomes English, but French is taught as a subject for at least an hour a day, and more if the inspectors so decide. It is argued, however, that these regulations apply only to schools in which French teaching was permitted "hitherto," and that the organisation of new schools in French communities is thus prohibited. The Ontario Government does not so interpret the regulations. But it is the deliberate intention to sanction French schools only where French is the prevailing language, and to provide for new schools by regulation rather than by statute. The Legislature acted four years ago not so much at the

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instance of opponents of French teaching as in response to the appeal of the Irish Roman Catholic element. Bishop Fallon, of London, the most eloquent and aggressive of their spokesmen, insisted that in separate schools attended by French and English speaking Catholics none of the pupils could obtain a decent education, and that the schools were distinguished for inefficiency and illiteracy. Substantially the Bishop's charges were sustained by a Commission appointed by the Government to investigate and report. Hence the new regulations and the rebellion at Ottawa. Under the leadership of the French Educational Association the schools at the federal capital were closed to the Provincial Inspectors. Submission to the new regulations was refused. The Separate School Board of Ottawa went so far in defiance of the Government that a Commission was named to take over its duties. The authority of this Commission was disputed. Five or six hundred pupils finally withdrew from the schools altogether, and there have been parades of children and parents in protest against the action and policy of the Ontario Government.

From the first the movement has had the benediction and support of Mr. Bourassa and the Nationalist group of Quebec. Throughout the churches of Quebec collections have been taken for the "wounded of Ontario," as the French Canadians of the Province are described. A measure was adopted in the Quebec Legislature authorising municipalities to make grants of money out of the parish taxes in order to assist the agitation against Ontario. The St. Jean Baptiste Society, the national organisation of French Canadians, makes this appeal: "In its capacity as a national society, and being sure of speaking for the immense majority of the population, the St. Jean Baptiste Society asks you to say what you think on this question, and also if you are ready to engage yourself to grant by voice and vote an allowance to the French Ontario minority. Many of the French clergy have denounced the Ontario

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regulations, and even urged that French Canadians should not enlist until the regulations were amended or rescinded. A demand for Disallowance by the Federal Government was refused on the ground that the Province of Ontario had not exceeded its constitutional authority. According to the Constitution French has equal status with English only in Quebec, in the Federal Parliament and in Federal Courts and documents. In a legal opinion prepared by Senator Belcourt of Ottawa, one of the leaders in the agitation against Ontario, the constitution is so interpreted. In the Debates at Confederation there is no suggestion that French should have legal recognition in the English Provinces. French, however, has generally been treated with consideration in the English communities, and the Ontario Government declares that it has no disposition or intention to enact or enforce regulations which will be unjust to French Canadians. In proof of this it is pointed out that the regulations may be relaxed in any community where additional French teaching is necessary or desirable. In litigation arising out of the legislation seven judges of the High Court of Ontario have affirmed its validity, while no single judge has supported the contention of its opponents.

Despite all this, however, a resolution was submitted in the House of Commons in favour of conciliatory treatment of French Canadians in Ontario. Disallowance was not demanded. No exact concessions were suggested. The constitutionality of the Provincial legislation was practically admitted. The resolution was moved by Mr. Lapointe, a Liberal member from Quebec, and supported by Sir Wilfrid Laurier in a speech of much vigour and eloquence. The Prime Minister opposed the resolution on constitutional grounds but said nothing to excite racial feeling. He deplored the discussion as enlarging the area of controversy and as calculated to make any concession by Ontario more difficult. He did not, however, suggest concession nor pass any judgment upon the Provincial

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legislation. The whole debate was maintained upon a high level. This was as true of French as of English members. There was tense feeling, but no inflammatory words were spoken. It is understood that there was acute division of opinion in the Liberal caucus. It was announced by Liberal newspapers before the vote was taken that if the English Liberal contingent from Ontario refused to support Sir Wilfrid Laurier he would resign the Liberal leadership. On the other hand, it is believed that even the French members of the Cabinet had determined to vote for the resolution. This would have left the Government with a bare majority or possibly in an actual minority. Sir Robert Borden, however, is never so resolute as in a crisis, and there is reason to believe that he resolved to dissolve Parliament if the Cabinet did not vote as a unit. Probably by no less decisive action could he have held any of his French supporters. The resolution was defeated by 107 to 60. Eleven of the Western Liberal Members and one of the Liberal Members from Ontario voted with the majority. Nineteen English-speaking Liberal members, seven of these from Ontario, supported the resolution. It was opposed by the entire English-speaking Liberal representation from Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta, but secured the support of seven French Conservatives from Quebec. The resolution upon which Parliament voted reads :

It has long been the settled policy of Great Britain whenever a country passed under the sovereignty of the Crown by treaty or otherwise, to respect the religion, usages and language of the inhabitants who thus become British subjects :

That His Majesty's subjects of French origin in the province of Ontario complain that by recent legislation they have been to a large extent deprived of the privilege which they and their fathers have always enjoyed since Canada passed under the sovereignty of the British Crown, of having their children taught in French.

That this House, especially at this time of universal sacrifice and anxiety, when all energies should be concentrated on the winning of the war, would, while fully recognising the principle of provincial

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rights and the necessity of every child being given a thorough English education, respectfully suggest to the Legislative Assembly the wisdom of making it clear that the privilege of the children of French parentage of being taught in their mother tongue be not interfered with.

An appeal to the Imperial Privy Council against the decisions of the Ontario Courts was argued only a few days ago. Judgment is awaited with profound interest and grave expectation. There are those in Canada who distrust the Judicial Committee on Canadian constitutional questions. It is argued that its decisions are sometimes governed by political rather than by legal considerations. In the famous Manitoba School question the judgments of the Canadian Courts were not sustained. There is apprehension that again the Courts of Canada will be overruled. This apprehension is quickened by the bold declaration of French-Canadian leaders that the Judicial Committee is impervious to the prejudices and animosities which govern the Courts of Canada when the interests of racial and religious minorities are at stake. Unfortunately there will be dissatisfaction and a disposition to resist whatever judgment may be pronounced. In the meantime, however, evidence accumulates that the authorities at Rome sustain the position of the English-speaking Catholics of Ontario.

It is curious that the resolution submitted to Parliament made no mention of Manitoba, which has adopted regulations affecting the French language less liberal than those which prevail in Ontario. Naturally the Conservative Press points out that Manitoba has a Liberal Government and Ontario a Conservative Government. It is not difficult to explain the position of Western Liberals. The population represents so many races and languages that it is impossible to maintain an efficient elementary school system if a multiplicity of languages is recognised. Since there is no constitutional reason to give French priority or pre-eminence other languages would have to be con-

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sidered if French were recognised. It may be added that in some of the English-French schools of Ontario the regulations which have encountered such violent opposition at Ottawa are working satisfactorily. There is no doubt strong and general feeling in Ontario that English must be maintained as the dominant language, but the authorities disclaim any desire to deal harshly with French-Canadians. The legislation which is assailed was enacted under the Premiership of Sir James Whitney, who had regard for the French people. No doubt the action of Sir Wilfrid Laurier in Parliament will bring the whole French population of Canada to his standard, whatever may be the effect in the English-speaking communities. Opponents of the French demands suggest that it is sought to take advantage of a crisis in the fortunes of Canada and the Empire to secure new rights and privileges for the French people, and they insist that these cannot be conceded, however unseemly and untimely is the dispute which is dividing the two races into hostile factions. Feeling, perhaps, is also aggravated by unsatisfactory recruiting in Quebec, or at least by a response which the English Provinces regard as unsatisfactory. When the war began, it was thought that the appeal of France would be irresistible in Quebec, and that the common sacrifices of France and Great Britain would unite French and English in Canada in a common patriotism and a common devotion to the ideals for which the free nations contend on the red fields of France and Flanders. Instead we have a racial quarrel, stimulated by Nationalists in Quebec, aggravated perhaps by occasional unwise utterances in the English Provinces, and of ominous import for the future. At the moment compromise is difficult, and all the more difficult because the issue has become involved in federal politics.

Canada

II. PROVINCIAL GENERAL ELECTIONS

NEW Legislatures have been elected in Quebec and Nova Scotia. In both Provinces the Conservative party sustained decisive defeat. Out of 85 members only seven Conservatives were elected in the French Province. Twenty-three Liberal candidates were returned without a contest. The Provincial Conservative Leader was defeated by a 1,700 majority in the constituency which he held at the dissolution. The contest followed closely upon the debate in the House of Commons over the status of the French language in Ontario. The Provincial Conservative leader had opposed the measure to tax municipalities for assistance to the French campaign. The St. Jean Baptiste Society, the French Canadian national organisation, sought to pledge candidates in favour of financial support for the movement to extend French teaching in Ontario. Mr. Bourassa and the Nationalists united with the Liberals against the Conservative Opposition. In the speeches of Sir Lomer Gouin and his Ministers, however, there were few if any references to the situation in Ontario. There is evidence that the Provincial Government was generously supported in the English communities of the Province. The Roman Catholic ecclesiastics were generally favourable to the Government. Undoubtedly the Government was strengthened by the educational issue, but with Liberals and Nationalists co-operating the position of the Opposition was hopeless. Moreover, Sir Lomer Gouin is strongly entrenched in the confidence of Quebec. His administration of Provincial affairs has been economical and efficient. He has much resolution of character. His personal integrity is beyond suspicion. Nor has his administration been disfigured by any serious scandals. With the racial educational question altogether eliminated he would have been sustained.

Provincial General Elections

For the time the Conservative party has little strength in Quebec. The Imperialism of the Conservative leaders is suspected. Autonomy is still a word of meaning in the French Province. For the war in many French communities there is only passive support. The hierarchy does not forget that the Church was harassed by the French Republic. For generations French Canadians have been warned against "militarism," against acceptance of responsibility for the defence of the Empire, against the assumption of any obligation or burden for any object or enterprise beyond the borders of the Dominion. They are mainly a rural people, loving easy ways and quiet days, without the military temper or the spirit of adventure. There are those who demand conscription for Canada, but any attempt to apply compulsion in Quebec would only produce bitter domestic discord and leave a legacy of division and dissension for the time of peace.

In Nova Scotia the defeat of the Conservative party was only less decisive than in Quebec. Out of 33 constituencies only 11 were carried by the Opposition. In the old Legislature, with fewer seats, there were 24 Liberals against 14 Conservatives. There is reason to believe that Conservatives counted upon a more satisfactory result. There was even an expectation that the Government would be defeated. For 33 years the Liberal party has controlled the Nova Scotia Legislature. This even exceeds the long period of ascendancy which the Liberal party enjoyed in Ontario. In Nova Scotia, as in Ontario, there is apparently a profound reluctance to change Governments. Indeed, this is a characteristic of Canada. We have had only four changes of Government at Ottawa in the half-century of Confederation. But while there have been revolutionary changes of feeling in Federal contests, the Liberal party has held office continuously in Ontario and Nova Scotia for 32 and 33 years respectively. In Nova Scotia in the recent contest, as in Quebec, the Provincial leader had in exceptional degree the confidence

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of the people. Hon. George H. Murray, like Sir Lomer Gouin, commands the loyal support of his own party and the respect of his opponents. This perhaps is an adequate explanation of the results.

It may be worth while also to emphasise a by-election in Ontario. In North Perth, in which Germans are very numerous, the Conservative candidate for the Legislature was defeated by a majority of 583, where in June before the war there was a Conservative majority of 1,117. The chief issue in the contest was the measure abolishing liquor licences in the Province, which takes effect in September. The constituency includes the city of Stratford, where the liquor interest has considerable strength, and where a Conservative majority of 638 became a minority of 106. The German voters are also generally unfavourable to Prohibition, as is an element of the regular Conservative Party. It is also said that appeal was made to the Germans against the Provincial war taxes, but one can only speculate as to how far this consideration prevailed. The issue was settled in the private canvass, for only one public meeting was held by the Liberal candidate.

In the nine Provinces of Canada the Conservatives now have power in Ontario, New Brunswick, British Columbia, and Prince Edward Island. There is not much in the history of Confederation to suggest that Provincial elections foreshadow the result of a Federal election. There is a common party organisation for Provincial and Federal affairs, but it often happens that a province gives a majority for a provincial Liberal Government and votes as decisively for a Conservative Government at Ottawa. This was true under Sir John Macdonald, but less true under Sir Wilfrid Laurier. Whether or not the recent Provincial contests have Federal significance only the General Election for the Commons will determine. Wars disturb political calculations and try the souls of Ministers. At least Federal Ministers feel stronger when political

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allies control the provinces, as Provincial Governments feel more secure when the party to which they belong has power at Ottawa.

III. LABOUR, RECRUITING, AND RECONSTRUCTION

IN recruiting, Canada still adheres to the voluntary system. There are demands for national registration and even for conscription, but, as has been said, to apply either system is difficult in a country with so many racial elements as are embraced in the population of Canada. There is, however, a serious scarcity of labour alike for farms and factories. It has been suggested that manufacturers should supply recruiting agents with lists of indispensable employees, and in cases some such method has been adopted. Generally, between manufacturers and recruiting agents there has been sympathetic co-operation. It is recognised that we can do no greater service than to provide munitions if this is done at the credit of the Dominion. By joint action of the Government and the banks \$150,000,000 has been provided for this purpose, while it is estimated that contracts for munitions for \$400,000,000 have been placed with Canadian factories.

In the autumn subscriptions to a new domestic loan for \$100,000,000 will be invited. There is hardly a doubt that the response will be satisfactory, and possibly there may be a further credit for munitions.

It is estimated that 200,000 workmen are now engaged in the production of munitions. Necessarily, therefore, as a consequence of the industrial demand and the requirement of labour for the harvest, recruiting has slackened. We have, however, enrolled an army of over 350,000, largely from an English-speaking population of 4,500,000. It is not suggested that this exhausts the supply of men available for military service. During the first two

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weeks of July 5,000 recruits were obtained. The total figures show an enlistment in Ontario of 145,195, in Quebec of 36,890, in the three Eastern Provinces of 31,633, and in the four Western Provinces of 136,939. In the Toronto district the total enrolment is 79,715. In the West there has been proportionate recruiting. In many of the battalions there is a high percentage of native Canadians. Returns from various rural towns and villages show that 60 or 65 per cent. of the recruits were born in the Dominion. Labour, organised and unorganised, is strongly represented, although no exact statistics are available. There have been few labour disputes since the war began. This is the more remarkable since the demand for labour, save in the building trades, exceeds the supply. The Canadian railway organisations, affiliated with international unions, have refused to join in a movement for higher wages from the railway companies until peace is restored. This finely illustrates the spirit of Labour throughout the country. A revision of the scale of pensions has produced general satisfaction, and there is universal approval of the decision to have pensions administered by an independent National Commission. An Economic Commission, under the chairmanship of Sir James Lougheed, is deeply engaged with the problems of settlement and reconstruction which will test the resources of Canadian statesmanship when peace comes. In this connection there will be an early conference between the Dominion and Provincial Governments. It is recognised that common action is essential if the best results are to be obtained. The problems are the more difficult because the lands and natural resources of the Middle-Western Provinces are controlled by the Federal Government, while in British Columbia and the older Provinces authority over land and natural resources is vested in the Provincial Governments. As yet we have no definite forecasts of actual policy, save, perhaps, a general understanding that any special provision for

Labour, Recruiting, and Reconstruction

Canadian soldiers should extend to all soldiers of the Empire. The Economic Commission is also investigating problems of marketing, of transportation, and of immigration. Under the direction of Sir Wilfrid Laurier the Liberal Party also has an independent National Council, engaged upon the various problems which are before the Government and the Economic Commission. In the various Provinces, too, preparations for peace engage the attention of the Governments.

In the Federal field there is no general political activity, although it cannot be said that there is abstention from partisan controversy. Since the prorogation of Parliament Sir Wilfrid Laurier has delivered two or three speeches in Quebec. In these he has urged recruiting in the French Province. At Brome he said :

I especially ask my French-Canadian friends to do their part. There are men amongst them who tell them they must not enlist because they claim to have grievances in Ontario. Let me tell them that grievances must be settled by the Law Courts, and that they have their duties and obligations as well as rights, and that those who want to have their rights recognised as citizens of the Empire must be prepared to do their duty to the full.

The Prime Minister has not spoken since Parliament rose. Nor are any of his colleagues active on the platform. During the two years of war they have been worn to exhaustion, but there is little prospect of relief. Even peace will bring onerous and vexing problems. No Government in the history of Canada has been so severely tested as that which came into office five years ago, and upon the Prime Minister particularly the strain has been tremendous. There is reason to expect a reorganisation of the Cabinet before Parliament reassembles.

From day to day long columns of casualties appear in the newspapers, but the temper of the country was never more resolute. There is no vain mourning. There is no cry for peace. There is no shrinking from cost or sacrifice. If there is any apprehension it is that a pre-

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mature and inconclusive peace may be arranged. This is not because we have grown to love war, but because of the deep conviction that we cannot have a free and quiet world until, on land and sea, Germany is taught that she is not the world's master.

Canada. July, 1916.

AUSTRALIA

I. RECRUITING FOR THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY

AS was pointed out in the March number of *THE ROUND TABLE*, the evacuation of Gallipoli, though in some ways a keen disappointment to Australia, was also a definite source of relief. After the reaction which followed the long months of suspense and anxiety regarding the safety of her Army, Australia's attention was engrossed by three main subjects: her exact obligation to the Empire in the matter of troops, the advisability of immediately adopting Universal Service, and the utterances of her Prime Minister in England. Her duty under the first heading had apparently been put beyond doubt by the attitude of the Federal Government, which on November 26, 1915, offered the Imperial authorities a further force of 50,000 men, this consisting of entirely new units, and being independent of the 9,500 men a month who had been declared necessary as reinforcements. "This further contribution," ran the official cablegram, "will bring the total number of men supplied by Australia by next June to something like 300,000 men." This estimate was again quoted by Mr. Hughes at Ottawa as the contribution which Australia would have made by the end of June. To the surprise and disappointment of many people, Senator Pearce, Minister for Defence, who has been acting as Prime Minister in Mr. Hughes's absence, declared on March 23,

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1916, that, in view of certain arrangements made with the Home authorities, this estimate had been reduced, and the approximate total to be sent by the end of June was 209,500 men. The Minister alleged that the British War Office had sent a message expressly reducing the number of reinforcements, apparently in consequence of the evacuation of Gallipoli, and had further suggested that two of the new divisions should be formed in Egypt, and only one in Australia. Such, according to Senator Pearce, were the reasons for the reduction. It should be clearly noted that he only referred to the lowered figure as comprising the number of men who would have actually left Australia by June, and contemplated that from 50,000 to 60,000 men, in addition, would be in training throughout Australia by this date. As a matter of fact, at the date of Senator Pearce's pronouncement, 150,000 soldiers had actually left Australia, while 60,107 more were in training throughout her camps. On the other hand, the Minister's interpretation of the wishes of the Imperial authorities has not been borne out by the documents which he subsequently disclosed. The moral effect of his utterances has been deplorable, and has exercised the most prejudicial effect upon recruiting. It gave Australia a lead in the false "optimism" which she has, from the beginning, all too readily entertained regarding the war's seriousness and probable duration, and caused hundreds, perhaps even thousands, of young men to believe that it was going splendidly, that the original estimate had been found excessive, and that their services were no longer required by the Australian or Imperial authorities. The recruiting committees, which have been doing sterling work since the war began, were thoroughly disheartened, and their disappointment found expression in resignations and resolutions condemning the Minister's utterance. He and others have since made efforts to retrieve the blunder, but recruiting continues unsatisfactory, although in Victoria and South Australia the State Recruiting Committee has

Recruiting for the Australian Army

actually toured the country in a special train with the accompaniment of bands and flags.

It may be mentioned that on May 6 last the troops already despatched from Australia numbered 189,206, while 62,181 were in training within the Commonwealth.

The unsatisfactoriness of the later results, under the voluntary system, has accentuated the interest of Australia in conscription. The League which had been formed in several States with the object of securing Universal Service suspended its operations during several months in order to avoid prejudicing the work of the recruiting committees. It has recently resumed activity in Victoria, and is there conducting a vigorous campaign in conjunction with the Australian Natives' Association. This body is a non-party organisation, devoted to the furthering of national objects and ideals. By a large majority its delegates passed a resolution towards the end of March, to the effect that compulsory service should be adopted by the Commonwealth. Since then it has been working for this object through meetings, petitions, and the circulation of literature. On the other hand, leading Labour organisations have definitely pronounced against conscription. In some cases the rejection is unqualified: in others it is indicated that "conscription of life" may possibly be accepted in the last resort if accompanied by "conscription of wealth." To the extremists this means nothing short of confiscation of all capital: they reject as inadequate the unlimited taxing powers reposed in the Government by the Constitution. It is almost certain that this irreconcilable attitude of the Labour "bosses" does not fairly represent the point of view of the majority of Australian workers. Many of these would doubtless be opposed to conscription at all costs and hazards: but very many more are beginning to see that Australia is still in deadly peril, and that the workers of Australia have a unique stake in the war. The Australian Army is, of course, wholeheartedly in favour of conscription, and the soldiers may be trusted to bring strong influence

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to bear upon their friends and relatives. The average Australian is deficient neither in common sense nor the sense of fair play, and his natural independence makes him dislike the idea of letting others do his "bit" for him. It is probable that, if Australia were polled to-morrow, a large majority would be in favour of conscription.

So far the attitude of the Government on this subject has been non-committal. In March, indeed, Senator Gardiner, Assistant Minister for Defence, declared definitely against conscription. More recently Senator Pearce has declared that the Government has no immediate intention of changing the present method of securing reinforcements. But he has also publicly rebuked those who say they will not have conscription at any price, has pointed out that Australia is at present being defended in Europe by conscript armies, has declared that "conscription of wealth," as defined by the extremists, means robbery, pure and simple, and has reminded his following that Labour cannot cut itself loose from nationalism, and national obligations. Mr. Hughes, moreover, has recently declared in England that "the defence of his country is the primary duty of every man." It must never be forgotten that Mr. Hughes, Senator Pearce, and the former Labour Prime Minister, Mr. J. C. Watson, were the men who several years ago converted a previously pacifist Labour Party to the necessity of compulsory service for national defence. A fairly general impression prevails that the Ministry is only waiting the return of Mr. Hughes to follow Great Britain's lead and adopt conscription. Meanwhile, it is significant that the Parliamentary War Committee has declared Australia to be inadequately represented at the front, and has advised that if a satisfactory number of recruits is not forthcoming by an early date the whole question of the voluntary system be reviewed by Parliament.

Mr. Hughes in England

II. MR. HUGHES IN ENGLAND

THE other main topic of interest throughout Australia during the last few months has been Mr. Hughes, that remarkable spirit begotten by Australian democracy upon the teaching of Matthew Arnold. The apostle of "Culture," one imagines, would have been somewhat astonished at the evolution of his protégé, in whom force and fire certainly predominate over "sweetness and light," and whose speeches are perhaps expressed, to use Arnold's favourite distinction, rather in the "Corinthian" than the "grand" style. Yet Arnold would have recognised and acknowledged the rare quality of this Achitophel of the South, this

fiery soul which working out its way
Fretted the pigmy body to decay,
And o'erinformed the tenement of clay.

As far as Australia is concerned, there are various views concerning her Prime Minister's reception and recent utterances in England. There are, of course, the extremists on each side, one set of whom considers Mr. Hughes's visit to Windsor Castle derogatory to the Castle and the Crown, whereas the other deplors it as unworthy of Mr. Hughes and of the Sydney Trades Hall. But with these negligible exceptions Australia is wholeheartedly pleased and proud that he whom she has chosen to honour should have been honoured in full measure by the Mother Country, and this not merely because he is the figure-head of one of the great Dominions, but because he has been recognised as a statesman worthy of a tremendous issue. There are politicians who reject Mr. Hughes's methods; there are precisians who boggle at his metaphors; many patriotic Australians consider that his references to Australian valour are unduly braggart in tone; while

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certain trusting souls even go the length of declaring that his criticism of British methods will not bear examination. But every generous heart throughout Australia recognises that the Prime Minister's whole being is swayed and dominated by this war, and that all he has said and done since its beginning is the outcome of a great idealism and passion for the future of the British race. Mr. Hughes in the past has given up to Party—the Labour Party of Australia—the fierce energy which was apparently meant for the whole of civilised mankind ; but to-day the balance is redressed, and the agitator has become the prophet. The new manifestation, as has just been hinted, has had a discomfiting effect upon certain sections of Australian opinion ; Labour has not taken altogether kindly to advanced Imperialism, nor Imperialism to its new ally. The approval meted out to the Prime Minister in certain sections of the Australian Press has been strictly guarded and qualified. Even with the war to help them, many Australian editors have learnt nothing and forgotten nothing, while others have felt and imagined nothing, now or heretofore. Before discussing particular verdicts, it may be well to recapitulate briefly the main principles which Mr. Hughes has been advocating in England. The first and most obvious of these has been the prosecution of the war to an absolute finish ; the second the immediate destruction of German trade within the Empire, and when the struggle is over, the vigorous prosecution of a tariff war against Germany ; the third a closer and more effective bond of Imperial union ; and the fourth insistence on the vital interest of Labour in the present struggle.

Each of these suggestions has been differently received by the various Australian newspapers : but it must be emphatically stated that in certain of the Liberal journals there is a tendency to avoid judging them on their national and Imperial merits, and an eagerness to discount them on account of Mr. Hughes's connection with the Labour Party.

Mr. Hughes in England

The converse tendency is noticeable in the Labour Press. The Melbourne *Labour Call* and the Sydney *Worker* attack Mr. Hughes for supporting English Toryism and Capitalism and forgetting Australia and Labour—or, rather, Labour and Australia. These papers deprecate the idea of closer Imperial Federation, and clamour for closer Industrial Unionism. The Sydney *Bulletin*, which has done excellent work in making Australia realise the German peril and her own interest in the war, blames Mr. Hughes for neglecting Australia, and attacks the whole conception of Imperial Federation, root and branch. The Sydney *Daily Telegraph* declares that any scheme of Federation must “evolve” instead of being “fashioned precipitately or by artificial pressure.” How in human affairs evolution can operate without the “artificial pressure” of purposive action this journal does not trouble to explain. The strongly protectionist Melbourne *Age* expresses satisfaction at Mr. Hughes’s apostasy from Cobdenism, but doubts whether he is truly converted to high tariffism, and describes him as a protectionist rather through opportunism than conviction. In another leading article the same journal says: “On a basis of trade the British Empire may quite easily be fused into a powerful economic, naval and military identity. On the basis of politics it can never become more solidly or permanently united than it is now.” The *Age* also claims that protection should begin at home, and appears to think that it does not greatly matter if it ends there. It continues: “We are one autonomous nation. Britain is another. We are linked together by strong sentimental and commercial interests, and we covet no other sort or form of association.” The Melbourne *Argus* states that “both remote and recent experience are against Mr Hughes” in his opinion “that the Empire can be strengthened by the formation of a closer organic union.” The Brisbane *Courier*, on the other hand, thinks that such a union is possible, and even, in the abstract, desirable, but that the Dominions will have to reflect carefully as to

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whether they are prepared to give up so much of democratic self-control in order that they may have an effective voice in Imperial affairs. More intelligent than all these, and more truly representative of the best Australian opinion, is the comment of the *Sydney Sun* :

Mr. Hughes goes to England, and as part of his mission declares what he conceives to be Australia's economic faith. We aspire (he thinks and says) to national self-development within Australia and within the British Empire. We do not want to feed Germany's growth. We should willingly join in all British schemes to protect our nationalism against that of Germany by means of tariffs, navigation laws and other obvious machinery. Mr. Hughes is able to state this case with such precision and force that he has arrested the attention of all England. Naturally the strongest Protectionist and Imperialist groups in the United Kingdom are delighted by the appearance of so picturesque an ally, and they join in a chorus of praise for Mr. Hughes. Then comes the amazing reaction of prejudice among British Liberals, whose fetish is Free Trade, and British Socialists who hate Protection because they associate it chiefly with the Conservative land-owning interests. That party press in Australia which is hostile to the Labour Government seizes eagerly upon the same excuses. "Mr. Hughes is the tool of British Conservatives," they shout. "Mr. Hughes is disavowed by British Radicals and Socialists." As though such parrot cries mattered! The question is not whether Mr. Hughes is more pleasing to the *National Review* or to the *Manchester Guardian*, but whether in fact he has in his speeches in London expressed Imperial as well as Australian sentiment.

As has just been indicated, there is a large and weighty body of opinion in Australia which is only imperfectly represented by the Australian press: and it is probable that the best part of this world not only admire Mr. Hughes for his spirit and determination, but would subscribe in outline to the general policy advocated in his speeches. To deal with this in detail under the different headings indicated above, it must always be borne in mind that Mr. Hughes's suggestions regarding a new form of organic unity for the Empire have been vague and general in outline, and that although they have been construed both by the British and Australian press as implying some form of

Mr. Hughes in England

Imperial Federation, Mr. Hughes has himself expressly declared that he "has said nothing regarding the political relations between Great Britain and the Dominions." His utterances on this subject are indeed chiefly interesting owing to the Australian comment which they have elicited regarding the general question of closer Imperial Union. There is certainly less general enthusiasm in Australia for Imperial Federation than for the general anti-German policy outlined in Mr. Hughes's speeches. The average Australian has not tried to think out to a conclusion the various problems of Imperial administration, and imagines, rightly or wrongly, that the naval and military achievements of this war justify the continuance of the existing order. The loyalty and trust which he reposes in the British Government make him willing to leave the right of diplomatic negotiation, and the decision of peace and war in its hands, and he is apt to forget that such a right also imposes a fundamental obligation which it must sooner or later be his bounden duty to share. So far in the history of Australia no war issue has arisen in which the primary factor has been her own interest or honour or peril: Great Britain has always been the first mover. The possibility of the reverse case, or of a war-issue in which Australia's convictions might differ from those of Britain, necessarily suggests the advisability of some permanent Imperial tribunal for the discussion of foreign affairs, a tribunal in which the Dominions shall say their say, and learn through discussion their precise obligation.

It is impossible here to discuss the remaining phases of what Mr. Hughes has called "organic union": it is sufficient to say that Australia's imagination in this regard has been quickened by the "imperium in imperio" created by her new responsibilities in the Pacific, and there is no reason for believing that she would reject Imperial Federation once she were convinced that this would entail no infringement of her internal autonomy.

Of far more immediate appeal to Australia are Mr.

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Hughes's proposals regarding German trade. She herself has suffered grievously in her primary industries at the hands of Germany, her chief grievance here being the strangle-hold obtained upon her metal industry by certain German organisations. Her difficulties in this regard have already been described in *THE ROUND TABLE* (December, 1915) and need not be further detailed here. Australia feels acutely on this subject, and in the words of Mr. Hughes "has shown her earnestness by tearing out the cancer of German influence, annulling contracts and prohibiting Germans from being shareholders in companies." Mr. Hughes is fully alive to the fact that construction must follow destruction, and a scheme is in hand which will enable Australia to refine a portion of her own zinc and to send the rest for treatment to other parts of the Empire, or to allied countries. A Commonwealth Institute of Science and Industry is also in process of creation, and it is hoped that this will still further help to secure for Australia the fruits of her own labour. Regarding the domination by Germany of the Empire's "key industries"—Mr. Hughes has cited aniline dyes and tungsten—Australia is wholeheartedly on the side of her Prime Minister. Australia has also been aggrieved by the operation of the German Delbrück law, and its attempts to neutralise the obligations created by the oath of British naturalisation.

With regard to trade with Germany after the war Australia is also in accord with Mr. Hughes. Predominant Australian opinion is determined that after its conclusion the old fiscal order shall not continue unimpaired. Much preconceived prejudice against preferential trade has been thrown over: it is generally believed that whatever be the result of the present struggle the conclusion of military hostilities will be followed by a trade war with Germany, and that if the Empire is to survive in this, it must be organised thoroughly and at once. Australia for her part will protect herself against any wholesale dumping of accumulated manufactured goods which Germany may

Mr. Hughes in England

attempt when the war is over; but the majority of Australian citizens are anxious for far more than this, and would almost certainly favour any fiscal measure which would help the Empire towards a greater degree of independence and self-sufficiency. They would share the satisfaction expressed by Mr. Hughes before the Manchester Chamber of Commerce "that this Chamber in the Mecca of *laissez-faire* policy has, by an overwhelming majority, declared that the economic policy which has been regarded with almost religious veneration for three-quarters of a century is inadequate in this great crisis." Mr. Hughes has declared that a measure of tariff reform may, and probably will, follow the war's conclusion. He has also pointed to the widespread general feeling that "after the war we shall not be able to enter into friendly trade relations with our enemies," and has declared that Australia and the Dominions are anxiously awaiting a sign from Great Britain that her policy after the war will be such "as to strike a blow at the finances of Germany which are her most vital part." The general trend of these utterances would be endorsed by representative Australian opinion. It is, of course, impossible to discuss here the precise means for their realisation. Probably the average Australian has not yet faced the great difficulties and sacrifices involved in this ideal, nor taken steps to ensure that national organisation and efficiency which must be its first condition: but his instincts tell him that the alternative to such a scheme must be not only commercial failure for the Empire and herself, but the growth of a Germany swollen with wealth, and bent on the destruction of the one thing that can keep the British Empire free—British supremacy at sea.

In more than one of his speeches Mr. Hughes has referred to the Labour Party in Australia and elsewhere, and to the vital interest of the worker in this war. He justly claims to have shared in Labour's struggles, and to have fought its battles, and those who know his history

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realise that he speaks from full knowledge and experience. Mr. Hughes has certainly done fine work in Australia in forcing the Labour Party to grapple manfully with some of the essential problems of existence. In England he has remarked: "Labour has long realised that war is a great fact which talk about the brotherhood of man cannot sweep aside. We have not deluded ourselves with the belief that by offering the other cheek to our enemy 'brother' we can avoid the stiletto which the dear 'brother' holds behind him." Utterances such as this, and the warning quoted above by Senator Pearce regarding the necessity of Labour's allying itself with nationalism, show that the present Labour leaders in Australia have repudiated the anti-nationalistic propaganda of such of their following as have been dominated by the I.W.W. and kindred organisations. Mr. Hughes, speaking to the Labour Members of the British House of Commons, has declared "that the secret of Labour's success in Australia is the fact that the driving force is the spiritual enthusiasm of the fighters under Labour's banner." Elsewhere he remarked: "It is a great mistake to suppose that Labour is materialistic. There are materialists in our Labour politics, but these are not representative of the Labour movement in Australia."

Students of Australian politics may permit themselves to be a little sceptical as to the accuracy of these statements. Australian Labour "idealism" has coincided in the past too closely with the pursuit, through class warfare, of definite material benefits to justify completely its release from the detention of inverted commas. Mr. Hughes has in the past been one of the few men who have had the courage to point it to the duties as well as to the rights of Labour, and to its national obligations. His recent utterances show that he is prepared to continue in this course, and to hold up to Australian Labour a more virile and disinterested ideal than it has hitherto pursued. How far the Australian Labour Party will respond to his lead

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remains to be seen. Its rank and file have yet to learn that the unparalleled conditions of economic, political and social existence which they are at present enjoying are rendered possible by one thing only—their participation in the British Empire and the protection of British sea power. Perhaps Mr. Hughes may succeed in bringing home to them this fact, and their consequent Imperial obligations. Little need be said on the remaining point—Mr. Hughes's insistence on the necessity of our carrying this war through to a clean finish in the interests not only of ourselves but of civilisation. All healthy Australian opinion is behind the Prime Minister on this point, and is prepared to back its opinion by effort and sacrifice. Despite the hostility of certain Labour sections, there is good reason for believing that if conscription were introduced in Australia to-morrow it would meet with less practical opposition than it has encountered in Great Britain.

III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

THE last few months have witnessed, particularly in New South Wales, several developments of great importance. It would seem that we are moving towards the culmination of a distinctive phase in things political and economic. Price-fixing and the prohibition of certain exports, the general enlargement of Government control, the petrol incident in New South Wales (too readily assumed to indicate widespread Ministerial corruption), the sharp cleavage that has disclosed itself between the political and industrial sections of the Labour Conference in that State, the steady decline of Parliament as the essential governing body, recent Arbitration Awards, industrial unrest and its expression in strikes, are all matters demanding careful consideration and generally bearing some relation to one another.

War conditions have greatly increased the powers of

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intervention and control by Governments, but, in view of the disclosures of the Petrol Inquiry, there seems to be little assurance that such an enlargement of their powers is likely to be intelligently exercised by Ministerial Departments. We are reminded of the recent controversy between the Federal Treasurer and the Adelaide Steamship Company, when the Minister threatened to seize the Company's fleet and take over its business if it did not accept his terms for the carriage of sugar from Queensland to other States. There is little doubt that the fear of being requisitioned to carry at Government rates is a contributory cause of the shortage of shipping in Australia. While it is necessary to distinguish between war measures and the general policy of nationalisation, the somewhat truculent attitude of Ministers towards the commercial interests involved induces a general sense of insecurity, and stifles the criticisms of those best fitted to offer an opinion. The acting Prime Minister's recent statement that Government might well control the direction of capital investment after the war is hardly reassuring. Federal Ministers have given no indication that they possess the tremendous knowledge essential for such a highly responsible and difficult business as that of determining which investments should be allowed and which prohibited. On this, as on many similar occasions, the Australian politician seems to have failed to realise that things whose nature and scope are international cannot be safely handled with a narrowly national end in view. While the country cheerfully endures the economic inhibitions imposed upon it by a state of war, there is a certain feeling of alarm at Senator Pearce's airy talk about "burning our books on political economy." There is little sign that anyone in authority is thinking out the economic problem as a whole. No Australian Government has shown much understanding of or regard for the economics of production—the ordered development of the productive resources of this country. Their chief concern has been the interest of the consumer

The Split in the Labour Movement

of our primary products. The effect of the many forms of Government intervention upon the efficiency and output of production has still to be worked out, but it is beyond dispute that the results have largely been such as to throw doubt upon the desirability of extending these methods to times of peace.

IV. THE SPLIT IN THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

THE Annual Conference of the Political Labour Leagues of New South Wales held at Easter witnessed an actual cleavage, developing for some time past, between the political and industrial sections of the Labour movement. The Political Labour League is the local organising unit for elections and any other political effort, and the Annual Conference frames the platform of the party and discusses the actions of Ministers and Members of Parliament with the utmost frankness. As the membership of the Leagues includes not merely Trade Unionists but any person who subscribes to the platform of the Party, it is easy to see that the complexion of the Party as a whole might become very far removed from the purely industrial. As a matter of fact, the political machine has for some time been largely under the control of the more bourgeois members of the Party, and the newly conscious section of Industrialists represent the more militant Trade Union element. The reasons for their revolt may be briefly stated: (1) Irritation at the delay in giving effect to certain planks on the Labour Party's platform of special concern to Trade Unionists—*e.g.*, Workmen's Compensation Act, Eight Hour Bill, Amended Industrial Arbitration Act, Hut Accommodation Act, and other measures. (2) Alleged neglect of industrial needs by Federal and State Government Departments. There is a strong suspicion that the Labour Party, regarding the industrial vote as safe, has been spending its main energies on attracting the support

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of other sections of the electors. (3) The Government has made no attempt to abolish the Upper House, which it seems to find useful in amending or rejecting legislation embarrassing to the leaders of the Party, as well as providing a convenient means of patronage. (4) Increasing resentment that the Unions, which provide most of the political funds and the voting of the Party, have an inadequate share of political control. It was felt therefore that only by capture of the Party machine could they force the Cabinet and Caucus to recognise their claims and carry out the platform. (5) Personal antagonism to many Ministers. The Industrialists felt that the sacrifice necessary for the full execution of the platform was hindered by the desire of leaders to cling to office. Many Industrialists wished to go to the length of forcing the Premier and his Government to resign. The Conference actually did enforce a decision to this effect from the Cabinet, but the sense of the majority immediately arranged a compromise by providing for a Referendum on the abolition of the Upper House. (6) The entry into the Labour Party of a number of wealthy men, whose interests cannot be deemed identical with those of Labour, has increased the feeling of distrust in the industrial ranks.

It would be reasonable to hope that this split might bring about a healthy rearrangement of parties and a general improvement of political life. It is, however, almost certainly no more than the accustomed cleavage, inevitable at a certain stage, between rank and file and a successful parliamentary party. On the one side Labour Members of Parliament have been affected by the usual conservatising atmosphere of legislatures, and the immense difficulty of turning programmes into laws. On the other, the rank and file, ignorant of the difficulties of practical politics, with exaggerated faith in political power and exposed to various forms of economic pressure, have readily followed the leadership of the most militant Unionists. But they have evolved no new opinion or

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policy, and have shown no gift of leadership. It seems that the Labour movement is now rapidly settling down again after this dispute. The Industrialists are realising that they could not possibly carry the country, for the Labour Party is in power, not on the industrial vote alone, but on that of a large section of the general public, who find the Labour Party's programme in comparative accord with national needs. Of more interest to the public is the constitutional aspect of the crisis. Beneath the spur of Conference criticism, the Cabinet spoke and acted as if the Labour Caucus and the Conference were bodies to whom their resignations should be tendered. Throughout the discussion, Conference was treated as the dictator of Parliamentary legislation. This increasing tendency towards the elimination of Parliament as an essential part of the Government of the country is a most serious menace to Representative Government. This particular instance has formed the subject of a special report from the Governor to the Colonial Office. Not only is this development discouraging the best men from entering public life, but it also entails the neglect of large minorities of electors.

Australia. June, 1916.

SOUTH AFRICA

I. THE SESSION

PARLIAMENT was prorogued on June 19 after a session of which the total working period, including the preliminary three weeks' sitting before Christmas, was just under five months. During this period forty-eight public Acts were passed. These included twenty financial measures, dealing with appropriation and taxation, a number of minor amending Bills, certain emergency measures connected with the war, rebellion, and relief of distress caused by flood and drought—of which the most controversial was the Trading with the Enemy Bill—and at least eight measures which, in view of their character and the subjects with which they dealt, may be ranked as important contributions to the legislation of the country—viz., three University Bills, intended to settle the thorny and long-postponed University problem; four bulky consolidating Bills (Insolvency, Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, Mental Disorders, and Railway Regulation and Management); and a Miners' Phthisis Bill, recasting the whole system of compensation for miners' phthisis, and making important provisions for checking the prevalence of the disease. In addition to the consolidating Bills which were actually passed, three others—an Electoral Bill, which was designed to deal with registration of voters and procedure at elections without interfering with the franchise; a Criminal Procedure Bill, and a Magistrates' Courts Bill—

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received detailed consideration in Select Committees, and under a new Standing Order may be resumed next session at the stage which they have reached.

This legislative output is hardly suggestive of a War Session, or of such a condition of internal disturbance and unrest as justified General Smuts's phrase in the debate on the supplementary war vote in December: "We are sitting on the edge of a volcano." That South African legislators should have been able, in the middle of a great war and in a country where the embers of rebellion were still smouldering, to devote their attention to such subjects as have been mentioned above, is evidence not only of their powers of detachment, but also of their strong faith in the stability of their institutions and their sense of security under the British flag. Some people have been inclined to criticise Parliament for devoting attention to so many matters which are remote from the War, but there were heavy arrears of legislation to overtake, and "business as usual," as long as it was not party business, and did not divert energies which should have been applied to the prosecution of the war, was a good motto for Parliament to act upon.

As a matter of fact, the peculiar parliamentary conditions were unusually favourable to the passage of the long consolidating Bills which are needed to unify the laws of the different provinces, many of which are long overdue. All ordinary controversies between the Government party and the Unionists, as the official Opposition, were in abeyance owing to the necessity of co-operation during the war, and members of both parties were glad to devote their energies, released from the ordinary occupations of party warfare, to tackling subjects which involved no acute party questions. The Labour Party in the Assembly, for the time being reduced to three members, though they often voted against the Government, were, on the War issue, ranged on its side against the Nationalists: the edge of Labour criticism was, therefore, some-

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what blunted, and the claims made by the party on the time of the House were far less heavy than in previous sessions. The Nationalists, who are to-day the real Parliamentary Opposition, were handicapped not only by the smallness of their numbers, but also by their inexperience and lack of effective leadership. On votes of money for the war, and other measures directly connected with the war, they raised long debates, and they obstructed the progress of the Railway Regulation Bill by vehement onslaughts on the Government on the question of providing separate accommodation on the railways for coloured persons ; but they had few members who could make any claim to be adepts in the ordinary work of parliamentary criticism, and, where they were anxious to distinguish themselves as obstructionists rather than critics, they lacked both the perception to seize and the skill and pertinacity to make full use of their opportunities.

In spite of the many difficulties incidental to the situation, the nature of which has been partly indicated in previous articles, co-operation between the Government and the Unionists was successfully maintained to the end of the session. After the Unionists had stood the first severe strain on their powers of forbearance and self-repression, which was occasioned by the debate on the question of the pay of the Overseas Contingent, things worked more smoothly. There was a greater readiness among the rank and file of the party to recognise the essential facts of the situation, and when a division was likely to be forced by the Nationalists, on some point on which Unionist sympathies would naturally have led them to vote against the Government—*e.g.*, on questions affecting the Government's taxation proposals or its administrative methods—Sir Thomas Smartt had only, while stating the party's attitude, to remind his followers of the true object of the Nationalist tactics to bring them to the support of the Government.

General Botha succeeded in bringing the South African

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Party through the session with ranks unbroken, and his own position in Parliament was undoubtedly stronger at the end of the session than at the beginning. The absence of General Smuts on service in East Africa during the whole of the second part of the session rendered it necessary for General Botha himself to take a more continuously active part in debate than he has been accustomed to do when he could always rely on the services of his able lieutenant. He has shown a readiness and a vigour in dealing with Nationalist attacks and in asserting and justifying the war policy of the Government—as dictated not only by considerations of South Africa's duty to the Empire, but also by regard for her own interests and the preservation of her own liberties—which has heartened his own supporters and caused confusion in the ranks of the enemy. At times he has adopted towards the younger Nationalist members a tone of fatherly reproof, which is evidence that he has by no means abandoned the hope of bringing the erring sheep back into the fold. So far the attitude of the Nationalists has not given ground for believing that this hope is well founded. Despite some loyalist protests, the Government introduced and passed a Bill limiting the period during which actions may be brought for wrongful acts to persons and property committed during the rebellion; and there has also been a further exercise of clemency, whereby more than twenty of the remaining rebel prisoners have been released, so that only about that number are now left in prison. These approaches on the part of Government have been met by the Nationalists with a bad grace: their attacks in Parliament have increased rather than diminished in bitterness, and they have consistently spoken with an eye to their propaganda in the country. The object of all their tactics at present is to draw over to their side all waverers in the ranks of the South African Party who will allow themselves to be persuaded that Generals Botha and Smuts have by their loyalty to the Empire in this crisis betrayed the true interests of their

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own people. The situation will, however, wear a different aspect as soon as the triumph of the arms of the Allies is so visibly assured as to convince even the most unwilling believers in such a result, and it may then prove that some of those who are now most irreconcilable are not unwilling to lend an ear to General Botha's pleadings.

As an illustration of the kind of difficulty in which the Government has found itself, both in Parliament and the country, in dealing with subjects connected with the war, a short history of the "Trading with the Enemy Bill" may not be without interest. It will strike readers in other Dominions as somewhat remarkable that it was not until June, 1916, that any law was passed in South Africa dealing with the subject of trading with the enemy. It is true that the Royal Proclamations on the subject were duly issued in the *Union Gazette*, and certain precautions were taken by the Treasury, with the assistance of the banks, to see that the provisions of these proclamations were observed, but little or no information was vouchsafed to the public as to the nature of these precautions, and no machinery was set up for taking enemy property into Government custody. There was, therefore, no visibly growing fund to serve as evidence to the public that the precautions taken were effective. The slowness of the Government to introduce legislation was partly due to preoccupation with the rebellion and the campaign in German South-West Africa, and partly also to the peculiar difficulties of the situation in South Africa owing to the presence in the country of a number of traders and settlers who were German subjects or of German origin, and to the fact that measures directed against these people were likely to cause dissatisfaction and resentment among some sections of the country population.

The failure of the Government to satisfy the public that it was taking effective action with regard to trading with the enemy and the control of enemy property, and its lax policy with regard to the internment of enemy subjects,

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were partly accountable for the unfortunate outbreaks which occurred in various urban centres in May, 1915, immediately after the news of the sinking of the *Lusitania* was received, and which resulted in the destruction of a considerable amount of property, the greater portion of which, as shown by the report of the Select Committee which inquired into the subject during the session, belonged not to enemy subjects, but to British subjects and to subjects of allied countries. After these outbreaks there came into existence a movement known as the "British Citizen Movement," which carried on an active "anti-German" agitation throughout the country and made exaggerated demands as to methods of dealing with the property of enemy subjects, and even included in its proposals the denaturalisation of all Germans who had become naturalised as British subjects.

The question of enemy trading and enemy property was, of course, raised during the elections, and the Unionist candidates, while declining as a rule to go as far as the promoters of the British Citizen Movement, pledged themselves to secure adequate legislation on the subject on the lines of the British Acts. The subject was raised from the Unionist side of the House shortly after Parliament had met, and the Government undertook that a Bill would be introduced. In fulfilment of this promise Mr. Burton introduced a Bill in March which was modelled on the British legislation, and was in substance a codification of the British Acts passed up to that date. In moving the second reading of the Bill, Mr. Burton said that the Government took the view that it must regard the British Dominions as one unit for the purpose of the war; that it had followed the same practice with regard to the internment of enemy subjects as had been followed in Great Britain, and that this proposed legislation, which was designed to defeat the power of the enemy, must be regarded not so much as a South African as an Imperial matter. "It has been suggested," he said, "to us by the Imperial

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Government, suggested as these things always are and left entirely to our own discretion and to our own voluntary action, and suggested purely as a voluntary matter without the slightest hint of dictation, that it would be desirable in the interests of the British Dominions if we were to pass analogous legislation. It is obviously desirable that similar acts prohibited in the United Kingdom should be prohibited in the Dominions. The whole of the Empire is at war. We cannot separate one part of it from another." He then referred to the programme of the British Citizen Movement, and intimated that the Government were by no means prepared to accept their proposals. He proceeded: "What is good enough for the United Kingdom, in respect of legislation of this nature, is good enough for us, and we propose to take the United Kingdom legislation on this matter but nothing further."

Notwithstanding the studied caution of this speech, it provoked General Hertzog into making a violent attack on the Government policy of the now familiar type. He accused Mr. Burton of having "practically said that 'South African interests need not be considered, but only Imperial interests should be looked at.' The Minister had intimated that what was good enough for the United Kingdom was good enough for the Union. That was a fatal policy, and it was the policy of the Government." Apart from this general line of attack the Nationalist opposition to the Bill was based on the contention that, while nobody would object to steps being taken against the enemy getting advantage through trade with South Africa, the Bill went much too far and would prove the greatest source of misery and hatred if passed. Respectable German settlers, such as those in the Eastern Province, would be ruined. "Men who had been in South Africa for fifty years were now to be regarded as pariahs." This line of attack unfortunately received some encouragement from Mr. Merriman, who in his speech on the second reading indicated that in his opinion the Bill went unnecessarily far in interfering with

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rights of property. He expressed emphatic disapproval of the propaganda of the British Citizen Movement, and, while supporting the second reading of the Bill, hinted that it was in some respects too nearly in accord with that propaganda, and that its provisions ought to be substantially modified so as to meet the conditions of South Africa. The result of the Nationalist attack and Mr. Merriman's speech was to create considerable alarm in the minds of some of the members of the South African Party as to what would be the real effect of the Bill if passed, and the adjourned debate on the second reading was allowed to stand down for nearly a month while efforts were being made to allay these anxieties. A promise was given when the debate was resumed that the Bill would be referred to a Select Committee, and this promise, together with a recital by General Botha of the much more drastic measures taken in Germany with regard to the persons and property of British subjects, was sufficient to secure the united support of the South African Party for the second reading. The two Nationalist members of the Select Committee made desperate efforts to emasculate the Bill, but it eventually returned to the House without any of its essential provisions being seriously impaired; the principal concession which Mr. Burton found it wise to make in order to meet the objections of his own followers was to provide that the Treasury, which is the department entrusted with the administration of the law, before exercising in any individual case some of the more drastic powers which are conferred upon it, must apply to the Supreme Court for authorisation. After one more demonstration in the House by the Nationalists, the Bill was passed in its amended form.

The carrying of this Bill through the House was one of the many difficult tasks which Mr. Burton successfully accomplished during the session. A very heavy burden fell upon him in his double rôle of Minister of Railways and Minister of Finance, and, owing to General Smuts's

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absence, he also had to take a very large share in the general conduct of the business of the House.

His patience, firmness, and tactical skill in dealing with critics stood the Government in good stead. His speeches have usually been strictly confined to the question of the moment, but occasionally, in touching on larger issues, he has shown a breadth of outlook which is of good augury for the future. His justification of the Government's action in asking the House to pass the Trading with the Enemy Bill has already been quoted. It is worth while to add the following passage from his speech in a debate on a motion introduced by a Unionist member on the necessity of steps being taken by South Africa, in conjunction with the other British Dominions and the Allies, with regard to trade relations after the war: "I entirely agree with Mr. Henderson" (Unionist member for Durban) "that without question this war, and all that the war has taught us, has created a tremendous revolution in the position of the Empire and the units of the Empire. . . . I believe that the bonds are bound to be strengthened between the various units of the British Empire and the central authority, and strengthened in an entirely wholesome manner by the great events through which we are passing, but to my mind much more important than this question of trade relations, a much more important and much more lasting cementing of the bonds of the British Empire, is along the lines of common defence." He added that he looked forward to "a carefully considered and worked-out scheme, under which we shall be able to mobilise more rapidly, more effectively and more organically as a whole." Such sentiments as these may be generally accepted commonplaces in other Dominions, but they cannot be so regarded in South Africa, and they are therefore of importance when given utterance to by a prominent member of General Botha's Ministry.

Finance

II. FINANCE

A. The Budget

THE Minister of Finance, in his Budget speech, was able to present to the House a much more satisfactory statement in regard to the year 1915-16, just ended, than had been anticipated by his predecessor a year before. At the beginning of that year the Revenue had been estimated at £15,900,000 exclusive of receipts from bewaarplaatsen, to meet an expenditure of £16,484,000, so that a deficit had to be faced of £584,000. This was after taking account of the proceeds of such additional taxation as the Government had felt able to impose, and after suspending the sinking fund applicable to portions of the debt taken over from the old Cape Colony. The only proposals which the Government could make for meeting the deficit was to appropriate one half of the accumulated proceeds from the bewaarplaatsen—viz., £342,000—and to carry over an estimated deficit of £242,000. This unsatisfactory outlook was fortunately not borne out by actual results. The actual collections of revenue for 1915-16, again excluding the bewaarplaatsen, amounted to £16,529,000, while the actual expenditure, including supplementary votes, amounted to £16,258,000, so that, without touching the accumulated receipts from the bewaarplaatsen, there was a surplus of £271,000.

It may be as well to explain what these bewaarplaatsen receipts are, which have of recent years so often been called in as a sort of *deus ex machina* to restore a semblance of equilibrium to the national finances. Under the Gold Law of the South African Republic mining was prohibited under certain areas—*e.g.*, areas required for storage purposes (which is literally the meaning of bewaarplaats), for dump heaps, water rights, etc. As, however, the gold-mining industry passed from the outcrop reefs to the deeper

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levels, it became evident that many of these areas which had previously been reserved could with safety be undermined. The only difficulty about it was in deciding by whom and for whose profit they were to be undermined. Before the Anglo-Boer War the question of disposing of the right to undermine these areas was frequently under discussion, but, owing to the many difficult problems connected with it, nothing was actually done. After the war the Crown Colony Administration refrained from opening the question pending the grant of responsible government. In 1908 a new Gold Law was passed by the Transvaal Parliament, which, among other things, empowered the Government to deal with the mining rights under the *bewaarplaatsen* by way of sale or lease, but provided that the proceeds to be derived from such sales or leases should be carried to a separate account until Parliament had decided as to their ultimate disposal. Many of these rights have been disposed of, but neither the Transvaal Parliament nor the Parliament of the Union has yet dealt with the question of disposing of the proceeds, which, in the meantime, are accumulating in the Treasury. The question, briefly, is whether these proceeds belong to the Crown, in virtue of the general provisions of the law, which, after giving certain rights to the owner of proclaimed gold fields, vests in the State the right of mining for and disposing of the precious metals, or whether the owner of the land is still entitled to a share of the proceeds of these areas, which were excluded from the original mining area in respect of which he got his compensation. A Commission has inquired into the matter and has reported that half the proceeds should go to the State and half to the owner of the ground, and the Government has more than once announced that this is the principle on which it intends to proceed. Nothing can be done, however, until the necessary legislation has been passed, and until that has been done the proceeds are accumulating. They would amount at March 31 next to £1,067,000.

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The improved revenue receipts for 1915-16 were due mainly to a large increase in the Customs and Excise over the estimate, and also to an increase in the postal and telegraph receipts. This was rightly regarded as evidence of an unexpected growth of business and general prosperity. It is probable, however, that the cause is to be looked for in the large expenditure of borrowed money which took place in connection with the campaign in South-West Africa rather than in an expansion of wealth or of the productive powers of the country. To that extent the increase in revenue must be regarded with some doubt as to its permanence. Its immediate result, however, was that the Minister was able to finance the year's expenditure without having recourse to the bewaarplaatsen receipts, and without diverting from the sinking fund the revenues already referred to which properly belong to it.

For the year 1916-17 the Minister estimated a revenue of £16,336,000, exclusive of bewaarplaatsen receipts (amounting approximately to £188,000). The expenditure for the year is put at £17,871,000, so that he had to provide for an estimated deficit of £1,535,000. This he proposed to do in the first place by appropriating half of the accumulated bewaarplaatsen receipts, less certain amounts already appropriated under the Acts providing for the compensation of the victims of miner's phthisis, and, for the rest, to have recourse to increased taxation. From these sources he expected to get during the financial year 1916-17 the following amounts :

	£
Accumulated bewaarplaatsen receipts	433,000
Renewal of the special levy on gold-mining profits	320,000
Super tax on income	270,000
Excise on spirits	160,000
Customs on spirits	90,000
Diamond export tax	50,000
Postal charges	30,000

£1,353,000

There is, therefore, left to be carried forward to next

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year a deficit of £182,000 after appropriating the accumulated bewaarplaatsen receipts. These receipts cannot strictly be said to be part of the revenues of the year, and, properly, ought not to be used for meeting ordinary annual expenditure. In any case they are not yet available, until Parliament has passed the necessary legislation. The super tax on incomes takes the form of an additional income tax at the same rates as the existing tax—viz., 1s. per pound plus one two-thousandth of a penny on every pound of taxable income. It is levied on incomes over £2,500, subject to an abatement of £2,500, but the abatement diminishes at the rate of 10s. for every pound over £2,500. The tax on diamonds is something of a novelty, and not, perhaps, a very successful one. It has long been a popular idea that revenue could be raised by an export tax on diamonds, on the ground that they are an article of luxury, that South Africa almost holds a monopoly of production, and that an export tax on uncut diamonds would lead to the establishment in South Africa of a diamond-cutting industry. So far no tax of this nature has been imposed, partly, it may be, owing to serious fluctuations in the diamond market which have taken place in recent years, and partly owing to the fact that, under the diamond law of the Transvaal, the Government became interested to the extent of six-tenths of the net proceeds in the Premier Diamond Mine, which is one of the largest producers, but which, owing to its peculiar conditions, would probably be disproportionately handicapped by an export tax on uncut diamonds in comparison with other mines, such as De Beers. The tax now proposed is in form an export tax, but it is graduated on a scale from one-half per cent. up to five per cent. on the value of the diamonds according to the ratio of profit to total yield of the mine from which the diamonds were produced. The tax in consequence, although in form an export tax, is, in reality, a sort of profits tax, and under present conditions it will in practice only affect the De Beers mines.

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It will be seen, therefore, that the Finance Minister has not not been able in his Budget for 1916-17 to free himself entirely from those financial "expedients" by which an apparent equilibrium was sought to be introduced in the Budget of the preceding year. The country in fact is not paying its way, in the sense of meeting its annual expenditure from annual revenue. Nor is this state of affairs due to a temporary inflation of expenditure for war purposes. On the contrary, the whole of the war expenditure except the interest on money borrowed for war purposes has been and is being defrayed from loan. A contribution has indeed been taken from revenue equal, more or less nearly, to the estimated expenditure on defence purposes in normal times. This contribution for 1916-17 is put down at £1,300,000, and that must be regarded as a moderate estimate.

B. The Loan Account

We may pass now to consider the loan account. At the beginning of the financial year 1915-16 the debt of the Union amounted to £138,210,000. The expenditure on loan account during that year, after allowing for a reduction of debt amounting to £405,000, brought the total indebtedness to £150,805,000, and there was a debit balance on loan account of £874,000. For 1916-17 loan expenditure is estimated at £5,943,000, of which £3,225,000 is allocated for war expenditure, £1,250,000 for railway construction, and the rest for irrigation and various public works. To finance this expenditure it is proposed that about £6,000,000 should be borrowed from the Imperial Government in respect of war expenditure, past and current, and the balance raised by local borrowings.

The total expenditure on war purposes, actual and estimated, from August, 1914, up to March 31, 1917, is put at £26,693,000. This includes expenditure on the expedition to German South-West Africa, the garrisoning

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and administration of the conquered territory, the cost of equipping contingents from the Union to German East Africa and bringing up the pay of the men belonging to these contingents from Imperial rates to Defence Force rates ; on internment camps ; and, last but not least, on the suppression of the rebellion in the Union. Of this total of £26,693,000 it is estimated that about £1,500,000 will come back to the Exchequer in the form of recoveries from sales of animals, equipment, etc. In the meantime it has been financed to the extent of £23,454,000 from loan account, and £3,239,000 from revenue.

No doubt these figures in respect of war expenditure appear small in comparison with the enormous burdens undertaken by Australia and Canada. Before making any comparison, however, between South Africa and other Dominions, in regard to their share of the burdens of the war, the exceptional circumstances of this country must never be lost sight of. In the first place the European population of South Africa is a comparatively small one, in the midst of a native population five times as great. Secondly, that white population has not been able to regard the war and the cause for which the Empire is fighting with the same single-mindedness as is exhibited in Australia and Canada. It is needless to go back over the events of the past, which may be regarded as accounting for this particular condition of things, but it is not too much to say that the attitude towards the cause of the Allies of a considerable section of the European population has been at best one of neutrality. This found expression in the attitude of the Nationalist members of Parliament during the recent session, which was one of unfailing hostility towards any proposal of assisting the Empire either with men or money on the ground that the war does not concern South Africa. Having regard to past events, more especially those of comparative recent history, out of which this attitude has grown, and considering also that, shortly after the war began, a large number of the European population

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went into rebellion against the Government and had to be suppressed by armed force, those who may be interested in comparing what has been done in South Africa with the contributions of other Dominions, will do well to remember that South Africa's contribution cannot fairly be measured solely by the expenditure incurred by her for war purposes or by the numbers of men sent to the battlefields of Europe. They must also take account of the statesmanship which has brought the country through a period of great political difficulty, of racial division, and of actual armed rebellion.

The figures given above in respect of the revenue and expenditure do not include the revenue and expenditure of the railways. Under the Act of Union the Railway Administration has a separate exchequer. The railway revenues are used solely for railway purposes and are not available in any way towards the general expenditure of the Government. For the current year the estimated expenditure of the Railway Administration, after providing a war bonus for the staff, is put at £15,066,000. To meet this it is estimated that the working for the year would produce a revenue of £15,024,000. No increase has been made on the freight tariffs existing before the war, except that the freight on coal from the collieries to the ports for bunkering purposes has been raised so as to produce an estimated increase of £500,000. The Administration, therefore, has an estimated deficit on the current year's working of £42,000, but it should be added that the estimates of expenditure provide only for a contribution of £750,000 for depreciation of permanent way, plant and rolling stock. Opinions differ considerably as to what an adequate contribution from annual revenue for depreciation would be, and it seems impossible to arrive at any scientific determination. According to the best available evidence, however, it is probable that an amount of from £1,200,000 to £1,400,000 would be adequate, and, on these figures, it is clear that the railway budget for the current year falls materially short in regard to this item.

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The total debt of the Union is, as has been said, upwards of £150,000,000 in round figures. Against this, however, must be taken into account the asset which the State possesses in the railways and harbours of the Union. The capital account of the railways and harbours stands at the present time at slightly over £100,000,000. Of this approximately £85,000,000 is included in the public debt of the Union and the balance represents contributions from revenue both before and after union. The actual indebtedness of the Union, therefore, although apparently large if measured per head of the European population, as is sometimes done, is by no means a serious burden if we look to the assets which it represents and to the undeveloped wealth of the country. At the same time the policy of swelling the national debt by unproductive expenditure, as has been done during the war period, is one which only circumstances of extreme financial difficulty can excuse.

South Africa. July, 1916.

NEW ZEALAND

I. THE PEOPLE AND THE WAR

IN the March number of THE ROUND TABLE reference was made to the prosperity of New Zealand and the difficulty a stranger would have in realising that these islands are part of an empire engaged in a struggle for existence. The comments then made hold good to-day, notwithstanding the march of great events. The cost of living has undoubtedly increased, and the householder grumbles accordingly, but amusements flourish as they did six months ago, and the demeanour of the people gives no outward indication of deep preoccupation in the waging of war, or serious consideration of the ultimate consequences. Certain occupations have, of course, suffered, and some trades have been hampered by the lack or delay of supplies from Great Britain, but the country as a whole continues to be prosperous and, except for the loss of so many men, cannot yet be said to have felt the pinch of war. Races and picture shows still draw their accustomed crowds, and it is hardly a matter for wonder that people of a more serious cast occasionally express the opinion that a few bombs dropped in New Zealand would have more than a merely destructive effect.

Yet, on the other hand, we are spending, roughly, a million a month on the war; we have sent nearly 50,000 men to service overseas, and we have some 10,000 in camp in New Zealand. There is not the slightest wavering in

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our determination to keep our reinforcements up, and if need be we will increase them. Everybody readily admits that the war is far from being over, and that, before it is, a huge proportion of our manhood, whether married or single, will have left New Zealand upon active service. As proof of our sincerity the third reading in the popular house of a Bill to introduce compulsory service has been carried by more than ten to one, and at least an equal majority of our citizens is rejoicing at the adoption of a measure the principle of which is heartily approved, however much we may differ as to details. If it be true that we take our pleasures sadly we certainly take our burdens lightly. The man in the street and in the clubs is almost invariably optimistic, inclined to undue elation at incidental successes, and to put the best construction on any reverses.

It must be admitted that the people have not paid much heed to warnings to economise. Except that public subscription lists have made some slight temporary inroads upon the income of the average man, and that social functions have almost entirely ceased, the life of the people goes on very nearly as usual. In justification it may be pointed out that, so far as men are concerned, there is little outlet for patriotic enthusiasm except through the gateway of the recruiting station, and while we have not yet curtailed our personal comforts in life we, as a taxpaying body, are keen upon liberal treatment to our soldiers and liberal contributions to anything which will assist the empire's cause. More than one Minister of the Crown has been startled by the insistence of all classes upon the necessity for increased taxation in order to enable greater liberality on the part of the Government. The women of the Dominion have responded finely to the call for women's work.

Those administering the various patriotic funds, which have reached a very considerable figure,* have done valuable

* In his Financial Statement delivered on June 16 Sir Joseph Ward speaks as follows of the War Relief Funds :

"Extremely valuable gifts in money and in kind for various relief purposes in connection with the war have been contributed during the past financial

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work both in granting the temporary relief required before the slower wheels of Government machinery can be moved, and in supplementing in some cases the provision made by the State for wounded soldiers and those dependent upon men who have fallen. There is, however, a commendable desire on the part of the public to see a greater liberality displayed by the State, although it is recognised that this means increased taxation. Proposals to put returned men upon the land meet with very general approval, and the Government has already purchased several areas for this purpose, while other purchases will doubtless follow.

The visit of Sir Rider Haggard to New Zealand, although his mission is connected rather with provision for emigrants from Great Britain after the war than with the question of assisting our own soldiers, cannot fail to stimulate activity in this direction. In a recent interview he made some timely observations which will call attention to the importance of the matter upon broader grounds than the mere duty of helping the wounded. After referring to the reasonable anticipation that after the war there would be a wave of emigration from Great Britain, he said :

It should be quite clear to anyone who will think that the time will come, and soon, when that wave must be directed. What we are anxious to see is that the men who leave Great Britain will be bound by the shores of the British Empire and remain somewhere within the shadow of the British flag, and not settle in the United States and Argentine or some other foreign country. We know that after the Boer War an enormous number went to the United States. The empire cannot afford to lose these people, and it is a very evil state of affairs for us. We have rich lands lying idle and it is absolutely unnecessary that we should lose them.

year. The monetary gifts received by the Government, almost entirely for purposes outside New Zealand, amounted to £340,335. . . . Returns sent in by the various patriotic societies show that up to December 31, 1915, the sum of £1,588,280 had been raised by them, of which over £980,890 was then in hand ; but the funds of a number of societies have been considerably augmented since then, and it is estimated that the total funds now in the hands of patriotic organisations amount approximately to £1,250,000."

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I have stressed what I may call the appalling problem of our empire—an empire that covers a quarter of the globe, with so great a population of coloured races and an inadequate white population. See our danger should that population decrease, and if you think there is no danger of that, study the birth-rate. No expense is too great and no thought too high to give to the crux of the whole problem, which is how to retain within the empire our own citizens. The end of the war will not shut off the dangers to which the empire has been exposed, and will remain exposed. Defeated nations are not always crushed, and if the British Empire goes to sleep again after the victory she may find herself in a very different position when she is roused—she might find herself face to face with red death.

This is curiously like Froude's appeals in 1870,* with the difference that while Froude appealed to England alone, Sir Rider Haggard is addressing himself to a self-governing Dominion, though upon Imperial grounds.

Speaking of substantially the same remarks made by Sir Rider Haggard on another occasion, the *Auckland Star* said :

There is a great deal of sound common sense in what Sir Rider Haggard says. We are going to crush the military power of Germany, but we cannot crush the German people. A great people like the Germans cannot be removed from the list of nations. But Germany will not be our only rival in the world. New times may bring new enemies. We will have to maintain armies and navies and develop our resources in the wisest way. The material progress and strength necessary for safety depend on man-power, and the empire must see that that power is conserved by every possible means. Emigration to places beyond the empire must be vigorously discouraged. Britain has been sadly indifferent in this respect. Until a few years ago the Emigrants' Information Office in London, which is under the Colonial Office, actually gave as much encouragement to would-be emigrants to go to the United States as to go to British Dominions ; that is to say, it issued information quite impartially about America and the Colonies. This extraordinary policy, which must have cost the British Empire hundreds of thousands of citizens, has been altered, and the vigorous immigration policy of the Dominions has caused a considerable decrease in the number of British people seeking their fortunes in the United

* "England and Her Colonies" and "The Colonies Once More," reprinted in Vol. II. of *Short Studies on Great Subjects*.

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States. The net balance of outward over inward passengers of British nationality to the United States, which roughly represents the number of emigrants, was 52,000 in 1913, a decrease of about 50,000 from the figures for 1907. The net balance outward to all British possessions was 77 per cent. of the total. This percentage must be increased. We have shown that owing to the needs of Britain the emigration question is not so simple as it looks, but the point to be emphasised now is that men and women desirous of a change must be kept within the empire.

The attitude of the Government on the question was indicated by the Prime Minister in a recent speech in Parliament, when he stated that he had told Sir Rider Haggard that, although the wants of our own must come first, any help we could give to his scheme would be forthcoming. New Zealand, he said, would welcome any soldiers or sailors after the war, and he had assured Sir Rider Haggard that preference would be given to such soldiers and sailors and their families over any other persons who desired assisted passages to New Zealand.

II. PARLIAMENT—COMPULSORY SERVICE

THE most important news emanating from New Zealand since the last letter was written is that the country is definitely committed to the application of compulsion if the existing system proves insufficient to fulfil our commitments in the matter of reinforcements. For a long time the principle of compulsory national service has been growing in popular favour; public opinion, indeed, has on this point kept well in advance both of the Press and the politicians. Newspapers and members of Parliament alike, with a very few exceptions, have been most diplomatic and cautious, contenting themselves with general statements as to the possible necessity for compulsion if the voluntary system failed, and carefully avoiding any definite advocacy of the immediate introduction of conscription. How far this timidity on the part of re-

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sponsible politicians was due to a desire to see how public opinion would go, and how far to a certainty that public opinion would come round in time, and that it was unwise to appear to force the adoption of conscription too soon, is a delicate question which it is unnecessary to discuss here. The essential fact remains that we are now definitely committed to a measure which will ensure that our whole strength is available for the prosecution of the war.

The voluntary system has done well in New Zealand. This must be admitted, even by those who hold, with Mr. Oliver, that the voluntary system is neither voluntary nor yet a system. Under it some 60,000 men have been raised for service overseas. For a long time past our reinforcements have stood at 2,500 a month, and although at times big efforts have been required to send away the monthly contingent at full strength, there has been no serious difficulty down to the present on this score. As time has gone on, however, the faults of the present system have become apparent, and under the stress of a serious struggle for existence we have realised that no considerations can properly weigh against the prime necessity of efficiency. In the first few months of the war it was, in many, though not all, cases, an adventurous spirit jumping at the prospect of a soldier's life which prompted young men to enlist, but for many months past men in large numbers have gone from a pure sense of duty, giving up position, emoluments and ease, because they felt the inward call to go. And when one recollects that the vast majority of these men have never been outside New Zealand, and that our national development has been along lines which have diverted the attention, especially of artisans, labourers, and wage earners generally, to questions of immediate material import, it is a matter of pride that so many have been inspired by the wider views and seen or felt their imperial duty. But in a struggle like the present one the enormous effort required of every part of the commonwealth makes clear the unfairness and inefficiency

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of the voluntary system. In a small country like this, far removed from the conflict, and concentrating only on the task of sending a monthly quota of men and attending to the wounded who come back to us, the unfairness is seen perhaps more clearly and at an earlier stage than where other collateral problems—munitions, shipbuilding, the supply of vital necessities—confront the people, and absorb a large part of their energies.

Be this as it may, conscription has long had a numerous and steadily increasing body of supporters in New Zealand, and there is little reason to doubt that if, as far back as last November, a referendum had been taken on the broad question there would have been a large majority in favour of compulsory service. The public, however, is inarticulate. No leader of any prominence arose, and it was left to the gradual growth of individual opinion, finding expression in conversations and occasional meetings of societies, to convince the Government that it was time it took some step. Events shaped much as they did in England, and no doubt our course of action was very largely influenced by what happened there. Instead of Lord Derby's scheme we had a desperate attempt by the Recruiting Board to stir up eligible single men to enlist. Local bodies were pressed into the service and a personal canvass by them implored. For one thing it was hoped that recruiting would thereby be stimulated, for another that the returns made under the National Registration Act would be checked, revised, and brought up to date. Different methods were adopted by the various local bodies, and the results were as satisfactory as could be expected. Undoubtedly recruiting was stimulated, and some revision of the national registration returns effected. Ministers throughout emphasised the fact that if the voluntary system failed they would not hesitate to introduce compulsion: the only hesitation on their part seemed to be a hesitation to recognise that the voluntary system had ceased to be voluntary, that it could not with any certainty continue to

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give the required result, and that the country was ripe for a change. Gradually, however, the pressure of facts and public opinion grew stronger. The decision was announced that Parliament would be called together earlier than usual in order to deal with measures in connection with the war, and a clear indication was given that some measure of compulsion would be submitted for consideration.

Parliament usually meets in the last week of June. This year it was convened for May 9. The Governor's speech on the opening day was notable for its brevity. After referring in a few words to the conduct of the New Zealand troops at the Dardanelles, and to the fact that when the withdrawal was ordered they, with the Governments and peoples of New Zealand and the Commonwealth, quietly and without demur acquiesced in and accepted the necessity of retirement from the battlefield where so much honour had been won, His Excellency simply informed members of the House of Representatives that they would be asked to make full provision for the prosecution of the war in addition to ordinary expenditure, and stated that Parliament would be invited to direct the whole of its energies to a consideration of measures which had direct relation to the war.

After about a fortnight's debate on the Address in Reply, the first measure was introduced—a War Pensions Amendment Bill, covering many matters which need not be enumerated or referred to here. The Minister found that his proposals were not sufficiently liberal to satisfy the House, and he had to add half-a-crown a week to the allowance (5s.) previously granted to soldiers' children. This was still not liberal enough for some members, but it was pointed out that the Government was merely laying the foundations of our pension legislation, and that later on, when it knew what the claims would be, Parliament might see its way to do better for pensioners. With this the House was forced to be content.

Then came the most important measure of the session—

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the Military Service Bill, concerning which there had been much curiosity and speculation. This is not the place for a detailed statement of its provisions, but the main features of the scheme can be sketched in a few words, and as it has now passed the Lower House with a few amendments, to be noted presently, it is convenient briefly to summarise its provisions here.

Stripped of technicalities and details of machinery, the Bill provided for the establishment of an Expeditionary Force Reserve, consisting of every male natural born British subject who is for the time being of military age—i.e. not less than 20 and under 46, and who is, or subsequently becomes, resident in New Zealand.

The only exemptions are :

(a) Members of the Expeditionary Force.

(b) Men discharged from that force after service overseas.

(c) Men undergoing imprisonment for not less than one year.

(d) Men in confinement as being of unsound mind.

The Reserve consists of two divisions. The first comprises :

(a) Unmarried men.

(b) Men married since August 4, 1914, unless they have children by a former marriage. (This date was amended in Committee to May 1, 1915.)

(c) Widowers with no children.

(d) Divorced husbands, or those judicially separated, having no children.

The second division includes all others, power being given to the Governor in Council to subdivide it into classes. No subdivision is attempted in the Bill. The first division of the Reserve may be enrolled by Proclamation by the Governor at any time after the passing of the Act. At any time after the first division has been enrolled the second division may be enrolled by means of a Proclamation approved in the Executive Council. The commandant, acting by direction of the Minister, shall call up

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such number of men as may be required, and the men who are to serve are selected by lot. These must report at the time and place specified, and become subject to military law as if they had voluntarily enlisted and taken the oath of allegiance. Special provision is, of course, made to cover the case of those who are medically unfit.

The fundamental penal section provides that if a man is found in New Zealand after the unit to which he is attached has left the Dominion for military service beyond the seas he is guilty of desertion and punishable accordingly. A Military Service Board or Boards are to be set up to consider appeals. No special occupations are exempted and no provision made for religious or conscientious objectors. The only grounds of appeal which may be urged by a man are:

- (a) that when called up he was not a member of the Reserve,
- (b) that he is a member of a division or class not called up,
- (c) that by reason of his occupation his calling-up is contrary to the public interest,
- (d) that by reason of his domestic circumstances or for any other reason his calling-up will cause undue hardship to himself or others.

As to (c) and (d) the Board must act in accordance with regulations (if any) which may be made. The system of voluntary enlistments continues until otherwise proclaimed, either generally for the Dominion or for any district or districts.

Very early in the debate on the second reading it became apparent that, although there were differences of opinion on matters of detail, the only opposition to the principle of the Bill came from the Labour members. Opposition from this quarter was known beforehand to be coming, for four of the six Labour members had attended a trade union meeting a day or so earlier, and only one had supported the principle of compulsion. This one member proved a staunch supporter of the Bill in the House.

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The Minister of Defence moved the second reading in a short and able speech, in the course of which he made the candid admission that in his own personal judgment the most just, the most democratic, the most scientific, and the surest way of securing the necessary men would have been compulsory national service right from the start. A definite test of the opinion of the House was made at an early stage of the debate, when a Labour member moved that the Bill be read a second time that day three months. This amendment was lost by 54 to 5. Those who opposed the measure did so mainly upon the ground that if better provision was made for soldiers the voluntary system would fill all requirements—that the trouble was merely that many men fit and ready were financially unfit to go. One member, in an interview prior to the debate in the House, put it tersely that the choice lay between conscripting a man at 5s. a day, or conscripting another 30s. a week from some other patriot who might not be able to go to the front. These views were vigorously pressed, but the opposition proved quite unavailing, and the second reading was carried by 49 to 5.

The Bill was well and diplomatically handled in Committee by the Minister. The only important amendment was that men who had married after the outbreak of war but before May 1, 1915, were removed from the first division. It was felt that to include men who had married before the call to service was unmistakable was too drastic a provision. An attempt to secure a general exemption for Quakers failed, but according to recent reports opinion on this point has undergone some change, and if an opportunity for reconsideration occurs the voting may go the other way. A hopeless stone wall was attempted by the Labour minority, but the only result was a wearisome waste of time. After the Bill had been dealt with in Committee it was read a third time in the small hours of June 10, and the announcement of the division (44 to 4) was followed by the singing of the National Anthem. The Bill has still

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to pass the Upper House, but there is no possibility of its being rejected there.

The immediate effect of the introduction of the measure was an increase in the number of recruits. Many single men—including, no doubt, a number who had had good reasons for deferring enlistment—came forward rather than wait to be conscripted, and this effect will probably continue for some time. The Prime Minister, indeed, appears to think that compulsion will not have to be applied; that with the measure in reserve upon the Statute Book ready to be brought into operation by a proclamation, a sufficient number of men will be forthcoming to keep up our supply of reinforcements. This, however, is not a matter of great practical importance—our reinforcements will be kept up, if not by voluntary enlistment, then by lot under the provisions of the Act. It may be mentioned here that calculations based upon the registration returns, and allowing for the number of young men who will be reaching military age each year, there will be no necessity to draw upon married men for the next twelve months at the least.

There are still many important matters to be dealt with by Parliament, and it has been resolved that for the remainder of the session Government measures shall take precedence of all other business excepting local and private Bills. At the moment of writing a War Regulations Amendment Bill is before the House. This is of some interest because it contains the Ministerial proposals with regard to the sale of liquor during war time, a subject which is bound to arouse a vigorous discussion. The Bill authorises the Governor-in-Council to make regulations governing the sale of intoxicating liquors to women and for the suppression or control of the practice of "treating." These provisions are sure to meet with strong support, except that some members will prefer that treating should be suppressed by direct legislation instead of being left to regulations, but in the opinion of many the Bill does

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not go far enough and should make provision for early closing of hotels in war-time. In this connection there has arisen a vigorous movement in favour of six o'clock closing, and a petition containing 100,000 signatures has been presented to Parliament praying that legislation should be passed accordingly. This petition is now being considered by a Committee, the report of which is not likely to be ready for some time.

The general opinion is that while there is little chance of Parliament being in favour of six o'clock closing, there is quite a possibility of the closing hour being fixed at eight or nine o'clock. In any case, there is no likelihood of the Australian precedent of a referendum upon the subject being followed. A course which may be adopted is to leave the closing hour as it is—viz., ten o'clock—but to give wide powers to close at any hours such hotels in the vicinity of military camps as may be considered inimical to the interests of soldiers. The Attorney-General, in replying to remarks made on the introduction of the Bill, made it clear that he himself (and he was probably speaking for the Cabinet) was opposed to six o'clock closing.

New Zealand. June, 1916.



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
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